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This report falls into three main sections, in accordance with the project brief (See Appendix 1).  The 
first provides an overview of current pay arrangements and collective enterprise bargaining 
agreements for teachers in Australian schools.  Within these arrangements, the report gives particular 
attention to provisions for performance-based pay schemes and to identifying potential impediments 
to the introduction of performance-based pay for teachers.   
 
The second part of the brief called for an overview of recent Australian and international research on 
the attitudes of stakeholders to performance-based pay schemes for teachers and the impact of these 
schemes on, for example, teacher retention, improved teaching standards, improved student outcomes 
and recognition of accomplished teachers. 
 
The third part of the brief asked for gaps in the Australian and international evidence base on 
performance pay to be identified and for suggestions about further research that would be valuable in 
assessing the value and/or acceptance of performance-based pay for teachers in the Australian 
context. 
 
This report focuses on published research about performance pay.  There have been many examples 
of performance-related pay schemes over the past one hundred years or so, especially in the USA.  
More recently, many more are being encouraged by President Bush’s US$500 million Teacher 
Incentive Fund for states and school districts that choose to introduce merit pay schemes.  The 
Teacher Incentive Fund will provide a $5,000 award to approximately 100,000 teachers across the 
country.  Many more schemes have appeared in recent years in other countries as well, such as 
England, Sweden and Singapore.  While many of these schemes have received considerable publicity, 
such as the Special Teachers are Rewarded (STAR) scheme initiated by the Florida Department of 
Education, this report will only give detailed attention to schemes that have been subject to systematic 
research. 
 
This report does not review in detail the advantages and disadvantages of particular methods of 
gathering evidence about teacher performance, such as student evaluations, classroom observations or 
measures of student achievement and many more.  Although these considerations are clearly 
important, they are not the focus of this report.  However, there is general agreement among experts in 
teacher evaluation that a valid and reliable scheme for assessing teacher performance for high stakes1 
                                                     
1 The term “high stakes” refers to decisions that lead, for example, to significant financial rewards, promotion, 
access to further career stages as well as registration and certification by professional bodies.  In contrast, 
evaluations of teacher performance for professional development or improvement purposes alone are regarded 
here as  “low stakes”. 
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decisions must draw on several types of evidence (Joint Committee on Standards for Educational 
Evaluation, 1988; Shulman, 1988; Scriven 1994; Pearlman, 2000; Stronge, 1997).  This is because 
such schemes need to encompass the full scope of what a teacher is expected to know and be able to 
do, not only to ensure their professional credibility, but increasingly, their legal defensibility.   
 
Teaching standards are increasingly used to describe the full scope of what teachers are expected to 
know and be able to do.  A set of standards typically includes a wide range of elements such as 
“creating productive learning environment”, “knowledge of content”, “promoting student learning” 
and “contribution to school and professional community”, among others.  Assessment of a teacher’s 
performance against each of these standards for high stakes decisions calls for very different types, as 
well as multiple forms, of evidence.  To illustrate, student evaluation instruments (and parent 
feedback) can provide reliable measures of class environment.  Paper and pencil tests are a valid 
means of gathering evidence about the currency of a teacher’s content and pedagogical knowledge.  
Direct evidence that students are learning what the teacher is expected to teach is also essential.  
Contribution to school and professional community requires documentation of activities and 
outcomes, verified by colleagues and principals. 
 
A valid and reliable scheme for assessing individual teacher performance for high stakes decisions 
therefore requires multiple, independent sources of evidence and multiple, independent trained 
assessors of that evidence.  This means that any single measure, such as measures of student 
achievement on standardised achievement tests cannot alone provide a reliable basis for making 
performance-related pay decisions about the efforts of individual teachers.  Performance pay schemes 
also need to include evidence about the context in which a teacher is teaching in making judgements 
about the quality of teaching (Fenstermacher & Richardson, 2005). 
 
There is an increasing desire among all stakeholders in Australia to develop policies for “revitalising” 
the teaching profession (DEST, 2003).  This includes pay systems that are more effective in giving 
incentives for highly accomplished teaching, for keeping excellent teachers working in classrooms 
and for providing professional leadership to colleagues.  There is increasing recognition, nationally 
and internationally, that career paths and pay systems can be, and need to be, linked to evidence of 
increasing capacity to promote valued student learning outcomes and, thereby, stronger levers for 
ensuring professional development and quality learning outcomes for all students (Sclafani & Tucker, 
2006; OECD, 2005).  Representatives of eight countries, including Australia, recently attended an 
international seminar on Teaching Policy to Improve Student Learning convened by the Aspen 
Institute.  Australia stood out as a country where teachers’ careers plateau very quickly and at a 
relatively modest salary.  A report summarising the conference proceedings (Olson, 2007) concluded: 
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Each of the nations participating was seeking ways to recognise expert teachers, reward 
them for their abilities, and take advantage of their skills.  Creating a stronger connection 
between individual teacher contributions and what they are paid lies at the heart of 
redesigning teaching for the next generation. (p. 5) 
 
Pay arrangements for teachers in Australia under current awards and agreements  
 
The guiding question in this section of the report is, “To what extent is teachers’ pay based on the 
quality of their professional performance within current Awards or Agreements?”  Attention focuses 
first on the relationship between teaching performance and teachers’ pay progression along the 
incremental scale.   The second part of this section focuses on the extent to which current awards and 
agreements provide career pathways for teachers beyond the incremental scale, based primarily on 
rigorous evidence of their teaching performance. 
 
The Incremental Scale 
 
Almost all teachers work within negotiated industrial awards and collective agreements between 
unions and employers.  In common with most OECD countries, the majority of Australian teachers 
begin their careers on an incremental scale along which they move one step each year to a higher 
salary level.  Scales usually include from 8 to 10 steps.  Progression to the top of the ladder is rapid in 
Australia - it takes only 9 years on average for most Australian teachers to reach the top of the scale 
compared with 24 years on the average for teachers in OECD countries.  The 2006 edition of the 
OECD’s report, Education at a Glance, indicates that whereas the average ratio of the salary at the top 
of the incremental scale to the starting salary is 1.70, it is only 1.47 in Australia.   
 
The typical requirement to progress through the incremental scales in most school systems is 
satisfactory completion of an annual performance review with a ‘supervisor’, such as a head of 
department or principal.  Each of the state and territory departments of education has produced 
comprehensive documents that set out how to conduct annual performance management processes 
schools.  According to recommended procedures, performance appraisals are to be conducted by the 
principal or supervisor.  These evaluations usually focus on the extent to which teachers are fulfilling 
their contractual duties, rather than the extent to which they are progressing toward higher standards 
of professional knowledge and performance.   
 
School systems, such as Victoria, SA and WA, are increasingly using sets of generic teaching 
standards as a framework for annual performance management reviews.  These standards have often 
been developed by registration agencies, such as the Victorian Institute of Teaching.  Anecdotal 
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evidence from key informants for this study indicates that there is considerable variation from school 
to school in terms of the rigour with which these annual performance reviews are implemented.  More 
systematic surveys are needed here, but teachers, principals and system administrators contacted in 
the course of this study pointed out that, although annual reviews are increasingly accompanied by 
independently gathered data about teacher performance, such as student evaluations, observations of 
classrooms and student progress, it is rare for increments to be withheld.  Some states and territories, 
such as Victoria and the Northern Territory, provide for accelerated progression up the scale based on 
classroom performance evidence, but this is also rare.    
 
In non-government systemic and most independent schools, the basis for determining progression 
through the incremental scale is similar to progression in the government systems.  As in government 
schools, available evidence suggests that it would be rare for a principal to withhold an increment 
from a teacher, although some non-government independent schools employ teachers under contracts 
in which there is a “subject to satisfactory performance” provision.  Almost all Agreements also 
provide for the denial of an annual increment if a teacher does not have a satisfactory annual 
appraisal.   
 
All Awards and Agreements have guidelines and procedures in place to address unsatisfactory 
performance.  These may include a pathway offering support and guidance to teachers who are 
performing below the expected level, but will also include formal discipline and/or dismissal 
procedures in cases where programmed support has not been successful in bringing a teacher to an 
acceptable level of competence, or in cases of serious misconduct.  Once again, it is difficult to find 
systematically gathered evidence about underperforming teachers in most school systems.  However, 
reports such as the recent NSW Auditor General’s report (2003) indicate that the numbers of teachers 
who are dismissed or deregistered each year for poor performance is small.   
 
In summary, it would be stretching the concept to call the incremental pay scale, in its current form in 
most states and territories, “performance-based pay.”  Evidence of performance, in relation to 
teaching standards for example, is rarely gathered in systematic ways.  Recent US research suggests 
an incremental scale based mainly on years of experience over the first five to ten years or so may be 
warranted, provided a rigorous registration system is in place and teachers are fulfilling their 
contractual duties satisfactorily (Clotfelter, et al., 2007).  This research indicates that Australia lacks: 
(1) a rigorous performance-based assessment at the point of  registration and entry to the profession 
(Gordon, Kane and Staiger, 2006); and (2) a rigorous advanced certification system that provides 
teachers with clear direction as to what they should get better at over those ten years or so, and strong 
incentives for all teachers to reach those standards.   
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Promotion positions for classroom teachers beyond the incremental scales 
 
The guiding question here is the extent to which preparation for promotion beyond the top of the 
salary scale provides strong incentives to demonstrate attainment of high standards of professional 
performance and contributions to the professional community.   
 
As the average age of Australian teachers is around 452, most teachers have been sitting at the top of 
the incremental scale for at least ten years.  The number of promotion positions beyond the top of the 
incremental scale in each school is strictly limited, meaning many experienced teachers are unable to 
access higher salary levels, regardless of their teaching performance.  In the recent Education at a 
Glance (OECD 2006), 13 out of 32 OECD countries reported that they adjusted the base salary of 
teachers according to evidence of outstanding performance in teaching or successful completion of 
professional development activities.  Australia was not one of them. 
 
In reviewing current arrangements for career progression, three approaches to paying teachers beyond 
the top of the incremental scale were identified:  
 
1. paying for jobs (e.g. executive or managerial positions);  
2. paying for evidence of increased knowledge and skills; and  
3. bonus pay or merit pay schemes for individual performance.   
 
The main career pathway for Australian teachers beyond the top of the incremental scale is through 
application for jobs or positions with specific responsibilities, such as head of a subject area, or 
coordinator of curriculum or professional development.  As the number of promotion positions of this 
type is limited, the application process is necessarily competitive. 
 
The second and third approaches are much less common.  Only three state and territory education 
departments have developed classifications that carry higher pay for teachers based primarily on 
systematically gathered first-hand evidence of “accomplished” teaching performance.  These include 
the Level 3 Classroom teacher position in WA, the Advanced Skills Teacher in SA and the Teacher of 
Exemplary Practice (TEP) position in the NT.  While the WA and NT schemes provide a substantial 
pay rise of around 10 per cent, the SA AST scheme provides a small increase in pay.  The Association 
of Independent Schools in NSW is introducing in 2007 a “performance-based remuneration system” 
based on evidence of attaining increasing levels of knowledge and skills, as defined by standards 
developed by the NSW Institute of Teachers (Newcombe, 2006).  The AISNSW has set up the 
                                                     
2 The National Survey of Teachers (MCEETYA, 2002) found that 51.5% of teachers were 45 years of age or 
over.  
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“Independent Schools Teacher Accreditation Authority” to develop procedures whereby evidence will 
be gathered to assess a teacher’s performance against the standards. 
 
The new classifications in WA, SA and the NT are not linked directly to advertised executive 
positions in specific schools.  Rather, teachers usually gain these portable classifications as a result of 
applying to a central agency for an assessment of their performance.  Teachers do not have to be at the 
top of the salary scale to apply for these positions.  Methods of assessment usually rely on a range of 
evidence about performance gathered together in a portfolio.  South Australia is noteworthy for 
including evidence gained from classroom observations by observers trained to use teaching 
standards.   
 
Little information is available about the psychometric quality of the methods used to assess teacher 
performance in these schemes, or the methods used to determine the required level of performance in 
relation to the standards.  Teacher evaluation is a relatively embryonic field in Australia.  Those 
involved in these schemes recognise that there is further room for development to ensure their validity 
and reliability.  A quota is used in the case of the WA Level 3 Classroom teacher position, which 
contradicts the concept of standards-based performance assessment.  However, Level 3 teachers who 
run the assessment process reported that the number of successful applicants so far has never 
exceeded the quota.   
 
There is also little research evidence yet about the impact of these schemes on teachers’ attitudes to 
performance pay, or their impact on professional development, practice, staff relationships, leadership 
and retention.  While the impact that these teachers have on their students is likely to be significant, 
the impact that these schemes have in a wider sense across schools and school systems is probably 
small as the numbers of teachers in these positions is quite small.  A challenge for those responsible 
for these schemes is to find ways to capitalise on the expertise these teachers have through the 
creation of new roles and career paths for them as leaders in the improvement of teaching. 
 
Case studies conducted for this report indicate that a variety of above-the-Award and performance pay 
schemes is in operation in independent schools.  These include the schemes outlined above, though 
annual bonus pay schemes based on the quality of classroom teaching are rare.  As with government 
schools, the majority of these schemes fall into the category of extra pay in recognition of extra work 
and responsibilities, rather than extra pay for evidence of improved performance in relation to 
teaching standards.  The AISNSW plan to provide a system for certifying teachers who attain higher 
levels of professional standards is a significant initiative.  Schools can use this certification to provide 
more attractive performance-based career paths for accomplished teachers.  This is an example of a 
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performance pay scheme based on evidence of increased knowledge and skill, on which it will be 
valuable to conduct research.   
 
To what extent do current arrangements impede, limit or prevent the introduction of 
performance-based pay arrangements for teachers? 
 
The overview indicates that there is nothing inherent in current processes for determining industrial 
awards and enterprise agreements that prevents the introduction of performance-based pay 
arrangements for teachers.  Although they are limited in scope, the existence of the three current 
schemes for offering promotion positions based on classroom performance demonstrates this.  These 
three schemes were developed as part of negotiations for current industrial awards and enterprise 
agreements.  They also owe their origins to the Advanced Skills Teacher (AST) concept, which was 
promoted by the teacher unions and employing authorities as part of the Award Restructuring reforms 
in the early 1990s.  Although the concept was consistent with the idea of building stronger links 
between teachers’ salaries and evidence of improved performance, implementation of the scheme was 
not.   
 
Since the AST experience, understanding of what is involved in developing credible methods for 
assessing teacher performance has grown considerably.  The development of professional standards 
has been strongly supported by all stakeholders in Australia (DEST, 2003).  The standards developed 
recently by subject associations for English, mathematics and science teachers are much more 
sophisticated than earlier sets of generic standards developed for the AST position.  A clear 
impression emerges from surveying current initiatives and major stakeholders that there is a strong 
desire to provide greater recognition to teachers who can show evidence of attaining high standards of 
professional performance.  All stakeholders recognise they have a mutual interest in promoting 
quality teaching through rewarding evidence of enhanced knowledge and skill.  
 
This desire currently manifests itself, however, in a wide range of different schemes that vary in 
quality from school to school and from school system to school system.  There is no system, as there 
is in other professions, whereby the profession provides a credible certification service to the public 
and employers that members have reached a certain level of performance.  There is no consistent 
pattern to the definition of highly accomplished teaching or methods for assessing performance.  
There are, however, some promising examples of embryonic certification systems developed by 
mathematics and science teachers, as summarised in a recent report prepared for Teaching Australia 
(Ingvarson & Kleinhenz, 2006a).  With some refinements, these systems could become operational 
within a short period. 
 
 12 
The case studies of performance pay arrangements in independent schools show this varied character 
clearly.  Like so many independent schools, each of these schools is attempting to develop career 
pathways for highly accomplished teachers and teacher leaders.  However, they find it difficult to 
develop, on their own, credible systems for standards-based performance.  Nor can their systems 
provide, or lead to, a portable certification with profession-wide respect and currency.  Developing 
valid teacher evaluation systems is complex work.  In other professions, national bodies usually set 
standards and conduct assessments for professional certification.  Their performance assessments 
thereby provide a valuable independent service, both to employers and individual professionals. 
 
What characterises current arrangements in education, compared with most professions, is equivalent 
to every business developing its own CPA system for accountants, or each hospital administration 
developing its own certification system for doctors who reach high standards in their field of 
medicine, or each engineering firm creating its own ‘Chartered Engineer’ standards.  Unlike these 
professions, teaching as a profession lacks its own system for providing an independent, authoritative 
performance assessment service to schools and school systems seeking to provide incentives to 
teachers to attain high standards of professional performance and retain those that do.   Without such a 
system, it is difficult to create a strong and credible market for highly accomplished teachers. 
 
This review suggests that the type of industrial or workplace relations system is not the deciding 
factor in developing viable schemes for linking teacher pay and career paths more closely to 
performance.  There is evidence that some of the most viable teacher evaluation systems in the USA 
have been initiated by teachers’ organizations (Kerchner & Koppich, 1993).  The Teacher Union 
Reform Network is a group of 21 major school districts and union leaders who are creating new 
models of teacher ‘compensation’ that have stronger links to improvements in student learning 
outcomes.  The models include school-based performance award programs, National Board 
Certification and knowledge- and skills-based pay systems. 
 
Rather than impediments to performance-based pay schemes, what appears to be lacking is the 
courage to create financially rewarding career paths based on increasing ability to teach well and 
promote valued student learning outcomes.  Creating such career paths requires changing the way 
teachers’ work is organized in schools and creating more differentiated roles for expert teachers in 
supporting school improvement. Current salary scales and career paths send a strong message that the 
most important thing for an ambitious teacher to be doing is preparing to move out of teaching into 
school executive positions.  The incremental pay system says, in effect, that teachers are worth more 
each year for about nine years.  After that nine or ten years it says, in effect, we do not expect you to 
get any better as a teacher (or, that there will not be differences in the effectiveness of individual 
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teachers).  There are few extrinsic incentives for teachers to show evidence of professional 
development and improved performance. 
 
What does recent research reveal about the impact of performance-based pay schemes 
for teachers? 
 
Performance-based pay schemes take a variety of forms and make use of different sources of 
evidence.  This makes it difficult to generalise about their impact.  One of the major distinctions 
between pay schemes lies in how they define what counts as ‘performance’.  Proponents of some 
schemes argue that standardised tests of student learning outcomes should be the main indicator of 
teacher performance.  Others argue that performance should focus more directly on evidence about 
what students are doing in classrooms as a result of conditions for learning established by teachers.  
As indicated earlier, a scheme that relies on one form of evidence is unlikely to be reliable.   
 
For the purposes of this report, performance-based pay schemes were classified into three main types: 
merit pay; knowledge and skills-based; and certification-based approaches.  Distinguishing features of 
each are identified in more detail in Section A of the report, but there are also features they have in 
common.  The report concentrates mainly on schemes that focus on indicators of an individual 
teacher’s performance in the classroom rather than their contribution to wider aspects of school 
functioning.  
 
Merit pay schemes  
 
The term ‘merit pay’ is still used in some quarters, but as used here refers mainly to the many 
schemes developed in the 1970s and 1980s in the USA.  Merit pay schemes in the past were usually 
developed within particular schools or employing authorities, and operated by school administrators.  
Typically, such schemes evaluated teachers against one another for a fixed pool of funds, usually 
delivered in the form of bonus payments.  They were not standards or criterion based.  The methods 
of gathering evidence were usually of doubtful validity and unreliable, such as classroom observation 
checklists or one-off tests of student achievement, often leading to staff dissatisfaction (Murnane & 
Cohen, 1986).    
 
It is worth including mention of these earlier schemes, both because there is a substantial body of 
research about their impact (e.g. Johnson, 1986; Murnane & Cohen, 1986), and because, despite this 
body of research, similar schemes still bob up today.  (See, for example, the Florida Special Teachers 
are Rewarded Scheme, which will distribute awards of at least 5 per cent of the base pay to the best 
performing 25 per cent of teachers within cooperating school districts.  “Performance” in this scheme 
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has to be based on measures of student achievement, but the precise nature of these measures is left to 
school districts to define.)  
 
Knowledge- and skills-based pay schemes 
 
Knowledge- and skills-based pay schemes come from a different tradition.  They have emerged in 
response to the ineffectiveness of traditional salary structures that focus rewards on additional course 
credits and university degrees rather than direct measures of knowledge and performance.  Proponents 
of knowledge- and skills-based pay schemes aim to provide a basis for reforming career structures 
(Odden & Kelley, 2002). 
 
The typical salary structure for teachers in the USA for example, unlike Australia, includes a 
substantial component based on accumulating further academic credits or qualifications.  Although 
these payments are well entrenched, research indicates that the investment has little impact on student 
learning outcomes.   
 
In knowledge- and skills-based pay schemes, pay increases are based on demonstrated improvements 
in the knowledge, skills and expertise needed to provide quality opportunities for student learning.  
Unlike merit pay schemes, knowledge and skills-based pay schemes are based on criterion- or 
standards-based approaches to the assessment of teacher performance.   
 
Knowledge- and skills-based pay schemes aim to ensure that the salary scale is a much stronger 
instrument for improving student outcomes than the traditional incremental scale.  These schemes aim 
to provide stronger incentives for professional development and reinforce the development of a 
workplace culture that values employee growth and development. 
 
The development of new methods for developing teaching standards and assessing teacher 
performance has greatly facilitated the development of knowledge- and skills-based approaches to 
teachers’ pay.  These new approaches may still include interviews, classroom observation and student 
evaluations, but they may also include portfolio entries containing videotape evidence and evidence of 
improved student knowledge and skills over time.  
 
These approaches invite teachers to provide the evidence that their teaching has met the standards, 
unlike old inspection methods.  Knowledge- and skills-based pay schemes usually distinguish several 
levels of teacher performance, from registered to highly accomplished teacher, reflecting increasing 





Professional certification is an endorsement by a professional body that a member of that profession 
has attained a specified standard of knowledge and skill.  It is usually voluntary.  The National Board 
for Professional Teaching Standards in the USA is perhaps the best-known example.  The NSW 
Institute of Teachers is an embryonic Australian example; Teaching Australia, potentially, could be 
another.  Professional certification can provide a basis for knowledge- and skills-based pay schemes 
in jurisdictions that accept its validity.  With professional certification, the professional body is 
responsible for developing standards and methods for assessing performance rather than a single 
employing authority.  The teachers’ role is to supply the evidence, within guidelines, that they 
promote quality learning in students. 
 
Attitudes to performance-based pay schemes 
 
So far as earlier merit pay schemes are concerned, their limitations are well documented (Johnson, 
1986; Odden & Kelley, 2002).  These schemes were often introduced with insufficient understanding 
of what was involved in developing fair and valid methods for teacher evaluation.  As a result, they 
often led to staff dissatisfaction and dissension (Murnane & Cohen, 1986).  Morrow (1992) studied 
performance-based pay plans in several states and districts in the USA and found that “there was no 
evidence in this study to support the position that it was pay-for-performance which improved student 
achievement” (p.285-286).  Incentives in themselves did not necessarily improve what teachers knew 
and could do, or lead them to teach more effectively.  Improved student learning outcomes were more 
likely to result from long-term, high quality professional learning promoted by knowledge- and skills-
based approaches to performance-based pay (Solmon, et al., 2007). 
 
Methods of assessing teacher performance have advanced considerably since the 1980s. Recent 
research (Heneman, et al. 2006; Urbanski & Erskine, 2000) indicates teachers are less sceptical about 
the possibility of fair, valid and useful performance assessments in knowledge and skills-based pay 
schemes.  They are most positive about the methods for assessing performance used in external 
certification processes such as those for the WA Level 3 classification (Ewing, 2001) and National 
Board Certification (NBPTS, http://www.nbpts.org/resources/research). 
 
Knowledge- and skills-based schemes represent a better ‘fit’ with professional communities (Louis, 
Kruse & Marks, 1996) and the needs of professional organisations that focus on evidence of service to 
clients. These organisations depend on people with the expertise to apply values and professional 
standards to often non-routine client needs and problems (Weick & McDaniel, 1989).  They also 
depend on the continuing development of expertise - and recognition that the development of 
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expertise in professions only begins with initial training.  In professional organisations, it is expected 
that the full expression of professional expertise will depend on experience and evolve over time.  
Most professions have some form of certification system that embodies this expectation and rewards 
attainment of higher levels of expertise.   
 
Several knowledge- and skills-based pay systems are reviewed in the main report.  Teachers view 
these new approaches to assessing their performance as more valid, rigorous, and therefore fairer, than 
those used in earlier merit pay and performance management schemes.  Employing authorities, school 
principals and unions in the USA increasingly view these schemes as a rigorous and therefore a sound 
basis on which to negotiate new pay scales that better reward evidence of developing knowledge and 
skill (Odden & Kelley, 2002). 
 
The evidence indicates that teachers’ attitudes to performance pay depend very much on how 
“performance” is defined and the validity and reliability of the measures used to assess it.  The level 
of scepticism among teachers appears to decline the more that teachers play a part in developing the 
standards and performance measures.  The evidence is that the most valid and challenging teaching 
standards extant have been those developed by teachers’ professional associations.  The National 
Council for the Teaching of Mathematics led the way in 1989.  More recent examples include 
standards developed by the National Board for Professional Teaching Standards and those developed 
by several Australian teacher associations (Ingvarson & Kleinhenz, 2006a). 
 
Few studies were found of public attitudes to merit pay.  The 2000 edition of the Phi Delta 
Kappan/Gallup poll asked the American public how closely teacher salaries should be tied to student 
achievement.  Only 25 per cent of the public said "very closely," while 24 per cent said "not at all" 
and 35 per cent said "somewhat". 
 
Under what circumstances do performance-based pay systems gain professional 
commitment and improve student learning outcomes?  
 
This review indicates that performance-based pay systems are more likely to have a positive impact 
when their development and operation is seen as a mutual responsibility between employing 
authorities and professional associations.  There are complementary roles to be played here in the 
development of standards, assessments, professional development, certification and employer 




a) their guiding purpose is to give substantial and valued recognition to teachers who provide 
evidence of professional development to high teaching standards (which includes evidence of 
student learning outcomes); 
b) valid (research-based) standards have been developed by expert teachers in their specialist 
field of teaching to provide long-term goals for professional development; 
c) appropriate research has been completed to develop reliable and valid  procedures for 
gathering evidence to indicate whether teachers have met those standards; 
d) the assessment of performance procedures are conducted by an agency external to the school 
to ensure reliability, comparability and fairness;  
e) teachers have adequate opportunities to learn the knowledge and skills required to put the 
standards into practice; 
f) a teacher’s ability to demonstrate that they have met the relevant standards leads to valued 
professional recognition, enhanced career opportunities and significant salary increases;  
g) teachers who reach high standards of performance gain access to interesting, challenging and 
well-supported positions in schools where they can provide leadership to improve teaching 
and learning; and 
h) Governments and other employing authorities become convinced that the assessment system 
is valid and reliable and make long-term commitments to support the system. 
 
Suggestions for further research on attitudes to performance pay 
 
The brief for this report asked, “What other research would have been valuable in assessing the value 
and/or acceptance of performance-based pay for teachers in an Australian context?” 
 
Stakeholder attitudes to performance pay depend mainly on what they have had the opportunity to 
experience.  As mentioned earlier, the legacy of payment by results and inspection is deep in the 
collective consciousness of the teaching profession and is passed down from generation to generation.  
Even the word “performance” can bring down the shutters with many teachers.  
 
However, when Australian teachers have been part of well-conceived schemes to develop standards 
and assessments of teachers’ knowledge and skills, their attitudes are very different.  For example, the 
Australian teachers who were part of the development of standards for highly accomplished English, 
mathematics and science teachers became very committed to those standards.  They found that they 
could write standards for what teachers should know and be able to do - standards that they had pride 
in.  They also found that it was possible to create valid methods to assess teacher performance against 
the standards.  As a result, attitudes changed with experience. 
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It is doubtful that there would be value in conducting more surveys of teachers’ attitudes in general to 
performance-based pay.  The usual answer to these surveys is, “it depends on how it is done”.  The 
most rigorous system for identifying accomplished teachers that we found in our review, the NBPTS, 
is the one that most involved teachers and their professional associations and organisations in all 
phases of developing the performance assessment system.  It is also the system most respected by all 
major stakeholders (all 50 states recognise National Board Certification).   
 
It is likely that the attitudes of most Australian teachers to the concept of performance-based pay will 
remain sceptical without similar participation in the processes of developing and trialling methods of 
gathering evidence and assessing performance.  While there is little doubt that most stakeholders 
recognise that pay systems and career paths need reform, a cultural change in attitudes needs to 
happen in parallel with any reform initiative.  Such reforms would need to be seen as a shared 
responsibility between teachers, governments and employing authorities.   
 
This review of performance pay schemes indicates the need to move gradually, in a developmental 
way, toward building capacity.  Based on the assessment of the available evidence, it would seem 
unlikely that there is any one model that could be readily adopted for application in Australia at this 
time.  Hands on experience with well researched and carefully developed assessment processes will 
lead to better informed decisions about how to make the pay system a more effective instrument for 
improving the quality of teaching and improving student learning outcomes.   
 
Therefore, it is suggested that two research and development programs on performance pay be 
initiated: one focused on developing valid and reliable systems for gathering evidence for individual 
performance pay decision; the other focused on learning how to operate team or school- based 
performance award programs.   
 
Individual approaches to performance-based pay 
 
Successful implementation of performance-based pay schemes for individual teachers is unlikely to 
become a reality without a major research program to develop our capacity for measuring teacher 
knowledge and skill.  
 
There is much to learn about reliable methods for assessing teacher performance from research and 
development work conducted overseas, but local capacity is definitely growing to conduct this kind of 
work.  The heart of any significant performance-based pay scheme is the system for assessing 
teachers’ knowledge and skill.  That system must be sound.  It must focus primarily on direct 
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(including measured) evidence about what students are learning, doing and experiencing as a result of 
the conditions for learning established by the teacher.  
 
While teachers’ attitudes to earlier merit pay schemes are well known, we only have limited 
knowledge about their attitudes to the concepts of knowledge- and skills-based pay and professional 
certification.  Pilot programs on performance pay in a few jurisdictions, with accompanying research 
projects would test the acceptability and feasibility of these approaches in the Australian context.  
 
These research projects should be designed in such a way as to greatly increase the numbers of 
teachers and other stakeholders who have direct experience with standards-based methods for 
assessing teacher performance.  We suggest that a national pilot project on standards, performance 
assessment and certification in two or three well-defined specialist teaching fields, such as primary 
teaching, and secondary mathematics and science teaching, be initiated with these purposes: 
 
• To conduct research and development work on standards-based methods for assessing teacher 
performance.    
• To trial these assessment methods with teacher volunteers to test their feasibility and 
reliability. 
• To evaluate the acceptability and credibility of these methods with stakeholders. 
• To examine the effects of the assessment process on teachers’ professional learning. 
 
Projects such as these will need sufficient consideration before it will be possible to go to scale.  It is 
vital to avoid the mistakes made by so many performance pay schemes in the past where there was 
little understanding about the importance of getting the performance assessment system to acceptable 
levels of reliability.    
 
At later stages, if such a project moved from a pilot stage to wider implementation, there would be a 
need for further research on the consequences of awarding recognition in salary terms to teachers who 
met designated standards or levels of performance.  Interest might focus, for example, on the level of 
teacher engagement in more effective modes of professional development, on the staff relationships in 
schools and on effective ways of organising schools to capitalise on the leadership that such teachers 
might provide.  
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School or team-based performance awards  
 
The prospects for performance-based awards for teams of teachers look promising, although the 
research so far is limited.  After reviewing several examples, Odden and Kelley (2002) claim that the 
evidence indicates that school-based performance award programs do improve student performance.  
However, there are cautions.  Improvement is greatest in areas of the curriculum measured by the 
assessment instruments, so measures need to be monitored to ensure they are valid representations of 
what is valued in the curriculum.  In addition, teachers need to believe the goals are achievable with 
given resources and that the system will be administered fairly.   
 
There is probably greater justification for using student outcomes, as measured on state wide 
standardised tests of student achievement, for team-based than individual performance bonuses.  
Other measures of performance related to student welfare, engagement and satisfaction are also more 
appropriate to team-based awards.   
 
Several jurisdictions in Australia have programs designed to strengthen professional community, but 
to our knowledge no team-based or school-based performance pay schemes have been developed as 
yet.  Developing and implementing such a scheme would be a major enterprise.  This is also an area 
where a collaborative pilot scheme might be initiated so that research could be conducted on the 
feasibility and viability of group-based performance award schemes. 
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SECTION A: BACKGROUND 
There is a long history surrounding the performance pay issue in Australia.  Perhaps the first example 
of a performance-related pay scheme for teachers in Australia was the “payment-by results” system in 
the nineteenth century, conducted by visiting school inspectors (Selleck, 1982).  One of the most 
recent was the “Advanced Skills Teacher” (AST) concept that emerged from the Award Restructuring 
reforms of the late 1980s.  Examples of the AST concept continue in the Level 3 Classroom Teacher 
Classroom Teacher Classification in Western Australia (WA), the AST1 and AST2 positions in South 
Australia (SA) and the Teachers of Exemplary Practice program in the Northern Territory (NT).   
 
England introduced a payment by results scheme for primary school teachers in 1862, which lasted 
until 1895.  In 1862, the then newly established Victorian Board of Education submitted a set of rules 
and regulations grafting payment by results on to the Common Schools Act in Victoria's parliament, 
an Act that had implicitly rejected that innovation.  Whereas the Common Schools Act envisaged a 
classified teaching service, with rewards based on qualifications, payment by results made pupil test 
results the basis of remuneration.  It took more than forty years to remove this system, whose 
detrimental effects on the breadth of the curriculum and the quality of teaching were widely 
understood and universally condemned (Selleck, 1982; Pawsey, 1994).  Since then, incremental pay 
scales for teachers have been based mainly on years of experience, rather than the quality of a 
teacher’s classroom performance.  However, visitations from school inspectors (or superintendents), 
continued to play a significant role in evaluating teachers and determining their career progression 
well into the 1980s (Connell, 1989; Holloway, 2000).  
 
These experiences have left a legacy deep in the collective memory of teachers.  Teachers want to be 
assured that proposals to differentiate pay on the basis of classroom performance will be feasible and 
valid, and supportive of productive working relationships with colleagues.  Many teachers are quick 
to equate any proposal that involves gathering evidence about teaching with an attempt to reintroduce 
‘inspection’ and justify rejecting it on that basis, even proposals for peer observation.  The teaching 
profession has been slow, compared with other professions, in developing its own systems for 
evaluating professional performance.  As a result, ‘promotion’ in career terms has usually been seen 
in terms of extra pay for extra responsibilities or extra work, rather than extra pay for better teaching.  
The former practice creates less controversy, but leaves quality teaching undervalued. 
 
The Advanced Skills Teacher  
The Advanced Skills Teacher (AST) reforms of the early 1990s in all school systems were arguably 
the most serious and pervasive attempt Australia has seen to introduce performance-related career 
paths for teachers.  These reforms aimed to reward evidence of professional development and keep 
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the best teachers in the profession and close to students.  Remnants of the AST reforms remain in 
some awards and agreements, such as the Level 3 Classroom Teacher classification in WA, the 
Teacher of Exemplary Practice position in the NT and the Advanced Skills Teacher classification in 
SA.  These relative successes are discussed in more detail later in this report.    
 
The fate of the AST reform provides valuable lessons for future attempts to link pay systems to 
performance.  Conceptually the AST reform was sound, but its implementation flawed (Ingvarson & 
Chadbourne, 1996).  The reasons need to be understood if the same mistakes are not to be made again.  
One of the main reasons was that the time and effort required to develop credible standards and 
methods of assessing teacher performance was considerably underestimated.  Also, the assessment of 
performance was usually left to untrained school-based panels.  The resulting inconsistency in 
assessments across schools and systems helped to undermine the credibility the AST process as a 
means of identifying highly accomplished teachers.  Lack of confidence in the reliability of the 
assessment process meant that the AST Level 1 step became automatic in most states and was 
absorbed into the incremental scale.  It was hard to convince teachers, who knew that their salaries 
had declined over the long term relative to comparable occupations that they needed go through the 
motions of performance assessment to justify a pay rise.  
 
An unintended consequence of several AST schemes was the negative effect they had on the very 
thing they were trying to foster and reward – quality teaching.  Some schemes removed supposedly 
better teachers from the classroom because AST positions became tied to other duties.  What was 
supposed to be a pay for performance scheme transformed into a traditional pay for extra work 
scheme.  The attachment of jobs to the positions was perhaps the major factor in the 1990’s AST 
failure to retain exemplary teachers in the classroom, particularly with the higher-level AST positions.  
In the words of one union leader, ‘The death of the AST was the attaching of jobs to it – that killed the 
whole concept of the developmental model of it’.  As one AST teacher tellingly reported during an 
interview for a research study in 1995, “Look, I don’t have time to teach well anymore” (Ingvarson & 
Chadbourne, 1997, p.15).  Schools also found it difficult to incorporate the idea of better pay for 
better teaching into their organisational structures and make effective use of advanced skill teachers as 
leaders of teachers working together to improve student learning outcomes.   
 
Types of performance based pay schemes 
There is no simple typology of performance pay schemes as applied to individual teachers, but 
common categories that appear in the literature include:   
 
1) Merit pay,  
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2) Knowledge and skills-based pay, and  
3) Professional certification. 
 
The main features of each of these schemes will be described briefly here, but it is important to keep 
in mind that there may be as much variation within schemes as there is between them.  Examples of 
each scheme are provided in Section D.  It is also important to keep in mind that the brief for this 
report focused on performance pay schemes for individual teachers rather than groups of teachers. 
There have been significant developments in group-based performance pay schemes in which bonuses 
are provided to all school staff or staff teams in schools that meet pre-set performance improvement 
targets, but these will only be described briefly in Section D. 
 
Merit pay  
Merit pay is a pay system in which workers’ pay is based on their performance.  Merit pay schemes in 
the USA were usually developed within particular schools or employing authorities, and operated by 
school administrators.  Merit pay schemes for teachers have a long history in the USA, using a range 
of methods, akin in some respects to methods used by inspectors and superintendents in Australia in 
the past.  When applied to teaching merit pay schemes usually took the form of one-off special or 
annual payments to a quota of teachers, based on idiosyncratic methods of evaluation used by school 
administrators.  Typically, schemes in the USA evaluated teachers against one another for a fixed pool 
of funds, usually delivered in the form of bonus payments.  They were rarely standards- or criterion-
based.  The methods of gathering evidence were usually of doubtful reliability, such as a few 
classroom observations or one-off tests of student achievement. 
 
Classroom observation has been the main method for assessing performance in merit pay schemes in 
the past, using a variety of observational checklists of dubious validity (Scriven, 1994: Stodolsky, 
1990).  More recently, merit pay schemes have sought to use measures of student achievement.  In 
2001, under its No Child Left Behind Act, the new Federal Government in the USA mandated that 
states use “test-based accountability” systems.  Complying with this act has posed major difficulties 
for states, and the main approach used, called the “cohort-to-cohort gain” approach, has been widely 
criticised (McCaffrey et al., 2006).  In this approach, the performance of one cohort of students in a 
given grade is compared with previous cohorts in the same grade; individual students are not tracked 
over time, unlike value-added schemes. 
 
Knowledge and skills-based pay schemes 
The idea behind knowledge and skills-based pay is similar to that of the AST reforms in Australia, 
though far more challenging of the assumptions that underpin the traditional incremental pay scale.  
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Pay increases are based on demonstrated improvements in the knowledge, skills and expertise needed 
to provide quality opportunities for student learning.  Unlike the earlier merit pay schemes, 
knowledge and skills-based pay schemes are based on criterion- or standards-based approaches to the 
assessment of teacher performance.  According to Odden and Kelley (2002, p.94): 
 
Knowledge- and skills-based pay is useful in organisations such as schools, for which the 
knowledge, skills and professional expertise needed are sufficiently complex that it takes 
years of training and experience for their full development. 
 
Knowledge and skills-based pay schemes aim to ensure that the salary scale is a much stronger 
instrument for improving student outcomes than the traditional incremental scale.  These schemes aim 
to provide stronger incentives for professional development and evidence of attaining high standards 
of performance.  They also aim to give more status than traditional career ladders to those front-line 
teachers whose knowledge and skills are critical to the achievement of student learning outcomes.  
Proponents claim these schemes reinforce the development of a workplace culture that values 
employee growth and development (Lawler, 2000)  
 
The concept of “knowledge and skills-based pay” has been strongly influenced by a number of 
organisational theorists, such as Lawler (1981; 1990), who have studied the relationship between pay 
systems and organisational effectiveness.  According to these theorists, effective organisations have 
been shifting from steeply hierarchical organisational (job ladder) structures to flatter, more 
egalitarian structures.  Rather than linking pay to specific job descriptions, new approaches were 
linking pay increments to the acquisition of knowledge and skills that the organisation needed to meet 
its objectives.  Pay for the job or position was shifting to “pay for the person” (Odden & Kelley, 2002, 
p.57).  These more flexible pay structures aimed to support the needs of organisations where teams 
are conducting work and where each individual performs many jobs over the course of a day, a week 
or a year.  Knowledge and skills-based pay systems aim to support the collaborative way in which 
effective professional organisations work and the need in schools for teachers who can take up wider 
roles and responsibilities.   
 
Methods for developing teaching standards and assessing teacher performance have improved greatly 
over the past fifteen years or so.  This has greatly facilitated the development of knowledge and skills-
based approaches to teachers’ pay.  A set of teaching standards aims to cover the full scope of what 
effective teachers know and do, including knowledge of content and students, ability to manage and 
monitor student learning as well as contribute to the wider school and professional community.  This 
means that a number of different approaches to gathering evidence of performance need to be brought 
together in evaluating teachers if all the standards are to be covered, unlike merit pay schemes.  These 
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new approaches may still include interviews and classroom observation and student evaluations, but 
they may also include portfolio entries containing videotape evidence and evidence of improved 
student knowledge and skills over time.  
 
One of the main differences between the new forms of standards-based assessments of teacher 
performance and the previous merit pay schemes is that the former invite teachers to provide the 
evidence that their teaching has met the standards.  The old schemes tended to be based on someone 
like an inspector or principal visiting the classroom to collect the evidence, or student test scores.  
They placed the teacher in a passive role.  In addition, test scores in themselves did not provide very 
useful feedback for a teacher about how they should teach differently to improve student outcomes.  
Because these new standards-based schemes gather a wider range of independent pieces of evidence 
about a teachers’ knowledge and skill they are more likely to provide teachers with valid and useful 
assessments of performance.   
 
Knowledge and skills-based pay schemes usually distinguish several levels of teacher performance; 
for example, from novice to expert, as defined for example, by the widely used Framework of 
Teaching developed by Danielson (1996).  These levels might reflect standards expected of teachers 
who gain full registration and entry to the profession and two or three further levels reflecting 
increasing proficiency and widening responsibilities, such as those described in standards developed 
by the NSW Institute of Teaching.  Odden and Kelley (2002) provide several models of knowledge 
and skills-based salary schedules, the most radical and fully-fledged of which completely replace 
incremental salary scales based on years of experience or academic courses credits with levels of 
performance based on professional standards.  
 
Certification-based pay schemes 
Merit pay schemes and most knowledge and skills-based pay schemes are developed by particular 
education employing authorities and implemented by school administrators.  The teaching standards 
and methods of assessment used in knowledge and skills-based pay schemes are usually developed by 
employing authorities or consultants hired by those authorities, not teachers’ own professional 
associations. 
 
Unlike teaching, most established professions have developed their own performance standards and a 
system for giving some form of “certification” to members who can demonstrate that they have 
attained those standards.  The “Certified Practicing Accountant” (CPA) and “Chartered Engineer” are 
two familiar examples of professional certification.  Professional certification is portable from 
employer to employer, as employers have come to recognise it as a credible indicator that a certain 
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level of professional knowledge and skills has been attained.  While initial certification (or 
registration) may be compulsory, more advanced levels of professional certification are usually 
voluntary.     
 
Professional certification is, in principle, similar to a knowledge- and skills-based pay system, except 
that the assessment of performance is conducted by an independent professional body.  Perhaps the 
most well-known example of a professional certification system for teachers is that developed by the 
National Board for Professional Teaching Standards in the USA.  Teachers and their associations play 
a central role in the development and operation of at every stage of the NBPTS’s certification 
procedures, from developing standards, to assessing the evidence of performance.   
 
These three approaches to performance pay system are described in more detail in Section D. 
 
Teacher policy and performance pay: recent developments 
Although the AST in its 1990’s incarnation came to be viewed generally as a disappointment and a 
lost opportunity, the concept persists.  The OECD Report, Teachers Matter: Attracting, Developing 
and Retaining Effective Teachers (OECD, 2005) documents major trends related to teacher quality.  
The report indicates a general concern about the declining capacity of teaching to provide career paths 
and opportunities that attract and retain its share of the ablest graduates.  Relative salaries for teachers 
have steadily declined over the past ten years.  Most OECD countries report problems with teacher 
retention.  The Australian report prepared for this OECD project (Skilbeck & Connell, 2003) 
documents a similar situation for Australia.  
 
The typical salary scale for teachers in Australia is a weak instrument for providing incentives for 
professional development and rewarding evidence of attaining high standards of performance.  The 
2006 edition of the OECD’s report, Education at a Glance, indicates that whereas the average ratio of 
the salary at the top of the incremental scale is 1.70, it is only 1.47 in Australia.  Thirteen out of 32 
OECD countries report that they adjust the base salary of teachers based on outstanding performance 
in teaching, or successful completion of professional development activities.  Australia is not one of 
them.   
 
While progression to the top of the ladder is rapid in Australia – it takes only 9 years for most 
Australian teachers to reach the top of the scale compared with 24 years on the average in OECD 
countries – the implicit message in the salary scale is that teachers are not expected to improve their 
performance after nine years.  The salary scale provides few incentives for continued development of 
expertise in teaching.  The relationship between professional development and career progression is 
weak in teaching.  A recent synthesis of research on attitudes to teaching as a career indicated that 
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many able were not choosing teaching because it was perceived as a low status job (DEST, 2006).  A 
recent national survey of public opinion in New Zealand revealed that, although teachers were highly 
regarded, teaching was seen as un unattractive career “because the pay is not commensurate with the 
effort (and) because outstanding performance is not rewarded” (Hall and Langdon, 2006, p.8). 
 
This problem has been understood for many years.  There have been many reports over the past thirty 
years advocating the development of standards for accomplished and highly accomplished teaching 
and their use in reforming teacher career structures.  Examples include: the Karmel Report in the early 
1970s; the NBEET reports on teacher quality and award restructuring in the late 1980s; A Class Act, 
the report of the Senate Inquiry into the Status of Teaching (1998); the Report of the Review of 
Teacher Education (Ramsey, 2000); the National Statement from the Teaching Profession on Teacher 
Standards, Quality and Professionalism (2003); and the report The Status and Quality of Teaching 
and Learning of Science in Australian Schools (Goodrum, Hackling & Rennie, 2000).  
 
Several of these reports have advocated the development of a national system for giving certification 
to teachers whose performance has reached standards for highly accomplished teaching.  The 
profession has been active in developing standards for this purpose over recent years.  This work is 
documented in Ingvarson and Kleinhenz (2006).  For example, after extensive national consultation, 
the recent Review of Teaching and Teacher Education (DEST 2003) announced an ‘agenda for 
action’ in its report, Australia’s Teachers: Australia’s Future.  One of its central themes was a call to 
‘revitalise the teaching profession’. The report recommended that: 
 
• National standards for different career stages should continue to be developed by the 
profession. 
• A national, credible, transparent and consistent approach to assessing teaching standards 
(should) be developed by the teaching profession with support from government. 
• Teacher career progression and salary advancement (should) reflect objectively assessed 
performance as a teaching professional. 
• Recognition, including remuneration, for accomplished teachers who perform at advanced 
professional standards and work levels (should) be increased significantly. 
 
Consistent with the research on performance pay schemes for teachers, this report indicates the 
importance of embedding such schemes within a broader set of policies for attracting, developing and 
retaining effective teachers, and creating conditions in schools that enable teachers to teach as well as 
they can.  Performance pay schemes are more likely to have a positive impact on student learning 
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outcomes when integrated within a broader policy framework for supporting quality teaching over the 
long term than when introduced in isolation (Wilson et al., 2000).  
 
Darling-Hammond found that states in the USA where student achievement had improved had 
invested more in teacher salaries, established professional standards bodies, created better career paths 
for teachers, invested more resources in professional development, and provided incentives for 
advanced certification from bodies like the National Board for Professional Teaching Standards.  
Gaining a full license to teach was delayed in these states until successful completion of standards-
based performance assessments during the first few years of teaching (Darling-Hammond, 2000).  
Improving performance in teaching is not so much a matter of incentives that make teachers work 
harder as increasing profession-wide capacity to provide quality opportunities for students to learn 
(Cohen & Hill, 2000).    
 
An example of a performance pay scheme that is embedded in a wider reform program is the Teacher 
Advancement Program (TAP) introduced by the Milken Family Foundation in 1999 and supported by 
the US Department of Education and eight states and school districts.  The program includes four 
main elements: 
 
• “Multiple career paths give qualified teachers opportunities to take on more responsibility 
as mentors and teacher leaders and get compensated for doing so.  
• Ongoing applied professional growth provides teachers with school-based professional 
development during the school day.  
• Instructionally focused accountability ties teacher evaluations to teaching skills and student 
achievement. Evaluations are fair because criteria are clearly defined, and they are conducted 
four to six times during the year by multiple evaluators whom TAP trains and certifies.  
• Performance-based compensation provides bonuses to teachers who demonstrate their skills 
through classroom evaluations and who increase their students' academic growth over the 
course of the year.  
 
TAP's professional development is designed to support teachers in achieving these goals. The 
Program provides additional compensation to teachers according to their roles and responsibilities, 
their performance in the classroom, and the performance of their students.  TAP currently involves 
about 4000 teachers.  A recent in-house research report claims that teachers in the TAP Program are 
producing “higher student achievement growth than similar teachers not in TAP schools” (Solmon, 
White, Cohen & Woo, 2007).   
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Performance based pay schemes for teachers have been relatively rare in Australia, compared with the 
USA.  Research there indicates that performance pay schemes have emerged periodically over the 
past one hundred years (Popham, 1997), usually during periods of economic downturn, and 
subsequent scapegoating of the education system (Protsik, 1996).  There can be a strange tendency at 
times to blame the profession itself for its limited ability to offer salaries and working conditions that 
attract the ablest graduates and to offer high quality preparation and continuing professional learning, 
when these are factors largely beyond the control of teachers.  
 
This brief background on performance pay and the following report indicate that there is an increasing 
desire, shared among all stakeholders, to develop policies that are more effective for keeping excellent 
teachers working in classrooms and providing professional leadership to colleagues.  Evidence 
gathered for this report indicates that there is increasing recognition, nationally and internationally, 
that pay systems can be, and need to be, stronger levers for ensuring quality learning outcomes for all 
students.   
 
The Australian Education Union (AEU) and the Independent Education Union of Australia (IEUA) 
strongly support the development of professional standards for teachers and the close involvement of 
the profession in the development of these standards. A recent AEU professional standards paper 
notes: 
 
The AEU strongly supports the development of appropriate professional standards for all 
involved in teaching….Their development provides an opportunity for professional 
recognition and public support, and will enhance the status of the profession…… 
 
Where there exists a clear level of professional support, understanding and consensus for 
any proposal to enhance professional teaching standards, teacher unions will endorse 
those initiatives in the appropriate professional and industrial forums (AEU Teaching 
Standards Kit). 
 
In addition, a recent AEU (ACT branch) paper invites members to revisit the AST concept and 
discuss the need for a system that rewards teaching excellence: 
 
Despite the short-lived existence of the Master Teacher and AST classifications in most 
systems, teachers and their unions have long held a belief that there needs to be a system 
that recognises and rewards excellence in classroom practice. . . . This debate has shied 
away in the past from expressing itself as part of a discussion of performance pay issues 
but that agenda is not one that can be sidestepped any longer. There are pressures from 
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among teachers themselves to develop systems that recognise and reward those who 
demonstrate excellence in their practice . . .  (ACT AEU, 2005) 
 
Summary 
This section has provided a brief background to performance pay.  Data gathered for this report 
indicates that there is an increasing desire among stakeholders in Australia to develop policies for 
“revitalising’ the teaching profession (DEST, 2003).  This includes pay systems that are more 
effective in giving incentives for highly accomplished teaching, for keeping excellent teachers 
working in classrooms and for providing professional leadership to colleagues.  There is increasing 
recognition, nationally and internationally, that career paths and pay systems can be, and need to be, 
linked to evidence of increasing capacity to promote valued student learning outcomes and, thereby, 
stronger levers for ensuring professional development and quality learning outcomes for all students 
(Sclafani & Tucker, 2006; OECD, 2005).   
 
Representatives of eight countries, including Australia, recently attended an international seminar on 
Teaching Policy to Improve Student Learning convened by the Aspen Institute.  Australia stood out as 
a country where teachers’ careers plateau very quickly and at a relatively modest salary.  A report 
summarising the conference proceedings (Olson, 2007) concluded: 
 
Each of the nations participating was seeking ways to recognise expert teachers, reward 
them for their abilities, and take advantage of their skills.  Creating a stronger connection 
between individual teacher contributions and what they are paid lies at the heart of 
redesigning teaching for the next generation. (p. 5) 
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SECTION B: CURRENT PAY ARRANGEMENTS AND PROVISIONS FOR 
TEACHERS ACROSS AUSTRALIA 
This section of the report provides an overview of current pay arrangements for teachers in Australian 
schools, according to jurisdiction and sector.  Its purpose is to identify the extent to which teachers’ 
pay is currently based on the quality of their professional performance within these Awards or 
Agreements.   
 
Data about current enterprise bargain agreements was collected mainly from relevant websites and 
other material in the public domain.  Further information, particularly with regard to some of the 
practical applications of the agreements, was collected from interviews with industrial officers from 
the major government and independent school unions.  This was particularly helpful in gaining an 
Australian overview and in developing the tables provided in this report.  Other officers of 
government departments and representative groups such as the Independent Schools Council of 
Australia (ISCA) also provided valuable advice and assistance.  
 
Almost all teachers in Australia work within industrial Awards and Collective Agreements negotiated 
between unions and employers.  Awards apply to all workers in the particular field and define basic 
conditions and terms of employment for a group of workers no matter where they are employed.  
Awards can be Federal or State. Agreements are made between an employer and a specified group of 
employees.  They define negotiated changes to work arrangements that apply to all employees in the 
specified group; for example, all teachers employed by a particular state government.  Awards operate 
as a kind of “safety net” for workers in that the same or better salaries and/or conditions than those in 
a ‘parent’ Award may be provided for within particular Agreements.  If there is a difference between 
the relevant Award and Agreement, the Agreement prevails.  Agreements differ from jurisdiction to 
jurisdiction, from sector to sector and sometimes from school to school.  
 
Awards and Agreements in the government sectors 
All government schools in Australia currently operate under an Award and/or a Collective 
Agreement.  These arrangements are common to all government schoolteachers in each state and 
territory.  Table 1 summarises the types of awards and agreements that currently apply for each state 
and territory.   
 
Three jurisdictions operate under a Federal Award and five under a State Award.  Government 
schools in Victoria, Australian Capital Territory and Northern Territory fall within Federal ‘parent’ 
Awards and State Agreements.  Teachers in all other states work under State Awards and/or collective 
Agreements.  South Australia and Tasmania have recently returned from Federal to State Awards.   
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Whether a state is working under a Federal or State Award is now more significant than previously, as 
schools under Federal Awards can operate under Australian Workplace Agreements and, in theory, 
pay differentiated salaries to teachers based on performance. 
 
Table 1: Negotiated Awards and Agreements in Australian government schools 
 




Federal award and collective agreement 
Northern Territory Federal award and collective agreement 
New South Wales State Award 
Queensland State award and collective agreement 
South Australia State award and collective agreement 
(recently moved to state award) 
Tasmania State award and collective agreement 
(recently moved to state award) 
Victoria Federal award and collective agreement 
Western Australia State award and collective agreement 
Source: ACER, 2007 
 
Current Awards and Agreements in each state and territory 
The relevant sections of the eight state and territory government school Agreements are described in 
detail in Appendix 2.  These Agreements cover the majority of teachers in Australia. The content of 
the Awards is often mirrored in the systemic Agreements.  While education authorities have many 
policy documents related to various items in the Agreements, there is variation in the extent to which 
performance appraisal and management is outlined or described in the Agreements themselves. 
 
While there are variations in the different Agreements, all Agreements cover and are binding on 
government school teachers in the particular state.  This may be variously specified as persons 
employed under a particular Act, or as persons who are members of, or eligible to be members of, the 
AEU.  The parties to the Agreements are the state (specified in various ways) and usually the state 
branch of the AEU.  
 
Awards and Agreements in the non-government sectors 
Non-government schools are broadly of two types: those that belong to a sector, such as the Catholic 
schools sector; and those that are independent, corporate entities.  The latter range in type from the 
traditional independent schools, such as Melbourne Grammar School or the King’s School in Sydney, 
to small local ‘Community’ schools.  The independent schools category includes a number of non-
systemic Catholic schools (about 80) and about 1100 other schools across Australia.   
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Many independent schools operate within the ‘safety net’ of a relevant Award, but may in practice 
pay higher than Award salaries and operate under system or school specific agreements.  To our 
knowledge, only one school in Australia is currently operating under an Australian Workplace 
Agreement.  A spokesperson for ISCA, estimated that there would be about 500 payment models 
across Australian non-systemic independent schools.  “Virtually all of the 1100 schools would pay 
award wages and would follow State Awards.  Very few would pay less, with agreement of staff.  
Some would pay more; the big difference between the Award salary and actual salary would be at the 
principal level, with some principals being paid way above the Award.  These salaries are not usually 
in the public domain.”  
 
Current industrial frameworks in the non-government Awards tend to mirror those of the government 
sector. The ACT, the NT and Victoria have federal Awards and the other five jurisdictions have State 
Awards. This situation is, however, currently in a state of flux. For a number of schools it is unclear 
whether the school is in fact constituted as a trading corporation under the terms of new industrial 
legislation.  In Queensland, for instance, Catholic education employing authorities have removed the 
system from federal legislation restrictions through a Memorandum of Understanding.  A Deed of 
Settlement would then follow that would include conditions and rights under state industrial laws for 
the Queensland Independent Education Union (QIEU) members. 
 
Typical salary scales under current awards and agreements 
In common with most OECD countries, the majority of Australian teachers begin their careers on an 
incremental scale whereby they move one step each year to a higher salary level.  Table 2 summarises 
the incremental pay arrangements for government school teachers in each state and territory as at 30 
June 2006.  The entry point for qualified beginning teachers is indicated in bold print.  
 
Table 2 also shows that that all systems have promotion positions beyond the top of the incremental 
scale.  These are positions with responsibilities beyond classroom teaching that usually include both 
extra pay and a reduced teaching allocation. These positions will be discussed later in this section of 
the report.  (Most schools also provide allowances of various sizes for specific jobs beyond classroom 
teaching, but these are not included in Table 2.) 
 
The incremental salary scale 
The incremental scales in Table 2 typically range from eight to thirteen steps, sometimes arranged in 
groups or bands.  Some scales include early steps for teachers who have yet to complete their 
qualifications or gain registration, such as emergency teachers.  Teachers who have graduated from 
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accredited teacher education courses usually enter a few steps up the scale.  Incremental salary scales 
for teachers in systemic Catholic and independent schools operating under specific Awards or 
Agreements are similar to those in Table 2 and are summarised in Appendix 2.    
 
Table 2 does not tell the full story about the pay received by most Australian teachers.  The teaching 
service in government schools across Australia is a ‘veteran’ service.  The average age of Australian 
teachers is over 45.  In New South Wales, for instance, few teachers are below Step 11 on the 
incremental scale.  Thirty thousand teachers are on Step 13.  According to an AEU source, the pay 
system is ‘absolutely top heavy’.  Because the number of promotion positions in each school is strictly 
limited, many highly experienced quality teachers are unable to access higher salary levels.   
 
Typical features of teacher pay scales in Australia 
Table 2 indicates that the salary scales for teachers in Australia are relatively “flat”.  Salaries at the 
top of the salary scale are usually no more that 1.4 to 1.5 times the starting salary.  This ratio is 
relatively low compared with several OECD countries where the steps on the incremental scale can 
rise to salaries more than twice the starting salary (OECD, 2006).  If this condition applied in 
Australia, most teachers would be on salaries between $80–90,000.  Teachers in Australia now reach 
the top of the scale relatively quickly – often by 30 years-of-age – and survey a situation where 
advancement depends mainly on competing for a limited number of positions or jobs, not an 
evaluation of the quality of their professional performance.  
 
Most Government school systems now have a form of performance pay associated with the 
incremental scale in that annual salary increments for teachers are subject to satisfactory annual 
reviews by school administrators.  These increments are rarely withheld, and the need to withhold 
them would probably also be rare.  Most annual review procedures are based on interviews and do not 
involve systematic procedures for gathering evidence about classroom performance.  Few studies 
have been conducted on the reliability and rigour of processes used in annual reviews.  Because of the 
shaky foundation of many teacher evaluation procedures, it can be difficult for school principals to 
withhold annual increments.  The NSW Auditor General conducted a critical review of the Education 
Department’s performance management in 2003 (NSW Auditor-General, 2003). 
 
It is important to clarify the implicit messages in the typical incremental salary scale for teachers.  It is 
also important to keep in mind the long industrial history that has lead to this common salary 
denominator - for male and female teachers, for primary and secondary teachers – as a means of 
minimising disputation. 
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Table 2: Classroom teacher salary rates in A$ (courtesy of the AEU - table adapted for this report) 
(Note) The ACT has not negotiated a new Agreement and teachers are currently working under the Agreement that expired in March 2006.  The figures in the ACT section of Table 2 are from 
the expired Agreement. 
 

















TEP 1 = 7.5  per cent of salary to max of 
96  per cent of ET2 
 
TEP 2 = 12.5  per cent of salary to max 
of ET2 
 
TEP 3 = 20  per cent of salary to max of 
ET4 
 1/1/06 1/10/06 











Expert Classroom Teacher 
E-1 59,458 
E-2 61,302 



























Senior Teacher (4 Year Trained) 





















TASMANIA AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY WESTERN AUSTRALIA NEW SOUTH WALES 
From: 9/3/06  
 
 1 40,860 
 2 42,144 
 3 43,431 
 4 44,711 
 5 47,009 
 6 49,431 
 7 51,976 
 8 54,658 






1.1 43,073 3YT min 
1.2 46,565 4YT min 






1.9 66,353 3/4/5YT max 
 
Note: Expired Agreement (March 2006) 
 
From: August 2006 
Level 1 
1     34,704 
2      36,507 
3     38,614 
4     40,278 
5    42,885 
6    45,410 
7     49,546 
8     54,479 
Level 2 
1     56,573 
2     58,900 
3  62,863 
Senior Teacher 1 
  64,495 
Senior Teacher 2 
  65,785 
Level 3 Classroom Teacher 
  71,149 
From: 1/1/06 
 
Step 1 36,936 
Step 2 (2YT) 40,259 
Step 3 (3YT) 42,943 
Step 4 45,167 
Step 5 (4YT) 47,621 
Step 6 (5YT) 50,072 
Step 7 52,527 
Step 8 54,983 
Step 9 57,435 
Step 10 59,888 
Step 11 62,341 
Step 12 64,798 
Step 13 69,334 
 
Source:  AEU in ACER, 2007
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One of the assumptions implicit in these scales is that teachers improve in what they 
know and can do over a number of years – in other words, that teachers become more 
effective as they become more experienced.  Therefore, they are worth more.  However, 
the scale also implies that they reach their peak of effectiveness after 8 –10 years or so.  
After that, the message implicit in the salary scale is that they are not expected to get any 
better.  In fact, few teachers will say they learned everything they need to know to be an 
effective teacher by that early stage in their career. 
 
For teachers at the top of the incremental scale, which is the majority, annual 
performance reviews are of, course, no longer linked to salary.  There is no direct 
relationship between the level of pay and the quality of classroom teaching performance 
for most teachers.  Performance pay in this sense is not a reality for most teachers in 
Australian government schools.  The salary scale on offer says, in effect, there are no 
material incentives just for more effective teaching.   
 
A long-standing feature of pay scales for teachers in Australia is their lack of recognition 
for teachers who gain higher or further academic qualifications.  Table 3 shows a typical 
salary schedule for teachers in the USA includes increments for academic credits and 
higher degrees (Odden & Kelley, 2003).  Table 3 indicates that a Classroom Teacher may 
reach a salary that is 120 per cent above the beginning salary in this schedule by step 13 
and after completing academic courses.  The typical salary scale for Australian teachers is 
only 42 per cent more than the starting salary.  It provides them with relatively few 
incentives to deepen or update their core professional knowledge through further 
academic study, though this knowledge may be important to their effectiveness.  It tells 
them neither what they should get better at, nor rewards them for doing so. 
 
Table 3: Typical Teacher Single-Salary Schedule in the USA 1999 – 2000 
 
Step Bachelor’s BA + 15 Masters MA + 15 PhD 
1 29,885 30,421 32,884 34,662 37,661 
2 31.973 32,326 34,770 36,548 39,547 
“ “ “ “ “ “ 
13 54,606 55,142 59,212 60,990 63,989 
14 56,229 56,755 60,834 62,613 65,611 
Source:  Odden & Kelley in ACER, 2007 
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Like Australia’s incremental scales, there is a lot of history behind the structure of the 
USA “Single salary scale”.  It provides an objective basis for paying teachers different 
amounts – for years of experience and for extra study.  Although this type of schedule is 
firmly locked in place in most USA school districts, it is important to mention that many 
USA commentators express strong reservations about its effectiveness as an instrument 
for improving student learning outcomes.  The courses that teachers study are often 
unrelated to their current field of teaching.  Hanushek (1994) found limited evidence that 
graduate coursework was related to teacher quality or classroom performance.  Murnane 
(1983) found that teachers with bachelor’s degrees were just as effective as those with 
master’s degrees.   
 
The main problem with the typical USA salary schedule is that it locks so much money 
up into an inefficient method for promoting professional development and higher 
standards of teaching (Little et al., 1987).  Advanced coursework and degrees are 
unreliable indicators of improved performance.  Commentators such as Odden and Kelley 
(2003) point out that the money could be used much more effectively as a mechanism to 
improve student learning outcomes by developing standards for accomplished teaching 
performance and rewarding teachers who can demonstrate they have reached those 
standards in their everyday practice.  
 
Teachers’ starting salaries stand up well in relation to those in several other professions.  
However, when teachers’ salaries after ten to fifteen years are compared with those who 
chose other professions, major disparities become strikingly evident.  Whereas members 
of other professions reach a stage, such as a Certified Practicing Accountant (CPA) in 
accountancy, or some such equivalent, where they “kick on” in terms of the professional 
recognition and the value placed on their knowledge and skill, teachers’ salaries plateau.  
The salary scale sends a clear message that remaining in teaching, developing teaching 
skills and teaching well is not the way to gain high status in a school’s organisational 
hierarchy.   
 
In this respect, it is worth comparing teachers’ salary scales in different countries.  Figure 
1 is derived from the 2002 OECD report, Education at a Glance.  It compares salary 
structures in Korea and Japan, countries whose students performed significantly better in 
the IEA TIMSS studies of student achievement in mathematics and science than 
Australia, the USA and England.  Noteworthy is the relatively strong plateauing of 
teachers’ salaries in Australia and England compared with Korea and Japan (teachers’ 
salaries in England have improved significantly since the data for this OECD report was 
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gathered).  Also noteworthy, but not shown in Figure 1, are the strong quality assurance 
filters that apply in Korea and Japan regarding entry to teacher education programs, 
qualifications, entry to the profession and promotion at key points along the incremental 



















Figure 1: Annual Salaries for Lower Secondary Education Teachers in USA 
Dollars, 2000 
 
Progression through the incremental scales in Australian government schools 
Table 4 summarises the current arrangements for teachers to move through the 
incremental scales in each state or territory government school sector.  (In reading these 
scales, note that in some states former AST classifications have been absorbed into the 
incremental scale.) As mentioned above, progression through the incremental scales, in 
most states, is subject to processes of annual performance review/appraisal in schools.   
 
The typical requirement to gain an increment is satisfactory completion of an annual 
performance review with a ‘supervisor’, such as a head of department or principal.  These 
reviews may be based on independently gathered data about teacher performance, such as 
student evaluations, observations of classrooms or student performance.  Typically they 
are not.  State and territory departments of education have produced comprehensive 
documents that set out how performance management processes should be conducted in 
schools.  According to recommended procedures, performance appraisal/management is 
to be conducted by the principal or nominee.  Increasingly, school systems are using 
teaching standards as a framework for annual performance management reviews.
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Table 4: Progression through the incremental scale for teachers in Australian 
state and territory government schools 
 
 What are the 
requirements to move up 
a step? 








Can a teacher ‘jump’ 







in bi-annual review.  
Twice yearly 
satisfactory appraisal 
through Participation in 
Professional Pathways 
Plan, 3 categories in 
scale. 
 
Yes Yes, one step if extra 
approved qualification 
completed, also 





Increment can only be 
withheld as an outcome of 
inability or discipline 
procedures in accordance 
with the Act. 
 Yes Beginning teachers 
meeting service 
requirements and with 
extra professional 
learning, one step. 
New South 
Wales 
Annual  review. Continuing efficiency –
conference, program 
observation, review of 
documentation. 


















Satisfactory performance. ”objective agreed 
criteria” at school 
level, no generic 
process. 
Yes *Yes  
Victoria 
 
Satisfactory performance. Meeting standards 
linked appraisal 
processes for different 
levels. 
Yes *Yes. Teachers on the 
incremental scale may 
also apply for 
promotion positions 
above the scale. 
Western 
Australia 




Source:  ACER, 2007  
*Note that while it is possible in some government systems to accelerate teachers on an 
incremental scale, there would be budgetary issues and procedural issues, given that government 
school salaries, budgets and procedures are transparent.  
 
Progression through the incremental scales in non-government schools  
Teachers’ progression through the incremental scale in non-government systemic (e.g. 
Catholic) schools and most Independent schools is similar to progression in the 
government systems.  As in government schools, available evidence suggests that it 
would be rare for a principal to withhold an increment from a teacher, although some 
independent schools employ teachers under contracts in which there is a “subject to 
satisfactory performance” provision.  In some cases it is possible for a teacher to move 
through the scale more quickly, but, as in the government systems, this is unusual.  As in 
some government systems, teachers can be promoted from a place within the incremental 
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scale to a promotion position beyond the top of the scale (Independent Education Union 
of Australia [IEUA]). 
 
Almost all Agreements also provide for the denial of an annual increment if a teacher 
does not have a satisfactory annual appraisal.  In order to progress through the 
incremental scale in both government and non-government sectors, teachers are usually 
required to demonstrate satisfactory performance based on meeting standards.  While an 
annual increment can be withheld in some cases, thus providing a further type of ‘deficit 
model’ for performance pay, in practice increments appear to be rarely withheld.  
  
Provisions in Awards and Agreements for unsatisfactory performance  
It is important to note that all Awards and sighted Agreements have guidelines and 
procedures in place to address unsatisfactory performance.  These may include a pathway 
offering support and guidance to teachers who are performing below the expected level, 
but will also include formal discipline and/or dismissal procedures in cases where 
program support has not been successful in bringing a teacher to an acceptable level of 
competence or in cases of serious misconduct. 
 
Thus, there are usually two possible paths already in place to address unsatisfactory 
performance; withholding of an increment, or instigating disciplinary/dismissal 
procedures.  These procedures appear to be seldom used, but negotiated frameworks are 
in place.  This is very relevant to the current debate, where some commentators seem to 
assume that there are no processes in place to manage teachers whose performance may 
have fallen below competent standards.  The fact that these procedures are rarely used 
could indicate that they rarely need to be and/or that there are problems with 
implementing them, not that there are legislative impediments to addressing these issues. 
 
Promotion positions for Classroom Teachers beyond the incremental scales 
There are three approaches to paying teachers beyond the top of the incremental scale:  
1) paying for jobs;  
2) paying for evidence of increased knowledge and skills; and  
3) bonus pay or merit pay schemes for individual performance.   
 
Some approaches represent combinations of these approaches.  
 
 41 
The main career pathway for teachers beyond the top of the incremental scale is through 
application for jobs or positions with specific responsibilities, such as head of a subject 
area, or coordinator of curriculum or professional development.  As the number of 
promotion positions of this type is limited, the application process is necessarily highly 
competitive.  The total number of promotion positions in Victorian secondary schools 
(including principals and deputy principals), for example, is set at about 30 per cent of 
the total staff.  Applications for these positions usually take the form of CVs, and 
applicants are judged primarily through interview processes in terms of their suitability 
for the advertised position, rarely through direct evidence of their performance as 
teachers.  It would be unusual for applications to include direct and systematic evidence 
of teaching performance for interview panels to consider.  
 
The second approach, pay for skills and knowledge, is less common.  There have been 
several attempts to introduce pay schemes that give recognition to teachers who can 
demonstrate professional development to high teaching standards.  In most cases, these 
were introduced as part of the AST reforms introduced in the early 1990s.  Some 
government school systems have maintained the AST concept to provide career pathways 
based on increases in a teachers’ knowledge and skills.  Examples include the Level 3 
Classroom Teacher position in WA, the Advanced Skills Teacher in SA and Teacher of 
Exemplary Practice (TEP) position in the NT.  Schools and school systems in NSW are 
considering the introduction of a career ladder model based on the evidence of increasing 
knowledge and skills.  
 
These pay schemes might be called “evidence of professional development” based pay 
schemes.  Their defining feature is that they are standards-based.  However, in practice, 
employers often impose quotas on the number of promotion positions in schemes such as 
the Level 3 Classroom Teacher position in WA, thereby contradicting the concept of 
standards-based pay on which they are based.  Fears of cost blow outs have proved to be 
unfounded.  The teachers who operate the central assessment process have set high 
performance standards.  The quota has yet to be filled. 
 
Individual performance or “merit pay” schemes are rare in government schools.  They are 
not usually part of industrial agreements.  The case studies in this report (Appendix 4) 
indicate that the practice is more common in Independent schools.  Merit pay schemes, as 
defined here, use one-off annual bonus payments to individuals as part of school-based 
performance management schemes.  These schemes, which may reward a wide variety of 
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types of performance, are usually run at the discretion of the school principal.  Schools 
are increasingly using teaching standards in these schemes. 
 
Promotion positions for teachers in government schools 
Table 5 lists the promotion positions available in government schools.  The first column 
lists positions based on application for specific jobs.  All systems present opportunities 
for this kind of career progression, which is usually based only indirectly on evidence of 
highly accomplished teaching.  The second column lists positions based on evidence of 
attaining high teaching standards – knowledge and skills-based pay.  Not all systems have 
such positions.  
 
It should be noted that there is a very large range of ‘allowance’ positions in schools, but 
these may not involve promotion to a different classification.  While the Northern 
Territory TEP is an allowance position, it is one of the few examples of extra payment 
based on high quality classroom teaching.  The allowance is paid as a percentage of 
salary and is included in superannuation calculations. 
 
For teachers at the top of the salary scales shown in Table 5, there are various conditions 
for access to promotion positions with higher salary levels, such as the position of Senior 
Teacher in WA.  There is also provision for access to a number of allowances both within 
and beyond the incremental salary scales.  These provisions vary widely within 
jurisdictions and sectors.  Access to salary classification levels beyond the incremental 
scale is usually tied to particular positions of responsibility, to leadership positions and/or 
to school administrative or managerial positions.   
 
Promotion beyond the top of the incremental scale usually depends on a teacher applying 
successfully for a position of responsibility or a specific job such as a head of subject 
department or year level coordination.  While job selection criteria in schools usually 
include a criterion relating to teaching competence, applicants are not usually required to 
supply direct evidence of their performance as teachers.  Instead, the focus of these 
selection panels is usually on capacity to fulfil the position in the future. 
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Table 5: Summary of promotion positions beyond the incremental scale in 
government schools 
 
State/territory Promotion positions based on 
application for a specific job 





 School Leader C – Executive 
Teacher 
 School Leader B – Deputy 
Principal 
 Principal  
No positions above incremental scale 
Northern 
Territory 
 Executive Teachers, 9 levels 
(Principal positions) 
Teacher of Exemplary Practice 1,2,3 (Note: 
Teachers can apply for TEP from within the 
incremental scale, with increased salary as a  




 Senior Assistant 
 Head Teacher 
 Assistant/Deputy Principal 
 Principal 
No positions at present 
(Proposal for a four level certification system 
based on NSWIT standards) 
Queensland  Senior Teacher 
 Head of Curriculum 
 Head of Department 
 Deputy Principal 
 Principal 
 Executive Principal 
No positions above incremental scale 
South Australia  Co-ordinator 1, 2, 3 
 Assistant Principal 2 levels 
 Deputy Principal/Principal 8 levels 
Advanced Skills Teacher levels 1 and 2 
 
Tasmania  Band 2 teacher 
 Bands 3 and 4 
 Principal class - 8 levels 
No positions above incremental scale 
Victoria  Leading Teacher 1, 2, 3 
 Assistant Principal - 4 levels 
 Principal 6 levels 
No positions above incremental scale 
Western 
Australia 
 Senior Teacher 1, 2 
 Deputy Principal 3 levels 
 Principal 4 levels 
Level 3 Classroom Teacher (quota applies, no 
more than about 3-400 positions at any one time) 
Source:  ACER, 2007 
Many teachers in government and non-government schools receive additional payment 
for specific educational tasks apart from classroom teaching.  This payment may be in the 
form of promotion to a higher classification, or in the form of an allowance.  In almost all 
cases, the extra payment also carries a time allowance and thus means time away from 
classroom teaching.  In terms of career structure, there is a further important 
consideration in that allowances are not always deemed to be part of salary for purposes 
of superannuation.  In some cases (e.g. Victoria), certain allowances (Special Payments 
and Higher Duties) may be treated as part of superannuation salary after a certain period.  
However, allowances, unlike promotions in general, are not necessarily ‘permanent’. 
 
In schools that select their own teachers, job specific criteria are usually attached to the 
advertised position.  It is worth noting that in some instances relatively junior teachers (at 
lower points on the incremental scale) who successfully apply for these positions are paid 
at a level well above the top of the (first level) incremental scale.  There are few 
promotion positions that are not tied to a specific job or set of responsibilities.  This 
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means that Classroom Teachers have relatively few opportunities to apply for a position 
at a higher level where the main selection criterion is proven high quality of their 
classroom teaching.  Or, put another way, it is rare for Classroom Teachers to be 
promoted on the basis of excellent teaching, and even rarer for such teachers to remain in 
classroom teaching on a higher salary. 
 
Table 5 shows how teaching is unusual compared with many professions that rely on 
advanced professional certification as the main basis for career progression.  Getting on 
in career terms in professions such as accountancy, engineering and medicine is based on 
gaining some form of certification by an independent professional body, such as a CPA, 
or a Chartered Engineer or a medical college.  These certifications are usually based on 
assessments of relevant professional knowledge and records indicating that high 
standards of performance have been attained.   
 
There is no equivalent in teaching.  Getting on in teaching generally means getting out of 
teaching and moving into school management.  Status is attached more to teaching less 
rather than teaching better.  There are few roles or promotion positions that place expert 
teachers in roles that enable them share their expertise and work shoulder to shoulder 
with other teachers in ways that might enhance student learning outcomes.  Few teachers 
at the top of the incremental scale in Australia have the opportunity to further their career 
and status because of their expertise as teachers.    
 
The NT, SA and WA education departments have developed classifications that carry 
higher pay for teachers who have demonstrated superior (“accomplished”) teaching 
performance.  These states and territories and the positions are listed in Table 6.  These 
classifications are not linked directly to advertised positions in specific schools.  Rather, 
teachers usually gain these positions after applying to a central agency for an assessment 
of their performance.  Teachers do not have to be at the top of the salary scale to apply 
for these positions.  Methods of assessment usually rely on presenting portfolio ‘entries’.  
South Australia is noteworthy for including evidence gained from classroom observations 
by observers trained to use teaching standards.   
 
Little information is available on how each of these schemes sets the required level of 
performance in relation to the standards.  The WA Education Department applies a quota 
in the case of the WA Level 3 Classroom Teacher position, which is inconsistent with the 
concept of standards-based performance assessment.  Their caution is understandable 
perhaps, but the number of successful applicants so far has never exceeded the quota.   
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Table 6: Summary of selection methods for the promotion positions in 

















Exemplary Practice 1, 
2, 3 note: this position 
is not a classification 
but an allowance. 
Teachers can 
apply from within 
scale from T6 and 
add  percent to 
salary 
Modelling of 




















































Source:  ACER, 2007 
Performance pay for teachers in non-government schools 
It is not so easy to provide a summary of current arrangements for promotion positions 
and performance pay in non-government schools.  Some schools are understandably 
reluctant to provide details about arrangements they have made with individual staff.  
Instead of tabulating these arrangements, a set of brief case studies of current practices in 
six independent schools is provided in Appendix 4.    
 
For some years, the Independent Education Union of Australia (IEUA) and employing 
Catholic and Independent authorities have negotiated various classifications and salary 
levels based on Advanced Teaching Standards.  These agreements vary within 
jurisdictions.  Sometimes a specific leadership role or other duty is attached to the 
position; sometimes a teacher is expected to act as an exemplar for other teachers by 
demonstrating and sharing advanced skills and practices.  
 
As in the government systems, the Awards contain relatively few promotion positions or 
allowances in non-government schools that require evidence of quality teaching 
performance measured against standards.  Within the Agreements themselves, there may 
be “room for movement.”  In Western Australian Catholic schools, for instance, 
promotional positions and allowances may, after consultation and agreement, “introduce 
a school-based system of promotional positions to replace these arrangements.”  
Independent non-systemic schools may operate within the ‘safety net’ of the relevant 
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Award, but have their own methods of recognising and rewarding high quality teaching 
performance.  Many may contain an ‘advanced’ teacher classifications. 
 
One representative of the sector expressed the view that very few independent schools 
would be paying performance pay.  ‘Most cannot afford the extra payments and live from 
day to day, relying on increasing enrolments.  Many are in debt because capital is paid for 
by parents not government.  Enrolments are the key; there is not a lot of leeway.’  
 
Some independent schools however are paying performance pay in various forms such as 
bonuses, advanced placements in a salary range, or higher salary levels than provided for 
under the particular Agreement or Award.  In many cases these arrangements are 
confidential between the teacher and the school principal. (See Appendix 3) 
 
In Victoria, of 150 independent schools, 70 are under industrial agreements.  Salaries 
differ from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.  Of the 70 schools, only a handful has AST levels 
for highly accomplished teachers (standards classification), with additional salary 
payments of between $2,000 and $6,000.  
 
Most Catholic schools (except some non systemic Catholic schools) still have a 'common 
rule award' and are in the NSW industrial relations system. A number of Independent 
schools, including Christian and Uniting Church schools, have collective agreements, or 
the independent schools common rule award (revised), in the state system.   
 
A significant number of independent schools, including some independent Catholic 
schools, and a few Christian schools are now covered by ‘collective federal agreements’ - 
although there are 2 different outcomes in the structure of these agreements. For instance, 
one collective federal agreement looks like the independent state award with incremental 
steps. The other has 3 bands with criteria to be met (except for teachers who are already 
at the top of the scale - they will automatically be at the top of band 3). The requirements 
to move from Band 1 to Band 2 match the current requirements for a beginning teacher 
under the NSW Institute of Teachers requirements to be accredited at the ‘Professional 
Competence’ level; that is, meeting the Institute’s requirements meets the school’s 
requirements. To move from Band 2 to Band 3 (with one salary rate) teachers will in the 
future have to demonstrate that they meet the Institute’s ‘Accomplished Teacher’ 
standards.  While these standards are agreed on and in place, the formal Institute 
assessment processes are not – consequently the NSW Association of Independent 
Schools will oversee an appraisal approach that will hopefully be endorsed by the 
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Institute in the future.  In the interim, teachers who meet the Institute standards, as 
appraised by the employer, will receive Band 3 status (called Experienced Teacher) 
worth an additional $ 6100 currently. 
 
One of the 14 – 15 independent schools in the ACT has a Master Teacher allowance 
concept.  (It is understood that nearly all teachers receive this allowance).  In independent 
schools in general, bonuses are not common. 
 
In non-government systemic schools, as in government schools, the Awards and 
Agreements include relatively few promotions or allowances that relate to quality 
teaching performance measured against standards that do not involve time out of the 
classroom.  Independent non-systemic schools may operate within the ‘safety net’ of the 
relevant Award, but have their own methods of recognising and rewarding high quality 
teaching performance.  Many may contain an ‘advanced’ teacher classification. 
 
Summary 
Using the typology of performance pay schemes described in Section A it is clear from 
this overview of current industrial arrangements in Australia that performance-based pay 
schemes of any type are uncommon.   
 
The incremental scale 
There is considerable commonality across the jurisdictions in terms of starting salaries for 
teachers and progression to the top of incremental salary scales.  Almost all awards and 
agreements have some provision for performance pay in that teachers receive an annual 
increment based on their perceived level of performance and that in almost all cases this 
increment can be withheld.  Most teachers also undergo some kind of performance 
appraisal on an annual basis.   
 
It takes from eight to ten years for most qualified and registered teachers to reach the top 
of the initial incremental scale.  While progression along these scales is not automatic, it 
is rarely withheld.  Procedures are being developed by the Victorian Institute of Teaching 
and the NSW Institute of Teachers where teachers only gain full registration after one to 
three years provisional registration period and a rigorous standards-based assessment of 
their performance.   
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A recent US research suggests an incremental scale based mainly on years of experience 
over the first five to ten years or so is warranted, provided teachers a rigorous licensing 
system is in place and teachers are fulfilling their contractual duties satisfactorily.  Based 
on state-wide tests of student achievement in literacy and mathematics, this evidence 
suggests that most teachers get better with experience over the incremental salary range 
(Clotfelter, Ladd & Vigdor, 2007).  Rockoff (2004) also found that years of experience 
was a determinant of student achievement.  What this research indicates is that Australia 
would benefit from a professional certification system that provides teachers with clear 
direction as to what they should get better at over those ten years or so, and strong 
incentives for all teachers to reach those standards.   
 
Promotion positions and performance  
When we look at arrangements beyond the top of the incremental scale across the 
jurisdictions, there is more variation.  As described earlier, three government systems, 
WA, SA and the NT, have promotion positions based on an assessment of performance.  
These schemes were introduced through industrial negotiations.  While the validity of the 
assessment methods used in these schemes has not been tested, in the context of this 
report, these are undoubtedly examples, albeit limited examples, of attempts to introduce 
performance-based pay.  Locally arranged schemes for over-award payments and 
bonuses can be found in many independent schools (See Appendix 4).   
 
The WA Agreement is the most specific with regard to performance pay in its description 
of the requirements for becoming a Level 3 Classroom Teacher.  This Agreement was 
successfully negotiated between the Director General for the WA Department of 
Education and Training and the State School Teachers’ Union of Western Australia (the 
WA Branch of the AEU).  The differences in the content of Agreements, and the 
specificity of the WA Agreement in this context, suggest that performance pay 
arrangements can be introduced with a shared understanding of -- and agreement about -- 
what constitutes fair and effective measures.  While it is not possible to draw definitive 
conclusions in this report about the reasons for the wide variety of performance 
appraisal/management across states, possible reasons for this disparity could be the  
presence of “drivers” – persons in different positions in the industrial landscape who have 
the knowledge, the will and the energy to develop effective and acceptable schemes. 
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SECTION C: FACTORS AFFECTING THE INTRODUCTION OF 
PERFORMANCE-BASED PAY ARRANGEMENTS FOR TEACHERS  
The previous section of this report summarised arrangements for teachers’ pay scales 
across the jurisdictions under current industrial awards and agreements.  The guiding 
question was about the extent to which current arrangements could be described as 
performance-based pay.  Attention turns in this section to identifying policy or legislative 
frameworks that may impede, limit or prevent the introduction of performance-based pay 
arrangements for teachers. 
 
The existence of the promotional schemes based on classroom performance in WA, SA 
and the NT indicates that there is nothing inherent in the current processes for 
determining industrial awards and enterprise agreements that prevents the introduction of 
performance-based pay arrangements for teachers.  Although they are limited in scope, 
the existence of the three current schemes for offering promotion positions based on 
classroom performance demonstrates this.  These three schemes were developed as part 
of negotiations for current industrial awards and enterprise agreements.  They also owe 
their origins to the AST concept, which was promoted by the teacher unions and 
employing authorities as part of the Award Restructuring reforms in the early 1990s.  
Although the concept was consistent with the idea of building stronger links between 
teachers’ salaries and evidence of improved performance, implementation of the scheme 
was not.   
 
There are no legislative or other frameworks currently in place that prevent the 
implementation of performance pay schemes.  There seems to be no in-principle 
impediment, therefore, to other school systems introducing this type of performance pay 
system.  In practice, of course, there may be other difficulties to overcome; performance 
pay schemes, for example, have major cost implications in terms of developing standards, 
training assessors, operating the assessment system, not to mention the cost of increased 
salaries. 
 
The development of professional standards has been strongly supported by all 
stakeholders in Australia.  Both the major government school union, the AEU and the 
major non-government school union, the IEUA have supported the development of 
professional standards for teachers and the close involvement of the profession in the 




The union’s effective negotiation with employers around the 
criteria/standards and appraisal processes associated with the Advanced 
Teacher classifications has been based on the union’s deep knowledge and 
understanding of the professional role and work of their members. 
 
A clear impression emerges from surveying current initiatives and major stakeholders 
that there is a strong desire to provide greater recognition to teachers who can show 
evidence of attaining high standards of professional performance.  All stakeholders 
recognise they have a mutual interest in promoting quality teaching through rewarding 
evidence of enhanced knowledge and skill.  
 
This desire manifests itself, however, in a wide range of different schemes that vary in 
quality from school to school and from school system to school system.  There is no 
system, as there is in other professions, whereby the profession provides a credible 
certification service to the public and employers that members have reached a certain 
level of performance.  There is no consistent pattern to the definition of highly 
accomplished teaching or methods for assessing performance.  There are, however, some 
promising examples of embryonic certification systems developed by mathematics and 
science teachers, as summarised in a recent report prepared for Teaching Australia 
(Ingvarson & Kleinhenz, 2006a).  With some refinements, these systems could become 
operational in a short period. 
  
The case studies of performance pay arrangements in independent schools (Appendix 4) 
clearly show this ad hoc character.  Like so many independent schools, each of these 
schools is attempting to develop career pathways for highly accomplished teachers and 
teacher leaders.  However, they find it difficult to develop on their own credible systems 
for standards-based performance.  Their methods do not lead to portable qualifications 
with profession-wide respect and currency.  This is complex work.  In other professions, 
national professional bodies usually conduct professional assessment and certification.  
What characterises current arrangements is equivalent to every business developing its 
own CPA system for accountants, or each hospital administration developing its own 
certification system for doctors who reach high standards in their field of medicine.  
Teaching as a profession lacks its own system for providing an independent, authoritative 
certification service to schools and school systems seeking to provide incentives to 
teachers to attain high standards of professional performance and retain those that do.    
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Our impression from reviewing current arrangements and interviews conducted for this 
report is that there is an increasing desire among school principals for a service that 
provides them with an independent assessment and certification that teachers have 
attained high standards of practice.  An advantage of such a service would be the 
comparability of the standards and assessments.  These schools are trying to provide 
incentives and recognition to teachers who attain high standards, such as the Level 3 
classification in WA.  They want the assessment to be credible, but know that this is very 
difficult for them to achieve at the level of the single school.   
 
Some independent schools in NSW have been looking toward the NSW Institute of 
Teachers as a possible provider of this service in the future.  There is no body that 
provides this service nationally or profession-wide at present, although this is a role that 
Teaching Australia has been considering for the future.  Leaders of principal 
organisations interviewed for this report indicated that there would need to be consistency 
from school to school in the meaning of terms such as “Highly Accomplished Teacher” if 
the aim of creating a stronger market for such teachers was to be created.  They 
remember that the inability of processes for identifying Advanced Skills Teachers to 
ensure comparability from school to school and system to system undermined the 
credibility of that classification.  
 
Conditions affecting the introduction of performance-based pay arrangements 
While current legislative frameworks do not prevent the introduction of performance pay 
schemes, this is not to say that the introduction of performance-based pay arrangements 
would be a straightforward matter.  Of course, it all depends on the type of performance 
pay in question.  The average life of merit-pay schemes in the USA, for example, has 
been about 4 to 5 years (Murnane & Cohen, 1986).  In comparison, schemes based on 
evidence of professional development, such as those above in WA, NT and SA, and the 
NBPTS in the USA, appear likely to be more long-standing.  The NBPTS has now been 
operating for nearly 20 years.  Original proponents said it would take at least that long to 
become accepted. 
 
It is clear from the extensive literature on performance pay that the success of these 
schemes is critically dependent, first, on the level of preparatory research, 
experimentation and field trials to ensure that methods of gathering evidence and 
assessing performance are valid, reliable and fair.  Without this kind of credibility the 
system quickly loses credibility and respect (Protsik, 1996).  Murnane and Cohen point 
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out that for a merit-pay plan to be effective, an employer must be able to provide answers 
to the following two questions that employees will inevitably ask:  
 
1) Why does worker X get merit-pay and I don’t? 
2) What can I do to get merit- pay? 
 
These questions can not be answered without a valid system for assessing performance. A 
scheme which is unable to provide satisfactory answers to these questions is likely to fail.   
 
The second need is to ensure there is long term funding to support the new salary 
arrangements.  The third, related to the first, is to ensure that these schemes are not left to 
individual schools to implement in their own way.  Schools rarely have the internal 
capacity to conduct fair and reliable high stakes assessments of teacher performance 
against professional standards.  Consequently, they may face charges of bias and 
cronyism - and staff relationships usually suffer as a result (Protsik, 1996, p.285-6).   
 
Many individual merit-pay plans were adopted as a means to increase teacher 
accountability and improve teacher performance.  For the most part, these plans not 
only failed to improve student achievement, but also destroyed teachers’ 
collaboration with each other and their trust in the administrators in charge of 
evaluating their performance. 
 
Consistency in application of the standards and assessments across schools often 
becomes a major issue that undermines the credibility of such schemes.  It is noteworthy 
that the most enduring and effective performance pay schemes are based on an external 
system for managing the assessment process such as the WA Level 3 and NBPTS 
systems.  
 
Who pays for better performance? 
The issue of performance pay in government schools bears a close relation to how 
schools are funded and managed.  State and territory funding allocations for all 
Australian government schools are decided centrally at the level of the state or territory 
jurisdiction, but how the allocations are spent in schools depends in part on the level of 
management independence granted to schools.  Government schools in Victoria, for 
example, have a high degree of self-management: principals select teaching staff and are 
able to operate more freely under their own ‘global budgets’ than their counterparts in 
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some other states.  But even in Victorian schools there are competing budget priorities 
and little flexibility to pay teachers extra by, for example, creating extra positions, or 
allocating bonuses for superior performance.  While, in theory, self-managing schools 
may appear to have more capacity to provide performance pay, budget constraints mean 
that this capacity remains limited. 
 
Government schools may also raise their own funds to be used at the discretion of the 
principal and school council.  A major source of such revenue in some schools is the 
enrolment of overseas full fee-paying students.  This may provide some schools with 
sufficient funds to reward some teachers or to increase the number of promotion 
positions, but even then budgeting priorities would still be an issue.   
 
School self-management also generally includes local merit selection of staff.  This may 
increase staffing flexibility and allow schools to select teachers who best meet their 
requirements, but again, central transfer requirements and teacher placements across a 
system can be highly restrictive, even in schools that have locally generated extra 
funding.  For example, a Victorian government school which has a large number of full 
fee-paying overseas students, and is therefore able to hire more staff still has to meet the 
system’s requirement to prefer displaced teachers already in the system over other 
applicants.   
 
State and Territory government schools vary in their ability to select teaching staff.  
These arrangements can be quite complex although all have some kind of central 
component.  WA has a ‘mixture’ of local and central appointment; South Australia has 
recently introduced local merit-based selection in a range of positions.  Graduate teachers 
in different states/territories may be offered beginning teacher positions under a range of 
schemes.  
 
Assessing teacher performance 
Assumptions underlying performance pay schemes 
While there is a shared desire among interested parties to reward accomplishment in 
teaching, there are very different assumptions about how incentives motivate improved 
performance and indeed, what should count as evidence of improved performance.  The 
literature on theories and research about the relationship between pay and motivation is 




The fact is that many previous attempts to change teacher compensation 
were ineffective at motivating higher teacher performance because most of 
these programs were implemented with flawed understanding of the 
psychological theories of worker and teacher motivation and poor 
understandings of the school organisational context.  
 
In developing a performance pay scheme, it is important to be clear about its purpose and 
the problem that the scheme is attempting to solve.  It is also important to be aware that 
performance pay schemes can generate unintended consequences, or distort performance, 
if they place more value on some aspects of a teacher’s responsibilities than others.  For 
some proponents, the assumption appears to be that teachers are withholding their best 
efforts for want of money incentives.  For them, the aim of performance pay is to increase 
the work rate.  For others, the problem that needs to be addressed is the lack of incentives 
and recognition for reaching high teaching standards.  For these people, performance pay 
aims to reward evidence of increased professional expertise.   
 
A key question to ask of any scheme is how engagement in the scheme will increase 
teachers’ knowledge and skill in ways that lead to improved student achievement.  
Research indicates that earlier merit pay schemes of the former type had little impact on 
improving student learning outcomes (Johnson, 1986).  They did not provide useful 
feedback as to how to teach more effectively.  Similarly, schemes that only provide 
feedback on a teacher’s performance  in the form of student scores on standardised 
achievement tests may give teachers limited information about how they could teach 
better (Darling-Hammond, 1992).  Teachers are more accepting of pay schemes that 
provide recognition for reaching high teaching standards.  And evidence is mounting that 
such schemes can improve performance and identify teachers who are more effective in 
terms of student learning outcomes (Ingvarson & Kleinhenz, 2006a).   
 
For still other proponents, performance pay schemes aim to address the difficulty 
teaching has in competing effectively with other professions for high quality graduates 
and keeping them.  Research in this area reminds us that intrinsic and extrinsic incentives 
are both important to quality teaching.  The primary motivator for teachers is the prospect 
of improving student achievement and enjoyment of school.  However, better pay and 
career prospects do attract better quality graduates (Chevalier et al., 2007), and poor 
relative salary ranks high among the reasons good teachers leave the profession.  While it 
is important to distinguish incentives designed to attract and retain good teachers from 
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those that will improve their teaching, policies are needed to ensure incentives of both 
types are in place (Johnson, 1986; 2006; Odden & Kelley 2002).    
 
Defining “performance”  
The brief for this report (see Appendix 1) focuses on current arrangements for 
performance pay in Australia, as well as national and international research on the impact 
of performance pay schemes.  The latter includes impact on stakeholder attitudes, teacher 
retention, teaching standards, student outcomes, and relationships between staff.  
 
Addressing these questions is not as straightforward as it may seem.  It will be clear that 
the impact of performance pay schemes varies widely with the type of scheme in 
question.  There is no one approach to performance pay, hence it is not possible to 
generalise about stakeholder perceptions of these schemes.  What is needed is a typology 
of performance pay schemes.  In other words, we need to ask, “what is being assessed 
when we claim to be assessing teacher performance?”  Is this the same as assessing 
teacher quality?  Another way of framing this question, which is central to the issue of 
performance pay, is, “On what bases should teacher performance be evaluated?” 
 
Fenstermacher and Richardson (2005) remind us that quality teaching is about more than 
whether something is taught.  It is also about how it is taught (p.189).  Successful 
teaching in the former sense may not be good teaching in the latter sense.  Teaching is 
undeniably a moral enterprise.   
 
What counts as “performance” varies.  For some the main indicators of performance 
should be measures of student outcomes, based on standardised tests of student 
achievement.  This is what Fenstermacher and Richardson call “successful teaching”.   
 
By successful teaching we mean that the learner actually acquires, to some 
reasonable and acceptable level of proficiency, what the teacher is engaged in 
teaching.  (p.191) 
 
For others, the evidence of a teacher’s performance should be based on observations of 
the quality of opportunities they provide for student learning in their classrooms in 




By good teaching we mean that the content taught accords with disciplinary 
standards of adequacy and completeness, and that the methods employed are 
age appropriate, morally defensible, and undertaken with the intention of 
enhancing the learner’s competence with respect to the content studied. (p.191) 
 
This distinction points to two different approaches to determining teacher quality – and 
two different views on the aspects for which teachers should be held accountable.  It also 
reflects different policy imperatives.   
 
Although it seems plausible to use student learning outcomes as a measure of “good 
teaching” and a basis for evaluating teacher performance, the direct relationship between 
good teaching and learning is uncertain. The relationship between the two is far from a 
simple 1:1 causal relationship.  Successful teaching, as defined above, depends not only 
on good teaching, but three other conditions as well:   
 
1) willingness and effort by the learner; 
2) a social surround supportive of teaching and learning; and 
3) opportunity to teach and learn (Fenstermacher and Richardson, p.190). 
 
Good teaching is only one of the ingredients necessary for successful teaching: a teacher 
may be good, while unsuccessful in certain contexts. While it may be reasonable to hold 
teachers accountable for good teaching in the sense above, it is clear that successful 
teaching depends also on conditions being in place for which others are accountable.  
Standards for good teaching need to go hand in hand with standards for quality teaching 
conditions and school resources.  This indicates the importance of recognising that 
successful teaching is a shared responsibility between governments and the profession. 
 
Assessing performance 
In any assessment of performance, whether it be Olympic diving or gymnastics or 
teaching, it is clearly important to describe what is to be assessed and how.  This is the 
role of standards.  The purpose of standards in performance assessment is to: 
 
• define what is to be assessed (i.e. what is good teaching; what should teachers 
know and be able to do?)   
• describe how it will be measured (i.e. what counts as valid evidence about 
teaching performance and how will it be gathered?), and  
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• specify the level of performance that meets the standards (i.e. how will the 
evidence be judged?)  
 
The purpose of teaching standards is to describe the full scope of what teachers are 
expected to know and be able to do.  A set of standards typically includes a number of 
domains and sub-domains such as those listed in Table 7.  (A committee of science 
teachers developed this particular set of standards for the National Board of Professional 
Teaching Standards (NBPTS) in the USA.  The table only summarises the main elements 
in this set of standards.  The full set of standards with elaborations of each element is 
nearly 30 pages long – good teaching is complex work)   
 
Table 7 illustrates the wide array of potential sources of evidence that might be gathered 
in assessing a teacher’s performance for each of the 13 sub-domains (N.B. The NBPTS 
uses only portfolio entries and assessment centre exercises).  These sources include 
people such as students and supervisors, existing school records, and teacher products.  
In other words, they include sources already available in most schools, some that might 
be gathered by trained observers and some that teachers can be asked to provide 
themselves to show how they meet the relevant standard.   
 
Student evaluation instruments (and parent feedback) can be used to provide reliable 
measures of class environment (Irving, 2005).  Paper and pencil tests can provide a valid 
means of gathering evidence about the currency of a teacher’s content and pedagogical 
knowledge (Pearlman, 2000).  Direct evidence of student learning of what the teacher is 
expected to teach, such as student work samples over time or repeated measures on valid 
measures of student growth, provide essential evidence of increasing understanding.  
Documented accomplishments, verified by colleagues and principals, can provide 
evidence of contribution to school and professional community.   
 
In summary, valid and reliable assessment of teacher performance requires:  
 
(i) evidence that taken together covers all of the standards.  Clearly, any 
assessment of teacher performance based on one or two forms of evidence 
only cannot provide a valid or reliable measure across all the standards 
(ii) more than one form of evidence for each of the standards 
(iii) evidence that is directly (not statistically) related to the quality of teaching by 
the individual being evaluated 
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Appropriate forms of evidence about teacher 
performance 
 








Student evaluations; classroom observations/video-
based portfolio entries; supervisor reports; school 
records/ personnel files; former students; 
communications with parents/parent surveys 
 Knowledge of 
science 
Paper and pencil tests of science and science pedagogy 
knowledge; classroom observations/videotape-based 
portfolio entries; teacher set tests/assessments of 




Teacher products: Samples of units of work; lesson 
plans; portfolio entries based on classroom activities 
and student work samples 





Engagement Classroom observation; videotape-based portfolio 
entries; Student evaluations; Parent survey 
 Learning 
environment 
Classroom observation; videotape-based portfolio 
entries; Student evaluations; Parent survey 
 Equitable 
participation 
Classroom observation; videotape-based portfolio 
entries; Student evaluations; Parent survey 





Teacher produced units of work; student work over 
time; videotape-based portfolio entries of student 
activity, classroom interaction/ discussion and student 





Samples of student work over time; student 
evaluations; repeated measures of student 
understanding of science concepts 
 Contexts of 
science 
Examples of teacher planned units of work, including 
aims, activities, assessments and samples of student 
work over time; videotapes of class 
discussion/interaction around key issues in science 






Portfolio entries based on assessment of student work 
samples over time; range and depth of assessment 
strategies used, teacher feedback and annotations of 
student work; samples of assessment tasks and student 
responses with teacher commentary  
 Family and 
community 
outreach 
Documented accomplishments with evidence of 





Documented accomplishments with evidence of 




Portfolio entries containing analyses and reflections on 
implications of student work samples and videotapes 
of student activities; Interviews following classroom 
observations 
Source:  ACER, 2007 
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(iv) full coverage of the teacher’s responsibilities; e.g. need to cover all 
curriculum areas if a primary teacher;  need evidence from several classes if 
a secondary teacher 
(v) evidence that is reasonably accurate and objective, and (ideally) is readily 
available and easy to collect. 
 
Multiple sources of data should be used, wherever possible, for each standard sub-
domain.  The use of multiple sources includes not only the use of several different types 
of evidence, but also several trained judges of each piece of evidence.  Apart from mutual 
confirmation, however, the use of multiple data sources sometimes turns up entirely new 
information about a teacher’s level of performance or range of contributions. These 
advantages have to be balanced against the increase in cost of evaluating teachers through 
using multiple sources.  
 
When two or more sources of data or information on the same attribute conflict, an effort 
should be made to determine why they do not support each other (e.g., recheck the 
accuracy of the sources or measures, the currency of the information, the use of samples 
collected on different occasions, typical day vs. bad day). 
 
There is general agreement among experts in teacher evaluation that a valid and reliable 
scheme for assessing teacher performance for high stakes decisions must draw on several 
types of evidence (Joint Committee on Standards for Educational Evaluation, 1988; 
Shulman, 1988; Scriven 1994; Pearlman, 2000; Stronge, 1997).  This is because such 
schemes need to gather evidence that encompasses the full scope of what a teacher is 
expected to know and be able to do, not only to ensure their professional credibility, but 
increasingly, their legal defensibility.   
 
Although it might seem simpler to use student test scores alone as a method for assessing 
teacher performance, it should be clear from the above that a fair and valid assessment 
needs to be based on direct evidence of performance.  That is, it needs to be based on the 
quality of the conditions that a teacher is providing for students to learn in relation to 
valid teaching standards.  Recent evidence indicates that standards-based assessments of 
teacher performance by trained teacher-assessors can reach high levels of reliability 
(Gitomer, forthcoming).  The evidence also indicates that the students of teachers who do 
well on these performance assessments, such as those used for NBPTS certification 
achieve better on standardised achievement tests than students of teachers who do not 
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(Milanowski, 2004; Goldhaber and Anthony, 2004; Vandervoort, 2004).  As a result of 
his research, Milanowski suggests that: 
  
 . . . scores from a rigorous teacher evaluation system can be substantially 
related to student achievement and provide criterion-related validity evidence 
for the use of the performance evaluation scores as the basis for a 
performance-based pay system . . . (p 34) 
 
Value-added methods for estimating teacher effects on student performance 
There have been significant developments in attempts to use student achievement as a 
measure for evaluating teachers.  Millman (1997) reviewed four of these schemes in the 
USA, each using different kinds of student assessment.  Two of them used “value-added” 
models for isolating and estimating school and teacher effects: the Tennessee Value 
Added Assessment System (TVAAS) and the Dallas Value-Added Accountability 
System.  Proponents of these schemes claim that they are able to separate the effects of 
teachers and schools from the strong effects of factors such as family background.  These 
two schemes are used, along with a range of other sources of information, to examine 
patterns of performance and to provide, for example, an indication of teachers who 
require professional development.  While, these two schemes are not linked to salaries or 
bonuses, Pennsylvania has recently drafted a bill that proposes to use student 
achievement results to evaluate and reward administrators and teachers.   
 
The consensus among those who are closely familiar with these schemes is that they do 
not provide, and are unlikely to provide, a valid basis for decision-making about the 
quality of teaching, such as that involved in making performance-related pay decisions 
(Kupermintz, 2002; McCaffrey et al., 2003; Raudenbush, 2004; Braun, 2005; Gordon, 
Kane & Staiger, 2006).  Some experts in educational measurement regard schemes such 
as the TVAAS as flawed because they use national norm-referenced tests that are usually 
insensitive to detecting the effects of teachers “instructional efforts” (Popham, 1997, p. 
270).  A danger with such schemes is that they may use student assessment data for a 
purpose that was not initially intended.  That is, they may use students' scores on a 
nationally standardized test to assess the performance of individual teachers when the test 
scores have not been validated for the latter purpose.   Such tests are usually designed to 
discriminate between students, not teachers.  In a recent review of the literature on the 




. . . VAM-based rankings of teachers are highly unstable, and that only large 
differences in estimated impact are likely to be detectable given the effects of 
sampling error and other sources of uncertainty.  Interpretations of differences 
among teachers based on VAM estimates should be made with extreme 
caution. (p.113) 
 
The reliability of value-added estimates depends on the quality of the student 
achievement measures that underpin them, and the margins of error in most existing 
measures need to be understood.  While there have been significant advances in our 
ability to measure educational growth, we are a long way from measures with anything 
like the reliability of, say, measures of growth in children’s weight or height.  In addition, 
measures available so far are limited mainly to reading and numeracy in the primary 
years.  For most subjects in the primary curriculum, and for most teachers of the 
secondary curriculum, there are no measures to which value-added modelling could be 
applied.  This means that value-added measures of student achievement, like any of the 
sources of evidence in Table 7, should only be used in conjunction with several other 
independent sources of evidence about a teacher’s performance (and, of course, only 
where there is evidence of their reliability).    
 
To our knowledge, only a few pay schemes, as yet, provide salary or bonus awards for 
individual teachers based on value-added measures of student learning (e.g. the Special 
Teachers are Rewarded (STAR) scheme initiated by the Florida Department of Education 
and the Teacher Advancement Program mentioned earlier).  Consequently, there is little 
research to report on stakeholder attitudes to these schemes or their impact.  
 
Standards-based methods for evaluating teacher performance 
A major trend in reforming teacher pay systems is to define performance in terms of what 
teachers know and can do – the quality of the conditions they provide for learning – and 
evidence about what their students are doing as a direct result of their teaching, including 
what they are learning over time.  These schemes are often referred to as knowledge and 
skills-based pay systems (Odden & Kelley, 2002).   
 
Professional ‘standards’ provide the vehicle for defining what teachers should know and 
be able to do in these schemes.  Knowledge and skills-based pay systems aim to provide 
stronger links between pay increases and evidence of capacity to meet standards of 
teaching.  Progress in this area has been greatly facilitated by more sophisticated methods 
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of standards-based assessment of teaching performance.  Teachers generally have a more 
positive attitude to these approaches to gathering evidence about their performance, such 
as those used for assessing teachers for Level 3 Classroom Teacher positions in WA or 
those used by the National Board for Professional Teaching Standard (NBPTS) in the 
USA, even though the standards are demanding and the assessment process rigorous.  
These schemes are discussed in more detail in Section D of the report.   
 
The foregoing gives two views about the basis for teacher evaluation and accountability – 
whether teacher performance should be judged in terms of student learning outcomes, 
using  national or state-level tests, or conformity with professional standards of the day.  
These two views apply across the professions, not just teaching, where practice depends 
on the application of expertise and judgment to what are frequently non-routine 
problems.  When questions arise about a doctor’s performance, for example, legal cases 
focus on whether that doctor followed procedures consistent with current standards for 
good practice based on research, not patient outcomes.  This is not to say, of course, that 
variation in outcomes is not an important evidence of potential variation in professional 
proficiency.  It is to say that variation in outcomes is not necessarily because of variation 
in professional performance. 
 
Wider definitions of performance: teacher leadership 
Going further, measures of performance will depend on how the scope and boundaries of 
teachers’ work is defined.  One of the characteristic features of teachers’ work is that the 
scope of a first year teacher’s work may be the same as that of a 30-year veteran teacher 
in the classroom next door.  Teachers’ work can be defined so that performance is 
assessed mainly in terms of the quality of classroom teaching.  Or, it can be defined so 
that measures of performance include, for example, the development of skills in 
leadership and management, in new subject areas, in technology, in curriculum 
development and student assessment, and in building school-community links.  Schools 
need teachers who perform well in all these areas, but traditional pay systems have rarely 
been designed deliberately to promote the development of knowledge and skills needed 
by schools.  In other words, the pay system has not been “strategic”.  “Strategic pay,” as 
Lawler (1990) calls it, is the means by which effective organisations ensure their pay 
system is aligned with their objectives -- that is, the extent to which the pay system 
encourages and rewards the development of the knowledge and skills that are central to 
achieving the organisation’s central purposes. As with measuring classroom performance, 
however, the challenge here is to develop relevant standards and reliable and valid 
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methods for gathering evidence about performance and outcomes beyond the classroom, 
not opinions and anecdotal evidence. 
 
Linking pay to performance 
Despite the seemingly obvious advantages of linking  pay to performance, the concept 
has proved to be more difficult to apply to professional work in non-profit organizations, 
like schools and hospitals, than to work such as sales and piecework where “employees 
contribute independently to the effectiveness of the total group or organization” (Lawler, 
1983 p.100).  The historical record is clear that few merit based pay schemes have 
survived when applied to teaching (Murnane & Cohen, 1986: Johnson, 1986; Odden & 
Kelley, 2003).    
The key challenge has been to find a valid basis on which to evaluate teacher 
performance (Scriven, 1994); in other words, a valid basis on which to hold teachers 
accountable for the quality of their practice.  As this report indicates, this is by no means 
as straightforward a task as it may seem.  Professional work is not as amenable to simple 
measures of outcomes as that of many other occupations. Rather than outcomes, 
professionals are held accountable for applying practices consistent with current research 
and best practice rather than one-dimensional outcome measures. The standards in Table 
7 earlier illustrated the scope of responsibilities for which a teacher might be held 
accountable.   
Consistent with this view, valuable new work has been done in Australia and overseas in 
recent years indicating that it is possible to develop a professional consensus around 
rigorous performance standards for teaching.  Teachers’ professional associations in 
Australia and in the USA have been demonstrating that they can develop standards that 
articulate what accomplished teachers should know and be able to do, based on research 
and best practice (Ingvarson & Kleinhenz, 2006a; National Board for Professional 
Teaching Standards: www.nbpts.org).  It is this capacity that holds the greatest promise 
for building a stronger relationship between teachers’ career advancement and their 
professional performance.  
Understandably, teachers have been more likely to support teacher evaluation schemes 
that they see as recognising the complexity of good teaching, when they perceive that the 
underpinning standards have validity, when the methods for gathering evidence about 
their performance are broad-based and sensitive to context, and when judges of their 
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performance have adequate training and expertise in their field of teaching (Bacharach, et 
al., 1990; Ingvarson & Chadbourne, 1998). 
 
One of the main lessons from over 100 years of efforts to introduce performance pay is 
the need to recognise the complexity involved in evaluating the performance of teachers.  
In the late 1980s, concern about the weaknesses of teacher evaluation systems in the USA 
was such that an expert panel made up of representatives from fourteen major 
professional associations in education was commissioned to develop a set of standards for 
evaluating systems for assessing teacher performance.  The panel embraced 
representatives of school administrators, state governors, experts in educational 
measurement, school principal organisations, educational researchers, and school boards.  
The outcome of the Panel’s collaboration became known as The Personnel Evaluation 
Standards (The Joint Committee on Standards for Educational Evaluation, 1988).  The 
standards have been revised recently by the Committee, following an extensive 
consultation process with stakeholders.  The 27 standards cover four main components 
that need to be in place for sound teacher evaluation systems: propriety standards (ethical 
and legal principles); utility standards (to ensure evaluations are informative, timely and 
influential; feasibility standards (to promote evaluations that are efficient and viable); and 
accuracy standards (to ensure interpretations of data are valid and assessments of 
performance are reliable.  
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SECTION D: RESEARCH ON THE ATTITUDES OF STAKEHOLDERS 
TO PERFORMANCE-BASED PAY FOR TEACHERS 
With a few exceptions, most of the relevant research literature on attitudes to 
performance pay comes from the USA and the UK (and Europe to some extent).  There is 
no simple typology of performance pay schemes as applied to individual teachers, but the 
common categories that appear in literature from the USA (e.g. Odden & Kelley) include 
‘merit pay’, ‘knowledge and skills-based pay’ and ‘professional certification’.   
 
In England and Wales, the terms “performance management” and “performance-related 
pay” are more commonly used, especially since the Government’s Green Paper reforms 
to ‘modernise’ teaching in the late 1990s.  Their origins, and the assumptions behind 
these reforms and changes in teachers’ work, are somewhat different from those in the 
USA.  As Marsden and Belfield (2006) point out:  
 
The performance management system for state schoolteachers, introduced by 
the government in 2000, sought to address the need to reward teachers better 
for excellence in the classroom.  Performance management sought to 
combine goal-setting and appraisal with performance pay, thus extending the 
growing practice of other parts of the British public services. (p.3) 
 
After 2000, all teachers were subject to annual goal-setting performance reviews.  
Experienced teachers were offered an extended pay scale beyond the top of the old 
incremental scale.  Progression to this upper pay scale and passing through the 
“threshold” depended on a successful assessment of their performance by school 
principals (Ingvarson, 2002).  
 
The main features of these schemes will be described below, but it is important to keep in 
mind that there may be as much variation within operational schemes as there is between 
them.  In examining stakeholders attitudes towards performance pay it is therefore 
important to be clear about the type of performance pay scheme to which those attitudes 
refer, since attitudes will obviously vary according to the particular understandings of the 
concept of ‘performance pay’ reflected in each scheme.  
 
It is also important to keep in mind that the brief for this report focused on performance 
pay schemes for individual teachers rather than groups of teachers. There have been 
significant developments in group-based performance pay schemes in which bonuses are 
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provided to all school staff or staff teams in schools that meet pre-set performance 
improvement targets, but these will not be reported on here.  
 
Following a brief discussion of the history of pay for performance schemes in the USA, 
the UK and Australia, this section of the paper presents an overview of performance-
based pay schemes for teachers that are currently operating in the UK (England and 
Wales, Scotland), the USA, Sweden, Singapore and Australia.  The overview includes an 
investigation of associated research that examines the attitudes of teachers and other 
stakeholders towards the schemes.  Most of the research carried out has been on the 
attitudes of teachers and school administrators, rather than other stakeholders.  
 
The section closes with a summary and discussion of the factors that seem to facilitate 
and inhibit the development of positive attitudes on the part of teachers and other 
stakeholders towards various kinds of performance-based pay systems.   
 
Paying teachers for performance: brief history 
In the last quarter of the 19th century, English, Australian and some USA teachers were 
paid according to pupils’ ‘results’ as assessed in examinations, tests, and visits by 
‘Inspectors’.  Introduced in England and Australia in 1862, the systems were designed 
largely as a cost cutting mechanism, but loftier hopes were also held for it, especially in 
Australia: 
 
It stimulates the teacher, it promotes organization, it ensures uniform 
progress unto the pupil, and by an equitable distribution of this payment 
amongst the teachers, and by making this payment dependent on their 
exertions, it enlists them heartily into the service.  (Austin, 1961, p.238)  
 
Unfortunately the systems did not live up to these promises.  They quickly became 
discredited on a number of grounds, not least of which was that teachers were found to be 
using practices of doubtful educational value, such as ‘beating the three R’s into their 
unfortunate charges’ (Austin, 1961, p.237) in order to secure their incomes.   
 
By the early 20th century, payment by results was officially discontinued in the England 
and Australia, and little more was heard, in those countries about paying teachers extra 
money for better ‘performance’ until the 1980s and 1990s, when governments and policy 
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makers started to show concern that poor education standards were contributing to poor 
economic performance (Hood et al., 1999). 
 
Merit pay  
The term “merit pay” is still used in some quarters, but as used here refers mainly to the 
many schemes developed in the 1970s and 1980s in the USA.  It is worth mentioning 
these earlier schemes, because there is a substantial body of research about their impact 
(e.g. Johnson, 1986; Murnane & Cohen, 1986), and because, despite this body of 
research, similar schemes still appear today.  (See, for example, the Florida Special 
Teachers are Rewarded Scheme, which will distribute awards of at least 5 per cent of the 
base pay to the best performing 25 per cent of teachers within cooperating school 
districts.  “Performance” has to be in terms of test student scores, but the measures are 
left to school districts to define.  The life span of such a project is likely to be no longer 
than the merit pay schemes of the past).  
 
Classroom observation has been the main method for assessing performance in merit pay 
schemes in the past, using a variety of observational checklists of dubious validity 
(Scriven, 1994; Stodolsky, 1990).  More recently, merit pay schemes have sought to use 
measures of student achievement.  In 2001, under its No Child Left Behind Act, the new 
Federal Government in the USA mandated that states use “test-based accountability” 
systems.  Complying with this act has posed major difficulties for states, and the main 
approach used, called the “cohort-to-cohort gain” approach, has been widely criticised 
(McCaffrey et al., 2003).  In this approach, the performance of one cohort of students in a 
given grade is compared with previous cohorts in the same grade; individual students are 
not tracked over time, unlike value-added schemes. 
 
These schemes came and went regularly during the 20th century in the USA, but they 
have been rare in Australia.  Although a number of teacher “appraisal” or performance 
management schemes appeared in Australia over the past twenty years (Ingvarson & 
Chadbourne, 1994), few were linked to directly to decisions about pay.   
 
‘Merit’ pay and ‘performance’ pay 
The term ‘merit pay’ was commonly used to describe the use of financial incentives to 
encourage employees’ efforts and lift productivity.  It is still common to find the terms 
‘Merit pay’ and ‘performance pay’ used interchangeably, with ‘merit pay’ being in more 
general use in the USA and ‘performance pay’ in Europe (OECD, 2005; Marsden & 
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Belfield, 2006) .  One distinction between the two terms is that ‘performance pay’ usually 
describes initiatives that strive for objectivity in assessment, while ‘merit pay’ schemes 
usually rely on the opinions and judgement of a supervisor: 
 
Definitions are fluid, but merit pay is often seen as a system in which ‘merit’ 
is determined by a supervisor, whereas performance is supposed to be a more 
objective measure.  In many instances, however, merit and performance may 
both be determined by a test, by some demonstration of teacher skill or 
knowledge, or by student achievement.  No uniform definition exists, so 
arguments for and against are often confused.  (Gratz, 2005) 
 
Research on merit pay 
Merit pay schemes in the USA have waxed and waned over the past 150 years.  Interest 
in merit pay has tended to coincide with periods of concern about the US economy 
(Johnson, 1986).  In 1953, only 4 per cent of schools had a pay for performance scheme.  
Following the then USSR’s success with Sputnik, and subsequent scapegoating of the 
USA education system, there was a resurgence of interest in the 1960s, but by 1978 fewer 
than 4 per cent of schools had merit pay (Murnane and Cohen, 1986).  Interest rose again 
in the Reagan 1980s, when education was targeted once more as the reason for a decline 
in the competitiveness of the USA economy.  Once again, however, these schemes were 
short lived, so that by 1990 a National Centre for Education Services survey found that 
only 2 per cent of teachers in American schools received individual pay for performance, 
3 per cent received group awards, and 16 per cent received some kind of career ladder 
award (Jacobsen, 1992).   
 
Research that aimed to find out why the schemes were failing to attract support revealed 
few surprises.  Teachers lacked faith in the fairness and validity of the school-based 
evaluation processes, objectives were ill-defined and funding was inadequate (Odden & 
Kelley, 1997; Johnson, 1984).  There were also concerns about threats to teachers’ 
collegiality, objections to including student achievement as a measure of performance 
(based on perceptions that there were many influences on students learning) and 
suggestions that some schools were cheating by misrepresenting students’ results (Clees 
& Nabors, 1992). 
 
Time and again, the record indicates that proponents treated teacher evaluation as if it 
was simple and unproblematic – something that could be left to untrained school 
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administrators.  The basic requirements for reliable assessment of complex performance, 
such as valid teaching standards, multiple forms of evidence and multiple, trained 
assessors remained unmet.  Despite their sometime confidence, the research indicates that 
school principals are not necessarily reliable judges of teacher performance, especially 
when that judgement is based on unstructured and occasional observations of classrooms 
(Medley & Coker, 1987; Stodolsky, 1990).  The micro politics of life in schools also gave 
teachers concern whether sufficient steps had been taken to minimise bias and cronyism 
in assessments of their performance (Blase, 1991).   
 
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, it became apparent that merit pay schemes rested on 
the assumption that incentives teachers needed to work harder if they were paid 
competitively on the basis of perceived (by school administrators) competence (Odden & 
Kelley, 2003).  Policy makers and designers of performance-related pay schemes began 
to question this assumption, recognising that improving teacher quality is a complex 
endeavour that calls for much more than providing incentives designed to lift and reward 
effort (Johnson, 2006).  Some recent attempts to design systems that overcome the 
weaknesses of previous efforts are described below.   
 
Performance pay reforms in England and Wales 
The Teachers Incentive Pay Project in England and Wales 
A performance-related pay scheme, The Teacher Incentive Pay Project was introduced in 
England and Wales respectively in 2000 and 2001 in two phases – Performance 
Threshold and Performance Management.  The scheme was envisaged on a large scale, 
as the Department of Education and Skills (DfES) employed over 650,000 teachers at this 
time.  Unlike performance pay systems in other areas, such as local government, it was 
uniform across the whole system, rather than implemented in a piecemeal fashion.  It was 
unusual in that it was limited to professionals: similar schemes introduced in the public 
health and other sectors excluded professionals and applied only to managers (Farrell & 
Morris, 2004, p.81). 
 
The Green Paper (Department for Education and Employment, 2000), in which the 
scheme was proposed, identified low teacher motivation and difficulties with recruitment 
and retention as problems that the initiative would resolve.  The source of these problems 
was perceived to be the prevailing ‘culture’ or ‘tradition’ in education in which teachers 
were not rewarded for performance (Richardson, 1999). 
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The Green Paper proposals envisaged the introduction of a performance-related pay 
scheme for individual teachers within a compulsory performance appraisal system.  The 
Teachers Incentive Pay Project, introduced in 2000 implemented the Green Paper 
proposals in the following ways. 
 
English and Welsh teachers who previously were unable to progress in pay beyond the 
top of the nine level salary spine became eligible to apply to cross a ‘performance 
threshold’.  To do this, they had to complete an application form in which they 
summarised evidence of accomplished teaching, using concrete examples from their day 
to day work, to show that they met the required level on a set of standards, developed by 
the DfES.  They were asked not to attach any supporting evidence to the form, but to 
ensure that evidence was available upon request.  Teachers were advised to provide no 
more than three examples of evidence for each standard and to limit their responses to 
250 words per standard.  The assessment processes were carried out under the authority 
of school governing bodies, which delegated the receipt and assessment of applications to 
the head teacher.   
 
Initially, this scheme included a verification process involving external ‘reviewers’, but 
this was discontinued in 2006 because of the expense and a perception that it was 
unnecessary, since in almost 100 per cent of cases the reviewers agreed with the head 
teachers’ judgements.  Teachers who ‘passed’ the Threshold gained an immediate pay 
increase and access to levels of the higher pay spine.   
 
The Threshold was the first part of the Teacher Incentive Pay Project to be implemented.  
The second part of the project, introduced after the first round of the Threshold, was 
‘Performance Management’.  This depended on a regular appraisal process similar to that 
of the Threshold and also directed by head teachers.  Only teachers who satisfied the 
requirements of the performance standards, at the appropriate level, in the annual 
performance review process were eligible to receive annual pay increments.  This, in 
theory, meant that teachers who met the standards at the particular level were rewarded 
for their performance.   
 
Research on stakeholder attitudes to the Green Paper proposals 
In 2000, Storey evaluated stakeholders’ initial reactions to the pay for performance 
initiative, as flagged in the Green Paper, by examining over 40,000 responses to a 
consultation document from teachers, school administrators and other ‘interested parties’, 
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including Local Education Authorities (LEAs) and school governors.  In 2001, similar, 
but more limited research was carried out among teachers in Wales (Farrell & Morris, 
2004).  This research documented stakeholders’ attitudes to the initiative before its 
introduction.  It is relevant today, particularly in light of subsequent research conducted 
after implementation (see below), because it provides retrospective information about 
attitude factors that appear to have seriously inhibited the success of the program.   
 
From her examination of an analysis of 36,000 questionnaire responses to the 
consultation document from teachers and head teachers Storey discovered that 62 per 
cent rejected the idea that new appraisal decisions arrangements should influence 
decisions on pay; 60 per cent disagreed that a new performance threshold for teachers 
was a good idea; 62 per cent opposed the plan for appraisals to be conducted by head 
teachers and externally validated; and 65 per cent disagreed with the proposal to provide 
whole school awards on the basis of achievement.  Only 18 per cent of teachers and 22 
per cent of head teachers agreed with the idea of a proposed ‘fast track’ reward scheme 
for good performance (p.514). 
 
Similar attitudes were revealed in her study of an archive of 4,064 extended written 
responses to the Green Paper proposals, which showed that support of the proposals 
ranged ‘at best from fragile and hopeful’ on the part of many of the LEAs through 
‘concerned and doubtful’ (the professional associations) to ‘largely absent’ (most 
teachers) (p.514). 
 
Storey’s research found that the question of who was to be responsible for the scheme at 
local levels was not clear to respondents.  Many school governors felt ‘ill equipped’ and 
were reluctant to take on new responsibilities in this area.  ‘We are lay people, not 
educational experts.  We cannot begin to make or endorse decisions about performance-
related pay for our staff’ (p.515). 
 
Overall the responses indicated a strong, often ‘passionate’ belief that the new 
performance management and performance pay initiatives would not raise the standard of 
student achievement.   
 
How to overcome difficulties in ‘measuring’ the many and complex tasks and aspects of 
teaching was a constant theme in the written responses.  A major concern for most 
teachers was how to meet the requirement that they show how they had contributed 
individually to students’ learning, given that many teachers might be involved in a 
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students’ success (or lack of success), as well as parents and other family members and 
friends.  What was to be valued and who were to be responsible for valuing it were 
questions raised in ‘countless’ archived responses.   
 
Storey’s concluding observations, based on the most common concerns raised in the 
written responses, were: 
 
1. Teachers were passionate in expressing their beliefs.  Many felt ‘wronged’.  They 
interpreted the Green Paper’s proposals as a demand for greater effort, deducing 
from this that their existing levels of effort were not valued.  They were deeply 
aggrieved about this; 
 
2. The responses indicated that the ‘messages’ of the Green Paper in relation to pay 
for performance were not well communicated; 
 
3. The responses indicated perceptions of an absence of trust between employer and 
teachers.  Absence of trust is of high concern, because trust has been shown to be 
an essential feature of all successful performance management and reward 
schemes; 
 
4. The proposals failed to take sufficient notice of the current culture of teaching, 
which, in many ways was the opposite of the kind of entrepreneurial, risk taking 
cultures in which most performance pay schemes had been introduced.  Changing 
the culture, if the Archive responses were to be taken as a guide, was likely to be 
an ‘uphill struggle’;  
 
5. Schools, unlike some organisations, depend more on an even distribution of 
effort across the staff than on the performance of a few people.  In the 
organisational structure of a school, the channelling of rewards towards a few 
individuals could be seen as ‘misdirected’; 
 
6. The performance literature (e.g. Armstrong 1993, pp. 79–80) lists key criteria for 
performance pay schemes to have a positive effect.  The proposals in this 




Farrell’s and Morris’s conclusions (2004) about stakeholder attitudes to the Teacher 
Incentive Pay proposals were similar to Storey’s.  In a paper entitled ‘Resigned 
Compliance’, they discussed the findings of an empirical study on the Teacher Incentive 
Pay project in Wales.  The study was carried out in 2001, one year after the project’s 
implementation in England, and concurrently with its implementation in Wales.  It 
reported on the findings of a survey of 1125 teachers in 49 schools (33 junior, 16 senior) 
about teachers’ attitudes towards the new pay for performance scheme.   
 
The results of the survey showed that 79 per cent of respondents agreed or agreed 
strongly that pay structures should take more account of the different duties performed by 
teachers, but that 65 per cent  disagreed or disagreed strongly that ‘the principle of 
relating pay to performance’ was a good one.  Seventy-two per cent disagreed that 
teachers should be paid solely on the basis of their individual performance, and 7 per cent 
agreed or agreed strongly that teachers should continue to be paid according to nationally 
determined scales.   
 
Given that the scheme was introduced to boost teacher motivation recruitment and 
retention, the researchers placed high significance on the survey results that showed 
teachers’ views on the likely impact of the scheme in these areas.  They found that 80 per 
cent of respondents disagreed or disagreed strongly that it would increase motivation, 83 
per cent felt it would have little or no effect on recruitment, 83 per cent felt it would have 
little impact on teacher retention, 77 per cent felt that it would not lead to better and more 
effective teaching, and 73 per cent felt it would have little impact on pupil learning.  
Sixty-four per cent believed that pupil progress should not be the central factor for 
judging eligibility for performance-related pay.   
 
Teachers agreed most strongly with the propositions that: 
 
• the scheme would be divisive (82 per cent); 
• the scheme would increase bureaucratic control (80 per cent); and 
• the scheme would lead to discontent and demotivate those ineligible to apply (76 
per cent). 
 
One of the highest percentages of agreement or strong agreement was the 91 per cent of 
respondents who believed that the introduction of Performance-Related Pay (PRP) would 
cause resentment among teaching staff.   
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In an open-ended section of the survey, most teachers reported concerns about the 
perceived fairness and validity of the processes that would decide which teachers should 
be rewarded under PRP.  Like the respondents quoted in Storey’s study, these teachers 
made many comments about the unsuitability of applying performance processes 
designed for industry to teachers.  Such comments were summed up in the words of one 
respondent:  
 
…if we could make sure the new material coming into the education factory 
was quality controlled then we could start with a level playing field and be 
able to assess PRP fairly, The form is an insult, as is the subjective nature of 
its implementation.  (Farrell & Morris, 2004, p.93) 
 
Other comments related to the difficulties of making judgements about different kinds of 
teachers in the same school: 
 
it is very difficult to compare the teaching performance of special needs to 
top level GCSE of A level.  Some groups are shared, how is this evaluated?  
Many teachers take on extra responsibility for no reward – should they give 
this up? Why not just concentrate on your PRP targets? (p.94) 
 
And in different types of school: 
 
PRP is unfair because teacher in high performing middle class schools will 
find it easer to cross the threshold than teacher in socially deprived areas 
where pupils fail to achieve for reasons completely out of the teacher’s 
control.  (p.94) 
 
Farrell and Morris concluded that teachers viewed the scheme as ‘undermining the 
principles of team work in schools and a broader public service and educational ethos’ 
(p.101).  They found little to indicate that the scheme would achieve its own stated aims 
of increasing teachers’ motivation, recruitment and retention.   
 
The reservations about the likely success of the Teacher Incentive Pay Project were 
echoed in a study led by Burgess (Burgess et al., 2001), that also drew on experiences of 
pay for performance schemes in the USA.  However, Burgess and his co-researchers did 
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find some small cause for optimism as teachers did not see the concept of performance-
based rewards for teachers as inappropriate. 
 
Like Storey, and Farrell and Morris, Burgess and his team also expressed serious doubts 
about the Teacher Incentive Pay scheme.  These were largely based on perceptions that 
the initiative was operating more as a mechanism to give more-or-less automatic pay 
rises than a genuine pay for performance scheme: 
 
If the scheme continues to operate to give almost all eligible staff a pay rise, 
then we would not expect much impact on effort as teachers will expect to 
get the bonus irrespective of whether they increase their effort ...  (Burgess et 
al., 2001) 
 
Recent research on the Teacher Incentive Pay Project 
The studies discussed above were carried out in the early stages of the Teacher Incentive 
Pay project and were consequently concerned more with attitudes towards what might 
happen when performance-related pay was introduced.  More recent research, such as 
that carried out by a team of researchers from Exeter University (Wragg et al., 2004), 
seems to suggest that the gloomy expectations were, in many respects, predictive of 
subsequent attitudes on the part of stakeholders.  However, this may have more to do 
with the rather amateurish methods used to assess teacher performance than with the idea 
of performance-related pay itself (Ingvarson, 2002).   
 
Phase 1: The Performance Threshold 
Wragg’s research, carried out over the first three years of implementation of the Teacher 
Incentive Pay Project established that 97 per cent of teachers who applied in the first 
round of the Threshold were successful.  Heads, surveyed in 2001, said they had had 
experienced no difficulty assessing the applicants, but felt they had been given 
insufficient training.  They also commented that the exercise, given the overall high 
success rate, was hardly worth all the time and energy they expended.  They were also 
critical of the £300 per day that was paid to the reviewers who verified their assessments, 
especially in view of the fact that disagreement between head teacher and reviewer 
occurred in only 0.4 per cent of cases.  (In later rounds, verification was provided only 
for a sample of teachers.  The verification procedures have now been discontinued).  




Of all the teacher unions in the UK, the National Union of Teachers (NUT) (the largest) 
was the most implacably opposed to the Threshold processes.  Their position, which they 
took to the High Court (with initial success), was that all teachers were entitled to the pay 
rise, given current salary levels.  They used commissioned research (Richardson, 1999) to 
argue against the concept of performance-related pay, but were not successful in 
preventing the processes from going ahead, albeit with modifications such as an appeal 
mechanism for unsuccessful applicants.  
 
Other teacher unions and associations were more moderate in their opposition to aspects 
of the new measures.  The Association of Teachers and Lecturers (ATL) gave qualified 
support, and the National Association of Schoolmasters and Union of Women Teachers 
(NASUWT) accepted the idea of a career ‘gateway’ for competent teachers, and were 
prepared to negotiate with the government, although they remained dissatisfied with 
some of the threshold processes and principles, especially that of linking teachers’ pay to 
‘crude exam league tables’ (Wragg et al., 2004 p.93).   
 
About 60 per cent of head teachers surveyed in 2001 were opposed to performance pay 
‘in principle’, but 39 per cent were in favour.  Heads’ concerns about implementing the 
threshold included: lack of training for them; the inroads made on their time and that of 
teachers; and perceived lack of clarity and guidance about how the procedures should be 
carried out.  After the first round, in which 97 per cent of applicants were successful, 
many head teachers, experienced a sense of ‘futility’: 
 
Since 97 per cent of eligible teachers who applied in the first round of 
threshold assessment were successful, the exercise seemed more of a general 
pay rise than a sieving of the most competent, barely worth the time and 
effort involved, especially as most heads had to deal with the applications 
entirely on their own.  This sense of futility was compounded by the usually 
negative reaction of the unsuccessful, some threatening action against the 
decision, a prospect of which heads were fearful.  (Wragg et al., 2004, p.63) 
 
Phase 2: Performance management 
The second phase of the performance pay strategy in England was performance 
management.   
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As in most performance management schemes, schools were given a set of procedures to 
follow.  Teachers’ performance was to be monitored and reviewed annually against a set 
of performance standards developed by the DfES.  Teachers were to provide evidence of 
meeting the appropriate standards in school-based evaluation process directed by the 
principal and involving other school managers, such as Heads of Department.  However, 
Wragg’s research discovered that the scheme was implemented very differently in 
different schools.   
 
In three years (2001–2003) Wragg and his co-researchers surveyed over 1000 head 
teachers and undertook intensive case studies of 32 teachers involved in performance 
management systems in their schools.  Most teachers and heads believed that, if 
implemented as designed, the system would have the capacity to bring about 
improvements in practice.  They saw the advantages of the scheme as: 
 
• providing a clear structure for improvement; 
• providing opportunities for reflection recognition of teachers’ strengths and 
achievements; 
• allowing teachers to discuss their career aspirations with managers; 
• sharing good practice; 
• helping to identify appropriate professional development; and 
• higher salary. 
 
The main disadvantages perceived by the teachers and head teachers were: 
 
• additional stress and pressure; 
• ‘bureaucracy’; 
• time consuming nature of the processes; 
• potential to be divisive; and 
• problems with measuring pupil progress. 
 
Wragg concluded that ‘few teachers made significant changes to well-established 
classroom routines as a result of performance management’ (p.147).  Despite ‘significant’ 
variation in implementation between schools they found that most teachers appeared to 
be quite relaxed about the processes.  Team leaders and heads were seen as 
unthreatening, and early anxieties about missing out on salary increases proved 
unfounded when it became apparent that, similarly to the Threshold, almost all teachers 
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would progress smoothly up the pay spine, as in the days before performance review.  
Not a great deal appeared to have changed. 
 
By 2003, 56 per cent of heads surveyed (four percentage points fewer that the 60 per cent 
of 2001) were saying that they were not in favour of performance-related pay.  The 
researchers did not see this difference as significant: 
 
What was especially notable...was that the figure of about 60 per cent being 
in favour, albeit sometimes with reservations, had remained remarkable and 
robustly consistent over the whole of the two-year period that separated out 
two national surveys.  (Wragg et al., 2004)  
 
Performance Management schemes in Australia 
As noted in Section B of this Report, schools in most Australian state education systems 
now carry out processes of Annual Performance Review (APR) for teachers.  In some 
systems, these processes are linked to teachers’ pay, in that increments can be withheld 
for unsatisfactory performance.  Criticism of these schemes largely reflects that of the 
English Teacher Incentive pay project.  A recent report commissioned by the Victorian 
Department of Education (Boston Consulting Group 2003) states: 
 
In practice … the performance management system does not work in most 
schools.  Objective, independently collected data on teacher effectiveness are 
not used in the vast majority of schools.  Often, teachers themselves provide 
the only evidence to support their assessments. . . Schools see the process as 
cumbersome and low value, and many teachers do not see it as constructive.  
Very strong teachers tend to characterise the process as a waste of time, 
while less strong teachers may question the school leader’s ability to provide 
them with objective feedback.  (Victorian Department of Education and 
Training, 2003, pp. 24-25) 
 
These reviewers found that while 99.85 per cent of Victorian teachers received a 
‘successful’ performance review outcome, principals’ perceptions of teachers’ 
performance told a different story: 10–20 per cent of teachers were seen by their 
principals as ‘outstanding’; 40–60 per cent were seen as ‘good teachers’; 10–30 per cent 
as ‘below average performers’; and 0–20 per cent as ‘significant under performers.  On 
this basis, the researchers concluded: 
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The net result is that the outcomes of the performance management process bear 
no relationship to teacher performance as perceived by most principals. 
(Victorian Department of Education and Training, 2003, p.25)  
 
A study of teacher evaluation in Australia by Kleinhenz and Ingvarson (2002), which 
included a case study of one large secondary school’s implementation of Annual 
Performance Review, found that the attitudes of the Principal, senior managers and 
teachers in this school towards APR were, on the whole, positive, but that its purposes 
were unclear to them: 
 
There seemed to be tacit understanding among all participants that the 
processes should be as undemanding as the meeting of basic accountability 
requirements would allow.  The processes were simple and time spent on 
them was minimal.  ‘Comfortable’ was the adjective most commonly applied 
to the relationship between reviewers and teachers.  (Kleinhenz & Ingvarson, 
2002, p.24) 
 
Standards developed by the employer, the Victorian government education department, 
were used to guide the review processes, but teachers and administrators did not appear 
to fully appreciate how the standards could be used to assess or improve teacher quality: 
 
The generally limited amounts of time they (the principal and managers who 
conducted the reviews) were able to give to the processes meant that their 
suggestions for improvement did not go far beyond helping teachers to 
identify strengths and weaknesses and directing them to appropriate (out of 
school) professional development.  They had used the standards as 
categories in which to make comments but they had not even started to think 
that the standards might be used to indicate levels of performance.  
(Kleinhenz & Ingvarson, 2002, p.23)  
 
Recent developments in performance pay in the USA 
Knowledge and Skills-Based Pay Schemes 
The main characteristics of knowledge and skills-based pay schemes were described in 
Section A of this report.  These schemes aim to replace the traditional incremental salary 
scales with a few major salary stages based on more direct measures of teacher 
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knowledge and skill.  Unlike merit pay schemes, teaching standards provide the criteria 
for assessing performance.  Several types of professional knowledge and skill might be 
rewarded in this type of pay scheme, such as:  
  
1. Increasing depth of expertise in a teacher’s field of content, curriculum and 
teaching (as might be assessed through National Board Certification processes) 
2. Widening areas of expertise as in gaining registration in new fields of teaching  
3. Development of skills in providing teacher leadership and team management. 
 
The introduction of knowledge and skills-based pay schemes to teaching has occurred in 
parallel with more sophisticated methods for developing standards for good teaching.  
These new forms of teaching standards aim to be research based and to represent what 
accomplished teachers should know and be able to do.  The evidence is that when 
teachers develop standards in their specialist fields, in collaboration with researchers, 
they are much more demanding than standards developed by employing authorities for 
performance management purposes3.  Many studies indicate that teachers view these 
“profession-defined” standards as valid and useful as a guide to long term professional 
development planning.   
 
The development of professional teaching standards has enabled the development of 
methods for assessing teacher performance that better reflect the complex nature of 
teachers’ work.   The purpose of standards is to define the domain of accomplished 
teaching – what accomplished teachers know and do.  Standards-based assessments of 
teacher performance have to gather data relevant to all the elements in this complex 
domain.  This calls for multiple forms of evidence - from samples of student work over 
time, videotapes or direct observations of classrooms, tests of content and pedagogical 
content knowledge, student feedback, to documented contributions to improving the 
professional and wider school community.   
 
Some examples of KSBP schemes in the USA, and research that investigated 
stakeholders’ attitudes towards them, are described below.   
 
                                                     
3 Ingvarson, L. &  Kleinhenz. E. (2006). Ibid.  
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The Cincinnati scheme 
In the 1999–2000 school year the Cincinnati Ohio school district field tested a pay for 
performance scheme designed to overcome some of the by now well known problems in 
attitudes towards performance pay. 
 
The scheme involved major changes to the pay structure, chief of which was building 
links between teachers’ pay and a standards-based teacher evaluation score.  The 
standards used were based on Charlotte Danielson’s Framework for Teaching 
(Danielson, 1996).  Teachers’ performance on each standard was to be rated at one of 
four levels.  Evidence included six classroom observations and a portfolio prepared by 
the teacher.  The results of the evaluation were intended to be reflected in a new pay 
scheme, to take effect in the 2002–2003 year.   
 
To move to a higher category on the new five point salary scale, Cincinnati teachers had 
to demonstrate a higher level of professional practice.  If a teacher failed to improve 
enough to move to a higher point, his or her salary would be capped.  Teachers were to 
have a fixed number of years to move beyond the first two categories.  If they failed to 
improve to this extent non-tenured teachers risked losing their jobs.  The consequences of 
a poor evaluation for tenured teachers included negative effects on their eligibility for 
lead teacher status or placement in a peer assistance program and possible loss of salary 
(Heneman & Milanowski 2003, p.175). 
 
As Milanowski and Heneman (2001) and Heneman and Milanowski (2003) discovered, 
teachers’, principals’ and administrators’ perceptions of the scheme reflected some 
‘successes’ and some ‘problems’.  The main success was that teachers accepted and 
welcomed the standards as an accurate representation of good teaching.  Many teachers 
could see the potential of the standards for helping them to improve their performance.   
 
On the deficit side, principals and administrators found that the system was seriously 
increasing their workload.  This was exacerbated by some technical design problems, 
such as insufficient guidance from the scheme’s developers about the amount and kind of 
evidence to be assessed.   
 
Teachers were concerned about:  
 
• extra workload on top of already crowded work schedules; 
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• uncertainty on evidence requirements, and about length and timelines; 
• the knowledge and suitability of the evaluators to conduct the evaluations, 
especially in terms of subject content knowledge; 
• the novelty of the system and implementation difficulties; 
• interpretations of the rubrics across schools, with resulting inconsistencies; 
• administrators’ management of the processes; 
• lack of feedback from evaluators; 
• perceptions that the implementation of the scheme was disorganised and 
confusing; 
• the fairness of the processes; 
• the evaluators not understanding the classroom context; 
• it being impossible to perform at the highest levels due to characteristics of 
students; 
• classroom observations occurring at unrepresentative times; 
• misinformation, e.g.  allegations (false) that a quota would be placed on the 
number of high ratings available; 
• the processes being too time consuming, stressful and burdensome; and 
• the new system putting teachers’ salaries at risk (even on the part of teachers who 
obtained high ratings).   
 
On the positive side, teachers reported that they accepted the standards and assessment 
rubrics as an accurate representation of teachers’ work.  They also said the scheme had 
caused them to: 
 
• reflect more on the quality of their work; 
• better align their teaching to student standards; 
• become better organised; and 
• improve lesson planning and classroom management skills. 
 
Despite further modifications, which included an extensive training program for assessors 
and administrators, painstaking attempts to ensure that the evaluations were fair and 
reliable, and support for teachers who were not able to demonstrate performance at the 
required levels, the Cincinnati pay for performance scheme was ultimately unsuccessful.  
The new pay schedule, due to be implemented in 2002–2003 did not eventuate because a 
large majority of teachers (96 per cent in a teacher association ballot) formally rejected 
the link between the evaluation system and the proposed pay system.   
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After three years, the teachers voted out the leaders who had helped design 
the system, and then voted down the pay system itself.  The implementation 
glitches and potential salary loss led to ongoing teacher perceptions that the 
evaluation system was not good enough to use for consequential decisions, 
even though considerable research has shown high levels of reliability across 
both principal and teacher assessors, and significant linkages between 
teacher evaluation scores and value-added student learning (Milanowski, 
Kimball & Odden, 2005; Odden & Wallace, 2006). 
 
The Vaughn Charter School scheme 
Much more successful than the Cincinnati attempt to introduce a pay for performance 
scheme was a program, now in its seventh year, which began in 1998 at the Vaughn Next 
Century Learning Centre, a charter school of 1200 students in Los Angeles.  (Charter 
schools in the USA are publicly funded elementary or secondary schools that have been 
freed from some of the rules and regulations that apply to other public schools in 
exchange for accountability for results.  These results are negotiated with the school and 
set out in each school’s Charter).   
 
At Vaughn, the new teacher evaluation system was implemented concurrently with the 
new salary structure.  Initially, the scheme was only available for new and early career 
teachers.  Like the Cincinnati scheme, the evaluation system was based on an adaptation 
of the performance standards developed by Danielson (1996).  The evaluators include a 
peer and school administrator trained to use an adaptation of the Danielson Framework of 
Teaching.  The main forms of evidence are classroom observation, teacher artefacts, 
student work samples and interviews.  Ratings on each of the 30 odd standards in the 
adapted Framework range from 1-4. 
 
For beginning teachers with a full teaching license, the initial salary increases by about 3-
4 per cent for five years, subject to achieving satisfactory ratings (2) on the Danielson 
standards each year.  Beyond this point, teachers can move through three salary “tiers”.   
Progression through the tiers depends on achieving higher ratings on the performance 
standards (2.5 average for Tier 1, 3 for Tier 2 and 3.5 for Tier 3.  Additional salary 
increases can be gained for: 
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• Acquisition of specific skills and knowledge needed for the school’s teaching 
program (e.g. Literacy expertise; ESL; subject matter knowledge, technology, 
etc.) 
• Contingency pay (e.g. improved student attendance, discipline, parent 
partnerships 
• Management and leadership skills 
• School-based awards based on increased performance on statewide student 
achievement tests ($1500) 
• Further credentials (Masters Degree $2000; National Board Certification $4000). 
 
The salary of a licensed first year teacher in 2000, USD32,500 could rise to about USD 
55,000 under this scheme.  The overall salary package provided more money potentially 
than teachers would have been able to receive in the Los Angeles Unified School District.  
In the first year of the scheme, Vaughn met its student performance targets, so all 
teachers received the performance bonus, offered under California’s Academic 
Performance Index (API) to schools in which student achievement improved to a 
specified level.   
 
Kellor (2005) suggested that part of Vaughn’s success in gaining stakeholder support for 
its innovative teacher compensation scheme linked to a standards-based teacher 
evaluation system was its status as a large urban Charter school.  The original plan was to 
extend the program over several years to include more senior teachers.  Some veteran 
teachers, however, who saw the amount teachers in the program received, and who 
believed that their teaching was of a sufficiently high standard to earn the performance 
reward demanded to be allowed to participate.  Largely because of these demands the 
date for full implementation was put forward, and the program was offered, on a 
voluntary participation basis, to all teachers at Vaughn in the 1999-2000 school year.  An 
independent survey of Vaughan staff showed that 75 per cent of teachers felt motivated 
by the knowledge and skills elements in the standards and wanted the program to 
continue. 
 
The Denver Pay for Performance Scheme 
In 1999 the state of Colorado initiated the Pay for Performance Pilot in the Denver 
Public Schools system.  This pilot was initially planned to last two years before full 
implementation of a pay for performance scheme that would link teacher compensation 
directly to student achievement.  It is significant because the lessons learned in the course 
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of the pilot resulted in a system, finally implemented in 2005, that was very different 
from original highly simplistic attempts to link teachers’ pay to improved student 
achievement.   
 
The core idea of the pilot was for teachers to set one or two learning objectives for their 
students.  For each objective achieved, the teacher received USD750.   
 
Although the pilot, from the outset, had the support of the teachers’ union, most teachers’ 
reactions were lukewarm.  Surveys carried out by the Design Team (Gratz, 2005) showed 
that teachers believed that, since they were doing the work anyway, they might as well be 
paid extra for it: 
 
‘As far as PFP (Pay for Performance) goes, it’s easy money.  I was doing it 
and I’m still doing it.’ 
 
‘We were setting goals even before PFP, so why not get the 1500.’ 
 
There was also a feeling that, since Pay for Performance was inevitable, teachers and 
schools should take the opportunity to be involved in shaping it: 
 
‘…We want to be a part of reform instead of just being the object of it.’ 
 
‘Oregon has imposed PFP through legislation.  If the Colorado legislature 
imposes it, we’ll be glad that we tried it out on our own and that we have 
data.’  
 
After two years the pilot seemed to be having little impact.  Principals reported that 
parents seemed unaware of it, and they themselves only gradually became aware of its 
possibilities as a management tool.  Most teachers (89 per cent) met the objectives and 
received the bonuses.   
 
Donald Gratz, who led the research team for the first half of the pilot, believed that the 
notion of rewarding teachers on the basis of self-set objectives for students’ performance 
was flawed: 
 
The easier the objective, the more likely the pay-increase.  How is it possible 
to manage such an undertaking without having teachers rush to the bottom 
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with easy to achieve objectives?  The lesson, I submit, is that teacher-set 
learning objectives, with support, are beneficial to student learning.  By 
contrast, providing a bonus encourages teachers to keep these objectives low, 
and is a disincentive to higher standards.  (Gratz, 2005, p.577) 
 
Gratz also pointed out that simply offering more pay for increased effort assumed not 
only that teachers were not trying their best already, but also that the necessary skills and 
knowledge and resources were not at issue.  Surveys conducted throughout the pilot 
showed that not even its strongest supporters among the teachers believed the pay 
incentive was causing them to work any harder – mainly because they thought they were 
already working as hard as they could.  Many difficulties were experienced with regard to 
measuring students’ learning and attributing improvement to the work of individual 
teachers. 
 
However, the scheme did have some (mostly unintended) positive consequences.  These 
included an increased focus on student learning, improvements in teachers’ collaborative 
assessment skills, and improvement in the district’s curriculum alignment.  None of these 
improvements, Gratz pointed out, could be directly linked to teacher motivation.   
 
The Denver pilot did not result in the abandonment of pay for performance for teachers in 
that state.  On the contrary, it paved the way for the much more thoughtful and 
comprehensive Professional Compensation System for Teachers (‘Pro Comp’), in which 
student achievement is just one component of a system that includes a standards-based 
teacher professional learning and evaluation process that aims to improve their skills and 
knowledge.  Designed in a partnership between the Denver Classroom Teachers’ 
Association and Denver Public Schools, 59 per cent of teachers voted in favour of this 
scheme in March 2004 (Press Release Denver Public Schools, March 19, 2004).  The 
scheme gained teacher and union support because it acknowledged the professional 
concerns raised in the pilot: 
 
Denver’s pilot has shown once again – and confirmed through a more 
complex experiment and a more comprehensive study than has ever before 
been conducted – that a system that attempts to closely measure and regulate 
instruction provides negative rather than positive incentives.  The final 
Denver product addresses these concerns.  It breaks new ground in its scope 
and in showing teacher willingness to move beyond the seniority-based 
system currently in use across the country (Gratz, 2005, p.581). 
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Pay for performance schemes in Iowa, Philadelphia, Steamboat Springs  
Recent attempts to introduce pay for performance schemes in Iowa and Philadelphia have 
met stakeholder opposition similar to that experienced in the Cincinnati example, as did a 
scheme in Steamboat Springs that failed to reach the implementation phase (Odden & 
Wallace, 2006).  Part of the reason for this failure to win the hearts and minds of 
participants seems to have been that they attempted to introduce ambitiously large scale 
changes without giving sufficient care and attention to aligning the schemes with the 
districts’ missions and objectives, and with other elements of human resources 
management.  They also appear to have underestimated the challenges of 
implementation.  
 
More successful was a scheme introduced in the 1990s in Douglas County.  In this 
scheme, which made minimal changes to existing structures, ‘knowledge and skill 
bonuses’ were added on to a traditional salary schedule.  Teachers were required to 
demonstrate continuing competence in order to access pay increases based on experience 
(Hall & Caffarella, 1996, 1998).   
 
Research by the Consortium for Policy Research in Education (CPRE)  
For nearly a decade, the Teacher Compensation Group of the Consortium for Policy 
Research in Education (CPRE), based at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, has been 
studying the design and effectiveness of pay for performance schemes in the USA.  The 
CPRE research, which aims to help schools and districts to ‘fend off another round of 
failed merit pay programs’, has comprehensively investigated the attitudes of 
stakeholders, especially teachers and administrators towards various examples of 
performance pay schemes (http://www.wcer.wisc.edu/cpre/tcomp). 
 
Initially the CPRE research focused on school-based merit-pay type performance 
programs in which each teacher in a school received a bonus for their part in meeting or 
exceeding student achievement goals (Heneman, 1998; Kelley, Odden, Milanowski & 
Heneman, 2000; Heneman & Milanowski, 2002).  They then shifted their research focus 
to knowledge and skills-based schemes that paid teachers extra for acquiring and 
demonstrating specific knowledge and skills that were seen to benefit student 
achievement.   
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In 2006, researchers Heneman, Milanowski, Kimball and Odden (2006) reported on 
findings from four ‘sites’ that used Charlotte Danielson’s Framework for Teaching 
(Danielson 1996) or an adapted version as the basis of KSBP evaluation schemes that 
were trialled and implemented between 1998 and 2001.  The sites were the Coventry (9 
schools), Washoe County (88 schools) and Cincinnati (81 schools) districts, and the 
Vaughn Charter School in Los Angeles described earlier.  A key aim of the researchers 
was to uncover administrator and teacher attitudes towards the schemes: 
 
...administrator and teacher reactions are a major determinant of the 
willingness of administrators to use the system as designed, and of teachers 
to agree to link pay with assessments of performance.  The initial acceptance 
and long term survival of the evaluation and KSPB system will be 
jeopardized if administrators and teachers believe the evaluation system is 
unfair, overly burdensome, and not useful in guiding teacher efforts to 
improve performance.  (Heneman et al, 2006) 
 
At all sites the researchers found that: 
 
The most positive and least varied reactions were to the performance 
competency model embedded within the evaluation system.  Teachers 
generally understood the standards and rubrics comprising the evaluation 
systems, and agreed that the performance described at higher levels 
described good teaching (Heneman et al., 2006, p.6). 
 
Many teachers interviewed said that this was the first time they had a clear understanding 
of the districts’ expectations of their performance.  Many also said that the standards 
helped them to have useful conversations about practice with their principals.   
 
Most teachers believed the evaluations were fair, although some raised concerns about 
the procedures used.  The main issues related to perceptions of trust, subject matter 
expertise, familiarity with the context and preparation.  They were also concerned that 
school administrators were not always able to conduct sufficiently thorough evaluations 
and provide useful feedback because of competing demands in their own workloads.  
Some evaluators were perceived as too strict, some as too lenient (Henemen et al., p.6).   
 
Henemen found that Principals and other school administrators generally agreed with the 
teachers on most aspects, especially on the point that explicit standards describing 
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performance helped them to have more productive professional conversations with their 
teachers.  They also felt that the amount of evidence collected, in combination with the 
rubrics describing the four levels of performance, helped them to be more effective as 
evaluators.  However, they were less happy with the amount of work placed upon them 
by the new evaluation procedures.  Some said that it had meant extending their work day, 
or causing them to work longer on weekends.   
 
An important feature of the CPRE research was that positive correlations were found 
across the four sites between the teacher evaluation scores and (value added) estimates of 
student achievement in Reading and Mathematics.  The correlations were highest in 
Vaughn and Cincinnati, where teachers were aware of possible future links between pay 
and performance.  The researchers ‘speculated’ that the higher correlations in Cincinnati 
and Vaughn may have been due to the use of multiple evaluators, better training of 
evaluators, and, especially at Vaughn, a longer history and stronger culture of agreement 
about what constituted good teaching.  Given the size of recent estimates of likely effects 
of teacher input on student learning (Nye, Konstanopolis & Hedges, 2004; Rowan, 
Correnti & Miller, 2002), they remarked, however, that these results in Vaughn and 
Cincinnati were ‘about what one might expect’ (Henemen et al., p.5). 
 
The most central issue for KSBP schemes is, of course, how to identify teachers who 
‘deserve’ to be paid more on the grounds of superior knowledge and skill.  Who will 
decide, and on what basis?  In most of the schemes discussed in this section so far, the 
decision was made ‘in-house’ under the authority of the school principal, with various 
kinds of involvement on the part of peer teachers and school administrators.  In its most 
sophisticated form, the decision to award higher pay involved the collection and 
evaluation of various kinds of evidence, including classroom observations, based on a set 
of teaching standards, such as those of Charlotte Danielson’s Framework for Teaching.  
Research on attitudes towards schemes of this nature, showed, among other things, that 
teachers and administrators respected fair and valid evaluation systems based on 
acceptable standards, and that they accepted the notion of rewarding superior teaching 
performance as demonstrated in such evaluations.   
 
If ‘the devil is in the detail’, a considerable amount of devil would appear to lie in the 
fidelity and quality of implementation as the central determinant of the outcomes of 
performance pay schemes.  Large school systems need to ensure that methods for 
collecting evidence and judging teacher performance for financial reward decisions will 
be fair and valid, that principals and administrators can continue to work with 
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disappointed teachers, and that the workload and stress levels will be manageable.  For 
many, these challenges are so great that they believe they can only be overcome through 
performance pay schemes that place responsibility for the evaluation of performance in 
the hands of external agencies, such as professional certification bodies.   
 
Certification-based performance pay systems 
The viability of a performance pay scheme depends more than anything else on the 
validity and fairness of the procedures for assessing performance.  Developing and 
operating a rigorous system for assessing teacher performance is a complex business.  It 
requires resources well beyond those of most schools to develop valid teaching standards, 
methods for gathering multiple forms of evidence and procedures for training assessors 
and minimising bias. 
 
The history of merit pay schemes indicates that it is a mistake to leave the operation of a 
high stakes assessment system to individual schools and the micro-politics of school life 
(Johnson, 1986; Murnane & Cohen, 1986; Blase, 1991).  This practice also undermined 
the credibility of the English Threshold reform and the Advanced Skills Teacher reforms 
in Australia and we have seen in the previous section that it can be a problem for 
knowledge and skills-based pay schemes if implementation is left to individual schools.   
 
The measure of “performance” in a performance-based pay scheme may be based instead 
on an assessment system operated by an agency external to the school.  This is 
increasingly the pattern.  In some cases, this agency is established within a particular 
school system, such as examples below from Scotland and Australia.  In other cases, this 
agency may be a national professional body providing a certification service to all school 
systems such as the Dutch Principals Academy and the National Board for Professional 
Teaching Standards in the USA. 
 
As explained in Section A, professional certification is an endorsement by a professional 
body that a member of that profession has attained a specified standard of knowledge and 
skill.  In this sense, professional certification is a special case of knowledge and skills-
based pay, except that the process of developing standards and methods for assessing 
performance is conducted by a national professional body rather than a single employing 
authority.  The standards are profession-wide and the certification is portable – not tied to 
a particular job or position in a school.  While professional certification is usually 
voluntary, when it is recognised by employing authorities as a credible measure of a 
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certain level of professional accomplishment it provides a powerful incentive for 
standard-based professional learning (Ingvarson & Kleinhenz, 2006b). 
 
Three examples of certification-based pay schemes are discussed here.  The first two are 
the Scottish Chartered Teacher scheme and the Australian ‘Advanced Skills Teacher’ 
classification.  The ‘portability’ of the certification in each these schemes is limited to the 
particular education systems in which it was developed.  However, as this certification 
gains credibility, teachers may find that it has currency beyond its system of origin.   
 
The third example, the NBPTS certification system, is one of the most well known and 
widely used of its type.  Most states in the USA now offer salary increases or bonuses to 
teachers who gain National Board Certification.  California has been offering an 
additional USD20, 000 bonus to National Board Certified teachers who move to 
disadvantaged schools.  The bonus is spread over four years. 
 
The Standard for Chartered Teacher Award in Scotland 
The Chartered Teacher reform aims to provide incentives for professional development 
and a career path for expert teachers beyond the top of the Scottish incremental.  To gain 
the Chartered Teacher Award a teacher needs to provide evidence that they have attained 
the Scottish Standard for Chartered Teacher. The Chartered Teacher Award is a 
‘portable’ qualification that attaches to the teachers who hold it, and allows those teachers 
to command a higher salary, whatever positions they hold in any government school.  All 
teachers who teach in the government school system in Scotland and who hold the 
Chartered Teacher Award, or have made progress towards it, are entitled to substantial 
extra pay (about 20 per cent).   
 
The Chartered Teacher concept emerged from a major industrial settlement in 1998 that 
led to a significant improvement in teachers’ pay and conditions.  The Chartered Teacher 
reform makes an interesting contrast with the English Performance Threshold 
Assessment reforms described earlier.  Menter et al., (2004) compare the two approaches 
and argue that “the Scottish example is strongly oriented towards professional 
development, while the English example is oriented towards performativity and teacher 
assessment”.  
 
The Standard for Chartered Teacher Award was developed under the auspices of the 
General Teaching Council for Scotland (GTCS) for experienced teachers who chose to 
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undertake the professional learning necessary for the Award.  Any teacher may undertake 
the Chartered Teacher program, provided he/she has full registration with the GTCS, has 
reached the top level of the salary scale, and has maintained a Continuing Professional 
Development (CPD) portfolio. 
 
There are now two ‘routes’ for achieving the Standard for Chartered Teacher status: the 
‘Program’ Route; and the ‘Accreditation’ Route.  Teachers who choose the program 
route complete a serious of modules or courses with their chosen Providers.  Candidates 
who choose the accreditation route are required to submit a 10,000-word portfolio and 
commentary showing how they have achieved and maintained the Standard for Chartered 
Teacher.  All assessments are carried out by the candidates’ chosen “Providers”, such as a 
university.   
 
Chartered teachers receive a salary increase of up to £7,000 per annum (approximately 
AUD17,000).  Applicants are expected to cover most of the costs of undertaking the 
modules.  This can range from £6,000 (accreditation route) to £12,000 (program route).  
Applicants who complete the program using the program route are awarded a Masters 
Degree by their provider as well as Chartered Teacher status.  Applicants who complete 
the program using the accreditation route receive the Professional Award of Chartered 
Teacher from the GTCS.   
 
The Chartered Teacher initiative is still in the early days of implementation.  At this stage 
it is hard to gauge teachers’ attitudes and the impact it may be having on their work and 
students’ achievements in Scottish schools.  An article by Hugh Reilly in The Scotsman 
raised doubts about the program’s likely effectiveness: 
 
Objective evidence clearly shows the CT program is dead in the water.  Of 
20,000 or so teacher who meet the criteria (by reaching the top of the un-
promoted pay scale), only 6,000 expressed initial interest.  To date only 
2,500 have embarked on the CT program.  (Reilly, 2005) 
 
This article elicited quite a strong , mostly negative, response from teachers, who 
criticised the cost of the program, its ’academic’ focus, and the large amount of extra 
work it placed on teachers (‘There’s no way I’m giving up my weekends to be lectured 
at’, said ‘Freddie’ in The Scotsman on May 6th 2005).  Anecdotal evidence suggests that 
teachers resent the large investment of time and money needed to access the Award, and 
that many believe the reward is not worth the effort.   
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The GTCS itself, however, believes that there is sufficient anecdotal evidence to show 
that the teachers who are undertaking the program find it a powerful means of improving 
their practice (Conversation with GTCS representative, 2005).  The Education Minister, 
Hugh Henry, announced a review of the Chartered Teacher program on 1 December 
2006.  
 
‘Advanced skills’ positions in Australian education systems 
As indicated in Section B, three Australian states and Territories provide pay beyond the 
top of the incremental scale for accomplished teaching performance, based on a 
standards-based assessment process.  These schemes include the Level 3 Classroom 
Teacher classification in WA, the Teacher of Exemplary Practice position in the NT and 
the Advanced Skills Teacher classification in SA.  The origins of these classifications go 
back to the Advanced Skills Teacher Reforms of the early 1990.  Salaries for these 
positions are roughly 10 per cent above the top of the incremental scale, however, 
teachers who are not at the top of the incremental scale can apply for these positions, in 
which case the increase in salary they receive can be considerably higher.   
  
Each of these school systems has established central guidelines for assessing applications 
for these positions.  In the WA example, the task of developing and operating the 
standards and the assessment process was initially contracted out to a university (Jasman 
& Barrera, 1998).  An association of Level 3 Classroom Teachers now manages the 
process.  
 
Apart from an evaluation of the Level 3 Classroom Teacher position which was carried 
out in 2001 (Ewing, 2001) most evidence of teachers’ attitudes towards these schemes is 
still anecdotal.  It suggests that teachers are not opposed to the notion of financial reward 
for demonstrated superior teaching skills.  In each case, they seem to regard the various 
assessment processes as fair and valid, and believe that preparation for the assessment 
makes a valuable contribution to their own professional learning.   
 
The Level 3 Classroom Teacher classification is of particular interest because the 
evaluation is standards-based and carried out by peer teachers in processes that are 
external to schools.  In these respects it bears some similarity to the NBPTS evaluation 
procedures.  Insofar as it is a system-wide initiative that provides a substantial reward for 
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teachers who teach within that system, it is similar to the Scottish Award for Chartered 
Teachers. 
 
Ewing’s research, which was commissioned by the Department of Education in WA, 
found that the majority of Level 3 teacher candidates (successful and unsuccessful) who 
responded to surveys and participated in interviews believed that the assessment 
processes were ‘valid’, but that more than half of respondents had doubts about the 
‘fairness’ of the evaluations.  This was thought to be due in part to the fact that assessors 
often taught in different fields and at different levels from the teachers being assessed 
(p.33).  Respondents were very positive about the benefits of going through the 
application process on their professional development.  Anecdotal evidence indicates that 
the Level 3 process and position have not had negative effects on staff working 
relationships. 
 
Seventy-two per cent of respondents in Ewing’s study believed that the portfolio 
assessment process was rigorous.  Eighty-three per cent of survey respondents felt that, in 
terms of rigour the assessment process ‘far outweighed the application requirements of 
other promotional positions (Ewing, 2001, p.31).  This raised questions about the relative 
rewards offered by the two types of position.  It is common to hear WA teachers say that 
it easier to gain promotion and salary increase by applying for a deputy-head position 
than by applying for the Level 3 classification.  
 
The low ‘pass rate’ (333 successful applicants of a total 1095 in the two Level 3 selection 
processes held in 1999 and 2000) suggests that assessment processes were rigorous.  
However, it is likely that fear of failure and perceptions of the requirements as too 
onerous may also be deterring teachers from applying for the Level 3. 
 
The National Board for Professional Teaching Standards (NBPTS)  
The NBPTS was formed in 1987 to advance the quality of teaching and learning in the 
USA by developing professional standards for accomplished teaching, creating a 
voluntary system to certify teachers who meet those standards and integrating certified 
teachers into educational reform efforts.  It is an independent, non-profit, non-partisan 
and non-governmental national organization with a broad membership base that includes 
practising teachers, state governors, school administrators, teacher unions, school board 
leaders, college and university officials, business executives, foundations and concerned 
citizens.   
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Most states and a growing number of districts in the USA now offer extra rewards, 
including annual bonuses and higher salaries to encourage teachers to apply for National 
Board Certification.  States and districts increasingly reallocate their professional 
development budget to cover the application costs, as evidence mounts about the validity 
of the assessment and improvement effects of the process. They are also offering salary 
incentives to attract and retain teachers who have NBPTS certification (Odden & Kelley, 
2002).   
 
There are several very significant differences between National Board Certification and 
the kinds of evaluation used to determine teachers’ eligibility to receive higher pay in 
other systems.  First, the standards on which the evaluations are carried out are 
‘profession-wide’ in that they are written not by employers in particular systems or 
jurisdictions, but by teachers who have been nationally selected as experts in their fields.  
(However, the Board has members from employing authorities, and consults widely with 
all stakeholders to ensure the acceptability of standards.)  Teachers feel they have 
‘ownership’ of the standards, which have now been developed in about 30 subject and/or 
levels of schooling fields, and believe that they provide in-depth representations of their 
skills and knowledge.  These standards are typically regarded as much more demanding 
than those developed for teacher performance management in schools. 
 
The second difference is that carefully trained peer teachers, who have already 
demonstrated accomplishment in their field of teaching, carry out the assessment of 
teachers performance under NBPTS supervision.  History teachers evaluate history 
teachers, early childhood teachers evaluate other early childhood teachers, and so on.  
Unlike some systems, especially performance management systems, in which teachers 
are evaluated by principals or other school administrators whose teaching expertise may 
lie in other fields, NBPTS certification processes ensure that teachers are evaluated by 
those with an in-depth knowledge of what is being evaluated.  This encourages teachers’ 
confidence in the validity and fairness of the processes.   
 
The third difference is that the evaluations are conducted on the basis of multiple pieces 
of evidence which teachers are required to submit as responses to certain tasks.  
Teachers’ knowledge of content and pedagogical content knowledge is assessed as well 
as practice.  Each of these forms of evidence focuses on students’ work, and on what 
students are learning as a result of the teacher’s work.  The NBPTS takes care to ensure 
the validity of its assessment tasks and scoring rubrics, especially the congruence 
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between the assessments tasks and the standards that are being assessed.  A recent report 
by Ingvarson and Kleinhenz (2006a) describes in more detail the methods developed by 
the NBPTS for assessing teacher performance. 
 
There is a large body of research on the National Board’s standards and methods for 
assessing performance.  The Board also commissions evaluations and studies of the 
validity of its certification system regularly.  Several independent research studies have 
shown on balance that teachers who gain National Board certification have better student 
outcomes than those who do not (Vandevoort et al., 2004; Goldhaber & Anthony, 2004).  
 
In a major study using longitudinal data covering all the North Carolina students in 
grades 3, 4 and 5 for the years 1995 to 2004,  Clotfelter, Ladd and Vigdor found that 
licensing (registration), experience as a teacher and National Board Certification each had 
significant effects on mathematics achievement.  However, further qualifications such as 
master’s degrees obtained after five years of teaching were associated with negative 
effects on student achievement.  This research, among other validity studies, indicates 
that National Board Certification would be a more direct way of rewarding performance 
than typical pay schedules in the USA. 
 
Teachers who have been through the process of assembling evidence about their teaching 
and applying for Board certification routinely rate the process as the most beneficial form 
of professional development they have ever had (Tracz, 1995).  Perhaps most important, 
the research suggests that standards-based schemes for assessing teacher performance and 
providing certification that leads to increased pay do not have the negative and divisive 
effects that so many earlier performance pay schemes had on staff relationships 
(Anagnostopoulos & Sykes, 2006).  
 
Board certified teachers are in high demand and are often mentors and leaders in their 
schools.  This is largely because members of the education and wider communities are 
confident that the Board’s stringent efforts to ensure the rigour, fairness, validity and 
reliability of its assessments can be depended upon to provide credible guarantees of 
teacher quality.  Board certified teachers are thus rewarded in terms of enhanced status 
and expanded employment opportunities as well as financial remuneration.  Many 
districts now integrate Board Certification into collective bargaining and their salary 
frameworks (http://cpre.wceruw.org/tcomp/research/ksbp/certification.php).    
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A study commissioned by the Board in 2001 sampled the views of 10, 000 National 
Board Certified Teachers.  This study found that teachers believed the certification 
process had: 
 
• made them better teachers (92  per cent); 
• was an effective professional development experience (96  per cent); 
• enabled them to create better curricula (89  per cent); 
• improved their ability to evaluate student learning (89  per cent); 
• enhanced their interaction with students (82  per cent), parents (82  per cent) 
and colleagues (80  per cent). 
 
Typical comments included: 
 
“The National Board Certification process was by far the best professional 
development I have been involved in.  I did not realise how much I still 
needed to learn about impacting student learning.  I learned so much through 
hours of analysing and reflecting.” 
 
“I gained valuable insight of myself as a teacher.  The process helped me to 
assess my teaching abilities as no administrator could have.  Most 
importantly, my students benefit from my self-improvement.” 
 
“Working with other teachers in my school who were also working on 
certification was rewarding.” 
 
“It was the hardest thing I have ever done and it is something I am so glad 
that I tried.  I am immensely proud of the work I turned in – even if I did not 
make the needed grade.  It has made me a better teacher and colleague.” 
 
By 2006 nearly 120,000 teachers had applied for National Board Certification and around 
45 per cent had been successful.  Many who miss out the first time apply again.  The 
application fee for National Board Certification is about USD2,500.  This may seem 
expensive, but it is much less than the costs of a Masters degree.  Many states and school 
districts pay the fee because they see as a better way of spending their professional 




the candidacy process and candidate support programs . . . incorporate 
elements of high-quality professional development identified in the research 
literature and are no more costly than other forms of professional development. 
. . Our findings on design and cost suggest policy makers should consider the 
NBC model as an alternative way to target professional development and 
salary rewards.  
 
Other developments in performance pay 
Individualised Pay in Sweden 
One of the most radical reforms to teachers’ pay arrangements has taken place in 
Sweden.  With the cooperation of the teachers union, Sweden has effectively deregulated 
teachers’ pay since 2000.  The reform was consistent with public policy direction in 
Sweden in general and the decentralisation of the education system in the 1990s.  With 
decentralisation, local municipalities demanded control of teacher salaries.  The goals of 
the policy change were to:  
 
• improve the efficiency, productivity and quality of the education system by 
providing local mangers the responsibility for setting pay in alignment with local 
needs; 
• link teacher performance with pay; and 
• improve teacher retention and recruitment. 
 
Fixed pay scales have been replaced by market-based individual contracts that are 
negotiated between individual teachers and local employers.  National pay agreements 
guarantee a minimum salary after one year of employment and individuals negotiate pay 
levels beyond that.  The first national agreement stipulated an increase in national 
expenditure on teacher salaries of 20 per cent during the first five years of the agreement.  
Beyond these guidelines, the local municipality (the employer) has the flexibility to 
determine an individual teacher’s pay.  Subsequent salaries are determined once a year in 
local negotiations (Johnson, 2006).  Strath (2004) states that, “the ultimate goal of all 
parties is to grant more autonomy on setting pay levels to the school managers and the 
expectation is that the use of the dialogue method will ultimately replace traditional 
negotiations” (p.9).  Strath reports that a recent study by the largest teacher union found 
that 60 per cent of teachers are now in favour of individualised pay compared to less than 
 99 
one third in a 1999 study.  Newer and younger teachers viewed the new scheme more 
favourably than more experienced teachers.   
 
Strath lists some implementation challenges that are already becoming clear: 
 
• Individualised pay requires thorough training of all local managers in the 
procedure; this has been a challenge to many municipalities and a reason unions 
have used traditional negotiations. 
• The devolution of authority with regard to pay has caused power struggles among 
local stakeholders. 
• Successful implementation of the performance-based part of the system requires 
clear incentives for those involved in the process.  Therefore, holding principals 
accountable for school results is crucial. 
• It is critical to have clearly defined criteria on how to evaluated teacher 
performance and clear objectives for schools. 
• Schools and municipality need to have adequate and equitable financial resources 
or the individualised pay system will lose credibility and potentially create 
inequitable conditions for hiring and retaining teachers.  
 
One of the authors visited several schools in Sweden recently and interviewed teachers 
and principals about this reform.  It was clear that the new arrangements were being used 
by principals primarily to attract teachers in shortage areas rather than performance pay.  
One of the effects of this was that experienced teachers found it harder to negotiate salary 
increases than younger teachers.   
One young male teacher in a middle school was clearly benefiting from the new system.  
He had been teaching four years and was highly regarded by the principal.  Through 
negotiations with the principal, his salary had been raised by about 30 per cent since he 
started.   
The following comments were made in a group of high school teachers who were talking 
about the new performance-related pay system:  
We call it the “rumour-based” salary.  The principal never sees what we do, 
though the new salary is supposed to be based on the quality of your teaching.  
Principals just don’t have the time – to see what you do.  Younger teachers are 
getting bigger raises than older teachers. 
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There is no way to have a career - as a teacher.  Performance- related pay? 
That’s a principal decision.  It produces envy. 
Young teacher: “You need a higher salary to attract us.” 
Older teacher: “But, you need a higher salary to keep us!” 
When asked later how he decides who to award pay increases to, the Principal of this 
school wet his index finger and pointed it to the sky, as if testing the wind.  Teachers also 
talked about the pay system in another high school: 
Pay is now related to how much extra work you take on, above the basic job – 
helping the team. Teachers make up the criteria for extra pay themselves.  It’s 
based on how active you are in developing the school – not for being a better 
teacher. 
Teachers who have come to the school recently can negotiate a higher salary 
than teachers who have been here a long time.   
Young teachers have more negotiating power – Sometimes I feel a bit stupid 
for staying on. 
Principal’s comment: The new teachers ask for more money than the 
experienced teachers.  
A young female teacher in a primary school pointed out that she is now paid more than 
her mother, who is also a teacher.  On the new pay system, she comments: 
The idea is good – though you have to sell yourself.  You have to wonder 
whether the principal really know how good you are. 
The real problem is how to get the good teachers to stay! 
 
This Swedish experiment will be interesting to watch.   
 
Career Tracks in Singapore  
The following summary is based on a report by Lynn Olson (2007) of a seminar 
convened by the Aspen Institute in 2006. 
 
Singapore has a well developed career system to recognize and reward outstanding 
classroom teachers.  Its education system is highly centralized and schools follow a 
national curriculum, with national tests for students at key intervals.  Teachers are 
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employed centrally by the national Ministry of Education; becoming a teacher is a highly 
competitive process and applicants are drawn from the top one-third of their college 
classes.  They are paid a full monthly stipend while they complete one to three years of 
teacher study at the National Institute of Education, after which they are obligated to 
remain in teaching for three years.  Teachers with an honours degree earn higher 
beginning salaries than other teachers.   
 
Since 2002, Singapore’s Ministry of Education has started a new incentive payment 
scheme to encourage teachers to make teaching their long-term career.  Teachers receive 
a retention bonus for every three to five years they stay in the service.  This has helped 
keep the resignation rate for teachers at less than 3 percent, despite the good performance 
of the Singapore economy over the last few years and increased job options in the private 
sector.  To encourage a culture of learning in schools, the government pays for 100 hours 
per year of professional development for all teachers.  Even so, said Wong Siew Hoong, 
the Director of Schools for the Ministry of Education, the challenge is to continue to 
motivate teachers to remain committed to the profession.  “For teachers to do the best 
job,” he said, “they must feel comfortable in school.  They must feel ownership of the 
school community.  And they must feel they want to do something for their students.”  
 
Partly for that reason, Singapore has developed a performance-based pay plan for 
teachers, which has been in place for about a decade, and more recently three career 
tracks for teachers to aspire to.  “One of our governing principles is the concept of ‘work 
for reward and reward for work’,” explained Siew Hoong.  “That assumes that people are 
incentivized by rewards and, therefore, as employers, we must reward people for their 
work.” The performance-based bonus system provides rewards for both outstanding 
individual and team contributions in every school.  In addition, on top of their base pay, 
individual teachers are eligible for annual bonuses, ranging from half a month’s to three 
months’ salary, based on the judgment of panels composed of people from within the 
school who have day-to-day knowledge of the teacher’s work.   
 
After their first three years in the classroom, teachers now can choose to pursue one of 
three career tracks: a leadership track; a specialist track, for those interested in curriculum 
and instructional design, educational psychology and guidance, educational testing and 
measurement, or educational research and statistics; and a teaching track.  The “teaching 
track” caters to the majority of educators, who want to make excellence in classroom 
teaching the primary focus of their careers.  Within that track, teachers can move up from 
a “senior teacher” to a “master teacher” to a “master teacher, level 2,” with their pay 
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rising to reflect both their demonstrated expertise and the assumption of additional 
responsibilities.   
 
Senior teachers serve as a mentor and role model for teachers in their schools.  Schools 
also have been given the flexibility to arrange their workload so that senior teachers can 
spend more time mentoring younger teachers.  Master teachers spend their time working 
on initiatives at the national level or assisting groups or clusters of schools.  The master 
teacher’s main role is to provide advice and guidance to teachers and to help introduce 
new teaching methods and pedagogy within subject areas.  Master teachers are appointed 
on a fixed, three-year term, which can be renewed, with the cluster superintendent 
deciding on the deployment of individual master teachers in consultation with local 
principals.  A master teacher might teach in a particular school for a semester or a year, 
for example, to provide model lessons for other teachers in the school to observe and 
learn from.   
 
To move up the career track, teachers must satisfy various criteria to show they have the 
skills, knowledge, and competencies for the job, by submitting a professional portfolio of 
their work to a selection panel at their school.  Among other things, applicants must 
demonstrate the contributions they have made to their school organization as a whole, 
their ability to collaborate with parents and community groups, to contribute to the 
character development and well-being of their pupils, and to advance student learning.   
 
Under the career-track system, a master teacher can earn a salary equivalent to a career 
“specialist” level 1 or 2, while a master teacher level 2 can earn a salary equivalent to a 
school vice-principal.  Individuals can also choose to move laterally across career tracks 
if they satisfy the criteria for the job or career track they want to enter.  “Now we’re 
saying that those people who are really, really good in the classroom, if we want to keep 
some of them in the classroom, we will move them into the teaching track,” says Siew 
Hoong, “whereas in the past we would have moved them up and out of the classroom.”  
 
Singapore’s Ministry of Education takes a very active role in managing the development 
of its educational workforce.  It identifies potential leaders early, uses data to track their 
performance, and makes sure they get a range of experience to groom them for future 
roles.  A competency-based performance management system evaluates teachers annually 
both for how well they meet current work targets and for their estimated career potential.  
The latter is used to identify training possibilities and to plan for future job postings and 
assignments.  Singapore and Japan also share a commitment to keeping teachers’ 
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mindsets open in a rapidly changing environment.  Japanese teachers with 10 years’ 
experience can spend several weeks in businesses, social welfare institutions, and other 
settings to improve their understanding of the broader society.  In Singapore, teachers 
may spend two to three weeks working in private industry to gain a better understanding 
of real-world contexts.  A “Teach Less, Learn More” initiative, launched in 2005, also 
encourages Singapore teachers to provide students with opportunities to speak up and 
engage in creative work in the classroom.  “Our preoccupation now is really about the 
future,” said Siew Hoong.  “Our students are going into a future that is so unpredictable, 
where change is the norm, where they are expected to be learning and relearning.  How 
do we get our students ready for that?  How can we get our teachers to be role models?” 
 
USA: The Teacher Incentive Fund 
In 2004, President Bush introduced a $500m “Teacher Incentive Fund” in the USA.  The 
purpose of the Fund is to support programs that develop and implement performance-
based teacher and principal compensation systems, based primarily on increases in 
student achievement, in high-need schools.  The Fund aimed to provide a $5,000 bonus to 
approximately 100,000 teachers across the country.   However, the program provides no 
guidelines as to how states and school districts might use student performance to evaluate 
individual teacher performance in ways that are reliable and valid4, a problem that 
leading researchers in the field agree no one has solved as yet (Millman, 1997, 
Raudenbush, 2004).  The Program also forces teachers to compete for a limited quota of 
one-off bonus payments, thereby ignoring previous research indicating the importance of 
pay schemes that foster, rather than undermine, stronger cooperation and joint effort 
within schools (Smylie & Smart, 1990).    
(There were echoes of the Teacher Incentive Fund in the Victorian Liberal Party’s policy 
announcement prior to the recent Victorian state election.  The Liberal Party announced 
that they would introduce performance pay for teachers if elected.  They proposed to 
award up to a 5 per cent bonus on their salary to 2000 Victorian teachers each year, with 
the criteria for awarding performance pay increases to be negotiated with teachers’ 
representatives, school councils and the Minister for Education, and to be firmly focused 
on those teachers who add the most to their students’ education and the school 
community as a whole.) 
Whether a categorical grant program of this nature would produce commitment rather 
than opportunistic compliance, as many grant programs do, remains to be seen.  It is 
                                                     
4 http://www.ed.gov/programs/teacherincentive/faq.html 
 104
already clear that States and school districts are experiencing difficulties in preparing 
applications that meet the requirements of the U.S. Department of Education.  The 
Department will appropriate less than half the money set aside for 2006 and provide more 
technical assistance to future applicants (Honawar, 2006).  
In a recent article, Jim Guthrie (Guthrie & Springer, 2006), the highly regarded, former 
Dean of Education at Berkeley University called for more pilot studies and 
experimentation before rushing into policy implementation.  What we know about pay 
for performance in schools, he argues, is far from conclusive, but what we do know is 
that:   
• Measures of performance must be aligned with what a teacher can reasonably 
be expected to accomplish, and student-performance targets triggering teacher 
bonuses must be realistically achievable and announced in advance.  
• Award-calculation procedures must be replicable and transparent, and of a 
financial magnitude perceived by teacher as significant.  
• Construction of pay-for-performance arrangements should not discourage 
teamwork among teacher and others in a school, but must discourage free-
riding.  
It is around these principles that carefully designed experiments and pilot projects should 
take place and be subjected to careful scrutiny.  
In the absence of experimentation and independent appraisal, the idea of 
paying teacher for performance will remain a reform dominated by hyperbole 
and assertion. 
 
President Bush’s Teacher Incentive Fund has also attracted considerable criticism from 
teacher unions.  For example, Reg Weaver, president of the National Education 
Association has stated: 
England tried it. Canada tried it. Several U.S. school districts have tried it. It 
has never worked. Paying teachers based on the test results of their students 
has failed for many reasons. But mainly it has failed because it hurts those that 
it purports to help: children. 
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Students learn best when teachers work as a team, not as free agents competing 
for a financial reward. These grants will promote unhealthy competition in a 
profession that thrives on teamwork and collaboration. Real learning is the 
casualty when teachers shift their focus from quality instruction to boosting 
test scores. 
The Teacher Incentive Fund seems likely to follow the pattern of many merit pay 
schemes in the past5. 
Summary and discussion  
This section of the paper has presented an overview of pay for performance schemes and 
their impact.  Three approaches to linking pay to performance were reviewed:  
 
1. Merit pay,  
2. Knowledge and skills-based pay, and  
3. Professional certification. 
 
The evidence indicates that teachers’ attitudes to performance pay depend very much on 
how “performance” is defined and the validity and reliability of the measures used to 
assess it.  The level of scepticism among teachers appears to decline the more that 
teachers play a part in developing the standards and performance measures.  The 
evidence is in that the most valid and challenging teaching standards extant have been 
those developed by teachers’ professional associations, beginning with those developed 
by the National Council for the Teaching of Mathematics in 1989 and more recently, 
those developed by several Australian teacher associations (Ingvarson & Kleinhenz, 
2006a). 
 
So far as earlier merit pay schemes are concerned, their limitations are well documented 
(Johnson, 1986; Murnane & Cohen, 1986; Odden & Conley, 2002).  These schemes were 
often introduced with insufficient understanding of what was involved in developing fair 
and valid methods for teacher evaluation.  However, proposals for simplistic merit pay 
schemes continue to emerge.  
 
Morrow (1992) studied merit pay plans in several states and districts and found that 
“there was no evidence in this study to support the position that it was pay-for-
                                                     
5 http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/09/20040922-1.html 
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performance which improved student achievement” (p.285-286)6.  Incentives in 
themselves did not necessarily improve what teachers knew and could do, or lead them to 
teach more effectively.  More effective teaching was more likely to result from long-
term, high quality professional learning promoted by knowledge- and skills-based 
approaches to performance-based pay.   
 
More recently, there is evidence that some performance pay schemes are associated with 
improvements in student achievement.  The Teacher Advancement Program is one 
example (Solmon et al., 2007), but it needs to be remembered that in this program 
performance pay is only one component of a set of support strategies designed to improve 
student performance.  
 
Teachers are less sceptical about the possibility of fair, valid and useful performance 
assessments in knowledge and skills-based pay schemes.  They are most positive about 
the  methods for assessing performance used in external certification processes such as 
those for the WA Level 3 classification and National Board Certification. 
 
The English Teachers Pay Incentive Project was shown to be similar, in some ways, to 
performance management and appraisal systems in Australian state education systems.  
The main similarity was that teachers’ progress along negotiated pay scales or ‘spines’ in 
both the English and (most) Australian systems is subject to performance as judged in 
review and evaluation processes conducted at schools.  In both cases, standards 
developed by the employer are used to assess teachers, and all processes are conducted 
by or under the authority of the principal. 
 
Evidence suggests that stakeholder attitudes towards the English Teachers’ Pay Incentive 
Project were initially negative, if not hostile.  These attitudes appear to have shifted 
slightly, as teachers and principals perceive advantages, such as the sharing of good 
practice, identification of professional development needs and opportunity to access a 
higher salary (Marsden & Belfield, 2006).  The chief problem seems to be that the system 
has ‘settled down’ and become ‘domesticated’ without producing significant change, as 
most teachers continue to move comfortably along the pay spine, much as before.  
Negative attitudes now appear to be mainly directed towards the time consuming, 
‘bureaucratic’ nature of the assessment processes.  Accessing the higher salary levels is 
seen as a burdensome hoop to be jumped through rather than as a rigorous means of 
                                                     
6 Morrow, S.Y. (1992).  A Study of Student Achievement Results Using Selective Teacher Pay-
for-Performance Models (Teacher Performance). Dissertation, Baylor University. 
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identifying and rewarding quality teaching.  The little evidence available on performance 
management systems in Australian schools suggests similar attitudes among Australian 
teachers and school principals towards the various antipodean versions of performance 
review processes in schools.   
 
The highly localised nature of American education is reflected in the many merit pay for 
performance schemes that have been attempted in various states and districts over more 
than 150 years.  Stakeholder attitudes, especially those of teachers and school principals, 
expressed strong resentment that many ‘merit pay’ schemes seemed to rest on an 
assumption that teachers were not working hard enough, and that promises of money 
would exhort them to greater effort.  Importantly, teachers often believed that the 
judgements of competence on which extra pay was awarded, were unfair.  These negative 
attitudes ‘brought down’ many a scheme, causing commentators to question whether pay 
for performance was appropriate to education as an enterprise (e.g. Johnson, 1986).   
 
In the latter part of the twentieth century and the first decade of the 21st, however, pay-
for- performance schemes that attracted stakeholder (especially teacher, principal and 
employer), support were designed and implemented in the USA and also in Australia.  
Some of the more successful programs in the USA were those that rewarded group 
(rather than individual) teacher performance.  Most promising so far seem to be examples 
of knowledge and skills-based pay systems that reward teachers who have satisfied the 
requirements of an evaluation perceived to be fair, valid, rigorous and consistent.   
 
Over 20 years ago the noted researcher Dan Lortie observed in response to a question 
about merit pay,  ‘The heart of the problem is that there is little agreement over what the 
art of teaching is’ (Johnson, 1984, p.182).  Since that time, much progress has been made 
in the development of professional teaching standards that set out to answer this problem.  
The first feature that is common to all recent successful KSBP pay for performance 
schemes is the development and application of standards that teachers recognise as 
providing accurate representations of their work.  Older schemes that assessed teacher 
competence, based on behavioural checklists, tended to engendered attitudes of, at best, 
compliance, at worst, revolt.   
 
Teachers readily understand and recognise that ‘modern’ standards, such as those of 
Charlotte Danielson’s Framework for Teaching, the field specific standards of the 
National Board for Professional Teaching Standards, and sets of standards developed by 
Australian teachers’ subject associations, accurately describe their professional 
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knowledge and skills.  Teachers welcome such standards as a vehicle for improving their 
professional knowledge and skill, and appreciate that any assessment of their teaching 
that is made on the basis of such standards is much more likely to be valid than 
assessment based on a bureaucratic list of superficial ‘competencies’.   
 
In summary, many pay for performance schemes have been tried over at least 150 years, 
and most have failed because they have not gained the support of the stakeholders who 
are most closely involved in the processes, most notably teachers and school 
administrators.   
 
This review indicates, however, that it is now possible to establish performance pay 
schemes that overcome many of the deficiencies of previous merit-pay schemes.  These 
standards-based schemes need to be distinguished from “performance management” 
schemes, which are the right and proper responsibility of school managers.  The focus of 
the latter is on whether teachers are fulfilling their contractual duties.  The focus of the 
former is on providing incentives and recognition to teachers to move to high standards 
of professional performance that improve student outcomes.   
 
Teachers view these emerging performance-based pay schemes more favourably; they 
have significant effects on teachers’ professional learning, and they create a cadre of 
teachers who are credible and welcome mentors and leaders in schools.  Employing 
authorities increasingly value the assessment services that a rigorous professional 
certification body can provide.  They can recommend to their teachers that they apply for 
certification from an external, independent agency, taking away the difficult and onerous 
task of attempting to set up their own local performance assessment schemes that rarely 
gain respect.  A rigorous professional certification system can give them a sound basis on 
which to offer incentives and recognition to retain valuable teachers who reach high 
standards of knowledge and skill.  One key element in gaining stakeholder support for 
such systems is the development of fair, valid and rigorous systems for evaluating teacher 
performance.  Another is that certification is an achievable goal for all teachers, not a 
special few, given adequate opportunities for professional development.  A third is that 
the salary benefits must be substantial, reflecting a genuine commitment to value high 
quality teaching.   
 
Paradoxically, standards-based performance assessment schemes developed by teachers’ 
professional associations such as the mathematics and science teachers in Australia and 
the NBPTS in the USA are often much more searching and rigorous than those developed 
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by employing authorities (such as the English Threshold).  NBPTS certification has 
gained a high level of credibility, with all stakeholders.  As a result, states and school 
districts are increasingly giving some tangible form of recognition to teachers who gain 
NB certification in salary arrangements. 
 
These new schemes might be called “evidence of professional development”-based pay 
schemes; evidence, that is, in terms of practices that are consistent with standards for 
accomplished teaching, and evidence of what students are doing and learning as a direct 
result of a teacher’s teaching.  Consequently, these new approaches to performance pay 
are regarded more favourably by teachers than the older schemes.  They also have a much 
greater impact on encouraging teachers to engage in effective modes of professional 
learning - modes that help teachers develop toward higher standards.  They also promote, 
rather than undermine, the development of accountable professional culture in schools. 
 
Under what circumstances do performance-based pay systems gain 
professional commitment and improve student learning outcomes?    
If a performance pay scheme is to achieve its chief aim of improving student 
achievement, it needs to identify the teaching practices (i.e. standards) that lead to 
improved student achievement and reward teachers who learn how to meet those 
standards.  This review indicates that performance-based pay systems are more likely to 
have a positive impact when their development and operation is seen as a mutual 
responsibility between employing authorities and professional associations.  There are 
complementary roles to be played here in the development of standards, assessments, 
professional development, certification and employer recognition.  In other words, 
performance-based pay schemes for teachers are more likely to be successful when: 
 
a) their guiding purpose is to give substantial and valued recognition to teachers 
who provide evidence of professional development to high teaching standards; 
b) valid (research-based) standards have been developed by expert teachers in their 
specialist field of teaching to provide long-term goals for professional 
development; 
c) appropriate research has been completed to develop reliable and valid  
procedures for gathering evidence to indicate whether teachers have met those 
standards; 
d) the assessment of performance procedures are conducted by an agency external 
to the school to ensure reliability, comparability and fairness;  
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e) teachers have adequate opportunities to learn the knowledge and skills required 
to put the standards into practice; 
f) a teacher’s ability to demonstrate that they have met the relevant standards leads 
to valued professional recognition, enhanced career opportunities and significant 
salary increases;  
g) teachers who reach high standards of performance gain access to interesting, 
challenging and well-supported positions in schools where they can make 
provide leadership to improve teaching and learning; and 
h) Governments and other employing authorities become convinced that the 
assessment system is valid and reliable and make long-term commitments to 
support the system. 
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SECTION E: SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH ON 
PERFORMANCE PAY 
In preparing this report, ACER was asked to identify: 
 
a) the gaps in the Australian and international evidence base related to performance 
pay, and 
b) what other data/research would have been valuable in assessing the value and/or 
acceptance of performance-based pay for teachers in an Australian context? 
 
It is noteworthy that most of the research drawn upon for this report has come from the 
USA or England.  The Teacher Incentive Project in England was part of a major national 
initiative to “modernise” the teaching profession that affected over half a million 
teachers.  Several major research programs, such as those led by Wragg (2004),  have 
been able to follow these reforms closely and add to our understanding of issues involved 
in implementing performance-based pay and factors affecting its effectiveness.   
 
In a survey of teachers in England, Marsden and Belfield (2006) found that most teachers 
(63 per cent) remained sceptical about whether the principle of relating teachers’ pay to 
performance was a good one after five years of the Teacher Incentive Project reforms 
there.  As we have indicated, however, the rigour of the methods for identifying effective 
teachers in that scheme remain doubtful.  Over 90 per cent also said the process had little 
effect on their professional development.  In contrast, over 90 per cent of teachers who 
have been through the National Board certification system said the assessment process 
was both valid and beneficial. 
 
Similarly, there have been many major performance-based pay reforms in the USA, of 
many different types, providing a basis for many research programs such as that run by 
Allan Odden, Carolyn Kelley and the CPRE team.  Several states like Connecticut have 
had comprehensive approaches to lift teacher quality for over 20 years.  These major 
reform programs also provided fertile ground for researchers to add to our understanding 
about how to provide incentives with positive effects on student outcomes.   
 
Equivalent reform programs are relatively rare in Australia, apart from the Advanced 
Skills Teacher reforms of the early 1990s.  Consequently, there is little Australian 
research to draw upon about performance pay.  Research on stakeholder attitudes to the 
idea of performance-based pay in the abstract can be useful, but research that is based on 
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experience with well thought through performance pay programs is much more likely to 
add to our understanding.   
 
It is doubtful that there would be value in conducting more surveys of teachers’ attitudes 
in general to performance based pay.  The usual answer to these surveys is, “it depends 
on how it is done.”  Stakeholder attitudes to performance pay depend mainly on what 
they have had the opportunity to experience.  We can run national consultation processes 
about standards, performance assessment and certification until the cows come home.  
Only hands-on experience with new approaches to developing standards and assessing 
performance will lead to changed attitudes and better informed decisions about how to 
make the pay system a more effective instrument for improving the quality of teaching.   
 
When Australian teachers have been part of well-conceived schemes to develop standards 
and assessments of teachers’ knowledge and skills, their attitudes are much more 
positive.  For example, the Australian teachers who were part of the development of 
standards for highly accomplished English, mathematics and science teachers became 
very committed to those standards.  They found that it was possible to write standards for 
what teachers should know and be able to do that they had pride in.  They also found that 
it was possible to create valid methods to assess teacher performance against the 
standards.  As a result, attitudes changed with experience. 
 
The most rigorous system for identifying accomplished teachers in our review, the 
NBPTS, is the one that most involved teachers and their professional associations and 
organisations in all phases of developing the performance assessment system.  It is also 
the system most respected by all major stakeholders (all 50 states recognise National 
Board Certification).   
 
It is likely that the attitudes of most Australian teachers to the concept of performance-
based pay are likely to remain sceptical without similar participation in the processes of 
developing and trialling methods of gathering evidence and assessing performance.  
While there is little doubt that, on rational grounds, most stakeholders recognise that pay 
systems and career paths need reform, a cultural change in attitudes needs to happen in 
parallel with any reform initiative.   
 
Such reforms would need to be seen as a shared responsibility between teachers, 
governments and employing authorities.  Teachers will need to accept responsibility for 
developing rigorous profession-wide systems for defining, evaluating and certifying 
 113
accomplished practice if they expect the public to place greater material value on their 
work.  Teachers and the teaching profession will need to be the agents rather than the 
targets of this reform. 
 
This review of performance pay schemes indicates the need to move gradually, in a 
developmental way, toward building capacity.  Based on the assessment of the available 
evidence, it would seem unlikely that there is any one model that could be readily 
adopted for application in Australia at this time.  Hands on experience with well 
researched and carefully developed assessment processes will lead to better informed 
decisions about how to make the pay system a more effective instrument for improving 
the quality of teaching and improving student learning outcomes.   
 
Therefore, it is suggested that two research and development programs on performance 
pay be initiated; one focused on developing valid and reliable systems and measures for 
gathering evidence for individual performance pay decision, the other focused on 
learning how to operate team or school- based performance award programs.   
 
Individual approaches to performance-based pay 
Successful implementation of performance-based pay schemes for individual teachers is 
unlikely to become a reality without a major research program to develop our capacity for 
measuring teacher knowledge and skill.  (By “successful implementation” we refer not 
only to schemes that are psychometrically rigorous, but also to schemes that have the 
power to give all teacher the incentives to engage in effective forms of standards-based 
professional learning, not just the few who may compete for bonuses.  In other words, 
successful schemes have the capacity, in Elmore’s terms (1996) to enable effective 
teaching practices to “go to scale”.)  
 
There is much to learn about reliable methods for assessing teacher performance from 
research and development work conducted overseas, but local capacity is definitely 
growing to conduct this kind of work.  The heart of any performance-based pay scheme is 
the system for assessing teachers’ knowledge and skill.  That system must be sound.  It 
must focus primarily on direct (rather than statistical) evidence about what students are 
learning, doing and experiencing as a result of the conditions for learning established by 
the teacher.  Our current capacity to create systems for assessing teacher performance that 
are valid, reliable and fair is limited.  It is doubtful whether there is a performance-based 
pay scheme in Australia that would meet these criteria, if subjected to rigorous research.   
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While teachers’ attitudes to merit pay schemes are well known, we only have limited 
knowledge about their attitudes to the concepts of knowledge and skills-based pay and 
professional certification.  Pilot programs in a few jurisdictions, with accompanying 
research projects would test the acceptability and feasibility of these approaches in the 
Australian context.  
 
Stakeholder attitudes to performance pay depend mainly on what they have had the 
opportunity to experience.  As mentioned earlier, the legacy of payment by results and 
inspection is deep in the collective consciousness of the teaching profession.  Even the 
word “performance” can lead many teachrs to lower the shutters.  Few teachers in 
Australia have experienced a knowledge and skills-based scheme in the way, for 
example, that teachers have who have been applicants for National Board Certification, 
or those who have been trained to assess those applications. 
 
As far as performance-based pay is concerned, we probably know more about what 
teachers do not want, than about what they would come up with if they had the 
responsibility for building a professionally credible performance-based pay system.   
 
Consideration might be given to research projects that would aim to greatly increase the 
numbers of teachers and other stakeholders who have direct experience with recent 
developments with standards-based methods for assessing teacher performance.  We 
suggest that a national pilot project on standards, performance assessment and 
certification in one or two well-defined teaching fields, such as primary teaching or 
secondary mathematics and science teaching, might be initiated with the following 
purposes: 
 
• To conduct research and development work on standards-based methods for 
assessing teacher performance.    
• To trial these assessment methods with teacher volunteers to test their feasibility 
and reliability. 
• To evaluate the acceptability and credibility of these methods with stakeholders. 




At later stages, if such a project moved from a pilot stage to wider implementation, there 
would be a need for further research on the consequences of awarding recognition in 
salary terms to teachers who met designated standards or levels of performance.  Interest 
might focus, for example, on the level of teacher engagement in more effective modes of 
professional development, on the staff relationships in schools and on effective ways of 
organising schools to capitalise on the leadership that such teachers might provide.    
 
It would be advisable to select a small number of specific teaching fields in which to 
begin this work rather than trying to cope with all the specialist fields at the same time.  
Primary teaching, or early childhood are examples of specialist fields where this work 
could start.  Alternatively, secondary mathematics and science teaching would also be 
suitable, as the respective subject associations have already done a great deal of 
groundwork in developing standards and trialling assessment methods.  These are also 
fields where teachers are in short supply and career paths are needed with a greater 
capacity to attract and retain good teachers. 
 
Projects such as these might be carried out under the umbrella of agencies such as 
Teaching Australia or state and territory professional standards bodies or some form of 
collaboration between the two.  This is an area where the adage ‘start small, but think 
big’ applies.   
   
Jurisdictions and teacher associations might be invited to submit proposals to be part of 
these pilot projects.  The pilot certification projects might be trialled in collaboration with 
one or two school systems.  It would be unwieldy to work with all jurisdictions on board 
from the start.  States and territories such as WA, SA and the NT might provide fertile 
ground for the experiment as they already have versions of performance-based pay 
schemes for accomplished teachers at the top of the salary scale and they may be 
interested in refining their schemes to increase comparability and mutual recognition.  
Project reference groups should have a broad membership of employing authorities, 
unions, parent organizations, principals and teachers.   
 
Projects such as these will need sufficient consideration before it will be possible to go to 
scale.  It is vital to avoid the mistakes made by so many performance pay schemes in the 
past where there was little understanding about the importance on getting the 
performance assessment system to acceptable levels of reliability.    
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Members of project teams, including practicing teachers, could develop or refine existing 
standards and assessment task guidelines.  Teachers could be invited to field test 
assessment methods, such as portfolio tasks and other methods for providing evidence of 
how their knowledge and practice meets the standards.  Members of teacher associations 
in the pilot states might develop local support groups for teachers as they prepared 
evidence of their performance.  The final step could be to train a group of experienced 
teachers, in the designated specialist teaching fields, to assess reliably the evidence 
provided by teachers against the standards. 
 
A central purpose of this study would be to monitor the attitudes of all stakeholders as the 
project progressed.  It would be important to build in processes for researching the 
reliability and validity of the new approaches to assessing performance.  The first stage of 
the pilot project might be trialled with a small group of teachers and it would be desirable 
if the cooperating school systems could guarantee suitable recognition for teachers who 
complete the process.  A project such as this would provide a firmer foundation on which 
to gauge the attitudes of stakeholders to the possibility of building pay systems that gave 
more incentives and recognition for evidence of attaining high standards of performance.  
 
It is important to continue to collect robust, defensible information on the effectiveness or 
otherwise of different models of performance pay for teachers.  This can inform future 
policy directions in this important area.   
 
School or team-based performance awards  
There are few gaps in the research on individual merit pay schemes.  Many studies 
identify potential weaknesses of these schemes: lack of fair performance evaluation, 
creation of competitive work environments, distrust between teachers and administrators 
and unstable funding (Odden & Kelley, 2002).    
However, the prospects for performance-based awards for teams of teachers look more 
promising, although the research so far is limited.  There is evidence that teachers who 
work in cooperative teams felt more motivated at work and were more successful in 
achieving higher student achievement (Shedd & Bacharach, 1991).  Timperley and 
Wiseman’s (2003) research in New Zealand shows a positive relationship between 
schools with strong professional communities and student achievement.  There is 
probably greater justification for using student outcomes, as measured on statewide 
standardised tests of student achievement, for team-based than individual performance 
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bonuses.  Other measures of performance related to student welfare, engagement and 
satisfaction are also more appropriate to team-based awards.   
After reviewing several examples, Odden and Kelley (2002) claim that the evidence 
indicates that school-based performance award programs do improve student 
performance.  However, there are cautions.  Improvement is greatest in areas of the 
curriculum measured by the assessment instruments, so measures need to be monitored to 
ensure they are valid representations of what is valued in the curriculum.  In addition, 
teachers need to believe the goals are achievable with given resources and that system 
will be administered fairly.   
 
Several jurisdictions in Australia have programs designed to strengthen professional 
community, such as Victoria’s Performance and Development Culture program, but to 
our knowledge no team-based or school-based performance pay schemes have been 
developed as yet.  Developing and implementing such a scheme would be a major 
enterprise.  This is possibly an area where a collaborative pilot scheme might be initiated 
so that research could be conducted on the feasibility and viability of such schemes. 
 
While team-based approaches to providing incentives to improve student achievement 
may prove to have some merit, they do not replace the need for pay systems and career 
paths that provide incentives to individual teachers to deepen and broaden their 
professional knowledge and skills.  Salary levels do affect the academic quality of people 
attracted to teaching.  They are also one of the most important reasons why teachers leave 
the profession.  There is general agreement among educational stakeholders that excellent 
teachers should be able to remain in the classroom without suffering financial loss.  They 
should not feel compelled to move into administrative positions, or into other careers in 
order to gain recognition or status.  The need to find better ways to recognise and reward 
individual teachers for meeting high performance standards will remain.  
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APPENDIX 1: PROJECT BRIEF 
Required Outcomes:  
 
(a) provide an overview of current pay arrangements for teachers in Australian 
schools, according to jurisdiction and sector, including industrial relations 
frameworks - who is covered by collective enterprise bargaining agreements and 
how; what other arrangements are there?  Is there provision, within any of these 
arrangements for performance-based pay schemes? 
 
(b) identify differentiation in arrangements between jurisdictions, including policy or 
legislative frameworks which may impede, limit or prevent the introduction of 
performance-based pay arrangements for teachers; 
 
(c) provide an overview of recent (since 2000) Australian and international research 
on the attitudes of stakeholders (including teachers, school leaders, parents of 
school-aged children, teacher employers, etc) to performance-based pay for 
teachers; 
 
(d) provide an overview of recent international research on the impact of the 
introduction of performance-based pay schemes for teachers.  What level of 
acceptance has there been for the introduction of performance-based pay?  How 
successful has the introduction of performance-based pay been in achieving the 
intended goals - e.g. higher levels of teacher retention, improved teaching 
standards, improved student outcomes, recognition, etc.?  What unintended 
consequences have arisen? 
 
(e) identify the gaps in the Australian and international evidence base on the issues 
above.  What other data/research would have been valuable in assessing the value 
and/or acceptance of performance-based pay for teachers in an Australian 
context? 
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APPENDIX 2: CURRENT AWARDS AND AGREEMENTS IN STATE 
AND TERRITORY GOVERNMENT SCHOOLS 
The relevant sections of the eight state and territory government school Agreements are 
described below.  Awards cover the majority of teachers in Australia and content of the 
Awards is often mirrored in the systemic Agreements. While education authorities have 
many policy documents related to various items in the Agreements, there is variation in 
the extent to which performance appraisal and management is outlined or described in the 
Agreements themselves. 
 
While there are variations in the different Agreements across the jurisdictions, all 
Agreements cover and are binding on government school teachers in the particular state.  
“Teachers” may be variously specified - as persons employed under a particular Act, or 
as persons members of or eligible to be members of the AEU.  The parties to the 
Agreements are the state (specified in various ways) and usually the state branch of the 
AEU.  
 
Australian Capital Territory (ACT) 
The ACT is currently operating under a federal award and an expired collective 
agreement. Schools have central budgets and centrally appointed staff. 
 
Parent Award: Commonwealth Teaching Service (ACT) Award 1981. 
 
Name of Agreement:  ACT Department of Education and Training  
Teaching Staff Certified Agreement 2004-2006  
(Certified 20 August 2004, Expired 1 March 2006) 
 
The new ACT Agreement (as at December 2006) was still being negotiated as of 22 
August 2006. Issues still under discussion are the quantum of salary increase and the 
amount of face-to-face teaching. The ACT branch of the AEU had initially proposed an 
Accomplished Teacher category to reward classroom excellence, worth about $3,000 to 
teachers. This has not been included in the Agreement now under negotiation but the 
ACT Education Minister has not ruled it out of future negotiation: ‘Key issues to be 
resolved [in future negotiations] included the assessment process, the administration of 
the program, the tenure within the category and the number of positions within the 
category.’ Australian, 21/7/06 
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There is currently a nine level salary scale for Classroom Teachers, plus three School 
Leader positions. School Leader C is an executive position with, usually, a large 
component of classroom teaching. It does, however, remove teachers from the classroom 
for at least part of the time.  
 
Teachers who commence with or who achieve a recognised qualification beyond the 
compulsory four year training can move up an extra step in the incremental scale. This 
has been the practice in the ACT for some time. However, if teachers are already at the 
top of the scale and gain an extra qualification, there is no provision for recognition by 
way of salary increase. Within the nine levels of the incremental scale, there are three 
categories for Classroom Teachers: Beginning Teacher, Accomplished Teacher and 
Emerging Leader. These categories have been included ‘for the purposes of identifying 
professional responsibilities and targeting support effectively’. All Classroom Teachers 
have an individual Professional Pathways Plan. Individual reviews are conducted twice 
yearly by the principal or delegate. There is also a Pathways to Improvement Plan to 
assist teachers in need of support. This contains provisions for addressing under-
performance, including reduction in an incremental level. 
 
There is also a Leading Teacher position with a one year maximum tenure whereby 
teachers are paid an allowance of $3,500 from school funds for a particular project. There 
is no quota for the number of Leading Teacher positions in a school, with schools having 
some budgetary discretion in this area.  
 
Teachers are placed in the Classroom Teacher salary incremental scale based on 
qualifications and experience. Movement through the scale is ‘based on performance and 
is in recognition of competence, developing expertise and the assumption of broader 
professional responsibilities’.  
 
All permanent teachers have a Professional Pathways Plan as a basis for assessing and 
developing professional performance and for engaging in performance feedback.  
 
Northern Territory (NT) 
The NT has a federal award and a collective agreement.  
 
Parent Award: Northern Territory Teaching Service Award 1981. 
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Name of Agreement: Northern Territory Public Sector 2005-2007 Teachers and 
Educators Certified Agreement.  
 
Australian Workplace Agreements are specifically excluded in the NT Agreement. 
‘During the life of this Agreement, Australian Workplace Agreements will not be 
introduced in respect of employees covered by this Agreement.’ (Clause 22.1) 
 
Teachers progress up the incremental scale according to years of experience. The annual 
increment can only be withheld ‘as an outcome of inability or discipline procedures 
undertaken in accordance with the Act’. 
 
Under the Agreement, all parties commit to implementing the Performance Enhancement 
Framework. One clause covers productivity, citing ‘increased skill levels arising from 
training and professional learning’. Increased skill levels are part of overall professional 
learning, and do not relate directly to annual increments. 
 
A Rapid Incremental Progression system is included. This scheme enables beginning 
teachers to progress through the incremental scale at an accelerated rate. 
 
Accessing the scheme involves gaining points for approved tertiary studies or 
professional development courses. Beginning teachers have the opportunity to move up 
an extra level on the pay scale at the commencement of their third year of teaching. 
 
The NT has in place a Teachers of Exemplary Practice (TEP) scheme. This status is 
awarded for sustained exemplary teaching performance and provides increased 
remuneration through an alternative career path to the Executive Teacher (ET) structure. 
Pay rates are tied to the ET structure, with allowances being paid up to specific 
maximums of the ET salary. The scheme has three levels, all of which include exemplary 
modelling of teaching, a role in curriculum and professional development and in school 
and/or wider system needs. Applicants are responsible for collating evidence, assessment 
panels verify the evidence, and moderation committees undertake system wide 
moderation of all reports. Teachers generally remain on a particular level of the TEP 
scheme for at least two years, although this is not mandatory.  Assessment panels are 
established by the school principal and include three teachers from the applicant’s school.  
The Chairperson should be a TEP3 or Executive Teacher Level 4 or above.  The Chair 
selects one of the teachers, who must be a TEP 2 or an Executive Teacher, or above.  The 
applicant nominates the other teacher, in consultation with the Chair. 
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Teachers are eligible to apply for TEP positions after two years’ teaching experience 
(from Step 6). If their application is successful, their salary increase will be given as a 
percentage of their salary point on the incremental scale with an upper limit related to ET 
levels. Thus there is provision for salary ‘acceleration’ in the last three levels of the 
incremental scale. 
 
New South Wales (NSW) 
Name of Agreement: NSW has a State Award: Crown Employees (Teachers in 
Schools and Related Employees) Salaries and Conditions Award 2006 Industrial 
Relations Commission of NSW. 
 
Teachers in NSW move up a common incremental salary scale subject to demonstration 
of ‘continuing efficiency in teaching practice, satisfactory performance and professional 
growth’.  Under the Teacher Annual Review Scheme, teachers are appraised by a 
principal, supervisor, or nominee: the. The annual review entails conferences, observation 
of educational programs and review of documentation.  
 
There are many policy and ancillary documents related to teacher assessment and review 
in addition to the Award, but no specific accountability procedures are described.  
Acceleration through the incremental scale can occur for people returning to or entering 
teaching from industry, with prior industrial experience being taken into account.   
 
Queensland 
Queensland has a State Award and a collective agreement. Schools have central budgets 
and centrally appointed staff. 
 
Parent Award: Teachers’ Award – State 2003 Queensland Industrial Relations 
Commission. 
 
Name of Agreement: Department of Education and the Arts Teachers’ Certified 
Agreement 2006 
 
Salary increments for classified teachers are automatic unless the teacher is subject to 
“Diminished Work Performance” or similar processes. Progression after a certain point 
on a scale is only by way of promotion, or by accessing senior teacher salary.  
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Progression is by annual increment within a range of bands, with provisions for three 
year trained teachers to accelerate. These provisions include accredited professional 
development and a standard form acknowledging additional knowledge and skills. There 
is provision for a principal to withhold an increment if performance is deemed 
unsatisfactory.  Otherwise, progression along the incremental scale is automatic subject 
to satisfactory professional performance.  There is no specific appraisal or review process 
as yet.  A set of aspirational, developmental professional standards for teachers is 
currently being developed and negotiated with the state union branch.  Providing 
evidence of meeting professional standards will at this stage be voluntary.  However, the 
Queensland College of Teachers is about to introduce a requirement for all teachers to 
meet conditions for renewal of their registration every five years. 
 
A particular stipulation applies to teachers who have less than four years training.  The 
Queensland agreement specifically excludes compulsory classroom observation as a 
method of establishing completion of qualifications to attain 4 year trained status.  ‘No 
teacher will be required to undergo classroom or other inspection for the purposes of 
certification.’  
 
Queensland also has a senior teacher position following the top of the incremental scale.  
To become a senior teacher, a teacher signs an undertaking regarding factors such as 
curriculum implementation and positive relationships.  The teacher’s primary role is as a 
classroom teacher.  The parties have agreed to a three-level classification structure from 
2009.  This structure will differentiate between teaching and leadership positions.  
 
South Australia 
South Australia has a State Award and a collective agreement.  Schools have central 
budgets and local selection of Classroom Teachers. 
 
Parent Award: Teachers (Department of Education and Children’s Services (DECS)) 
Award. 
 
Name of Agreement: South Australian Education Staff (government pre-school, 
schools and TAFE) Enterprise Agreement 2006  
 
Teachers are paid on an eight-point incremental salary scale (excluding Special Authority 
teachers).  Movement up the incremental scale is based on length of experience, not 
performance appraisals or reviews.  There are procedures in place to address a situation 
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where a principal believes underperformance is a problem. Teachers progress through the 
incremental salary scale unless the Chief Executive certifies unsatisfactory ‘conduct, 
diligence and general efficiency’.  A teacher can not be accelerated up the incremental 
scale. There are general systems of ongoing performance management in schools 
throughout the year. 
 
There is a separate two point scale for ASTs.  A new AST 2 assessment process, based on 
agreed criteria, is being trialled and implemented this year, and higher salary levels for 
Key teacher and Co-ordinator positions. AST positions are directly linked to classroom 
teaching performance.  There was previously a requirement that teachers be at top levels 
of the incremental scale before applying to become an AST.  The ‘step barrier’ has 
recently been removed, and teachers at any level of the scale may apply.  Teachers are 
also able to apply for AST 1 and AST 2 concurrently. ASTs are re-assessed after a 
number of years to ensure continuing high performance.  
 
Successful application for AST status is directly related to classroom teaching 
performance and not to any particular career path; it is directly related to teaching 
practice in a variety of classroom settings. ASTs are Classroom Teachers who spend the 
majority of their time in the classroom. An Assessment Panel of three merit trained 
members including the principal considers the evidence and whether the applicant meets 
the criteria. Evidence includes a portfolio, lesson observation, a presentation and 
discussion. ASTs are expected to spend the majority of their time in classroom teaching 
duties. 
 
There is no quota for the number of AST positions, with teachers being able to apply at 
any school. A school with a large number of very experienced teachers may have a large 
number of ASTs.  The state government funds the AST system centrally. 
 
The SA AST scheme is a performance pay scheme directly related to the appraisal of 
classroom teaching performance. There is also provision for recognition of classroom 
teaching excellence because teachers can jump from any point of the incremental scale to 
AST, now that the ‘step barrier’ has been removed. 
 
Tasmania 
Tasmania has a State Award and a collective agreement. Schools have central budgets 
and centrally appointed staff. 
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Parent Award: Teaching Service (Tasmanian Public Sector) Award 2005. 
 
Name of Agreement: Teaching Service (Tasmanian Public Sector) Award 2005 
The Teaching Service (Tasmania Public Sector) Salaries and Conditions of 
Employment Agreement 2005. Tasmanian Industrial Commission  
 
Teachers in Tasmania move through the incremental scale subject to satisfactory 
performance, ‘having regard to the teacher acquiring skills and professional 
knowledge…demonstrated by objective criteria.’  The employer may defer or refuse the 
increment if the employee does not meet the criteria. 
 
Positions classified at Band 2 are ‘instructional and classroom-based with employees 
demonstrating exemplary teaching practice’. Progress to this level is through appointment 
or promotion.  
 
Under the terms of the current Agreement, a Working Party will be established to review 
the current promotional structure and to ‘consider the concept of an ‘in classroom’ 
promotional teacher position’. 
 
The union has agreed to the satisfactory performance requirement, but there is no 
established process by the Department of Education (DoE) for appraisal.  The former 
three AST positions have been collapsed into one incremental step. 
 
Initial acceleration on the incremental scale can be offered to certain select beginning 
teachers, perhaps a couple of levels higher than otherwise. 
 
Victoria 
Victoria has a federal award and a collective agreement. Schools have global budgets and 
locally selected staff, which means they have, relatively, considerable staffing flexibility. 
 
Parent Award: Teachers’ (Victorian Government Schools) Conditions of Employment 
Award 2001. 
 
Name of Agreement: Victorian Government Schools Agreement 2004.  
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Progression through the salary scale is through an annual performance and development 
process. This process is designed to ‘recognise high performance and address low 
performance’. There is performance appraisal and quality assurance in that there are sets 
of standards for each of the three levels on the incremental scale – graduate, 
accomplished and expert – that define what a teacher at that place on the scale should be 
able to do. These sets of standards change between the three levels. One level of Expert 
Teacher is for access by former Experienced Teachers with Responsibility (ETWR), a 
previously available position. An increment can be withheld if performance is deemed to 
be unsatisfactory.  
 
The teacher class comprises Leading Teacher and three levels of Classroom Teacher: 
Expert; Accomplished; and Graduate. 
 
Salary progression is linked to achievement against professional standards or similar 
criteria. Teachers may be considered for accelerated salary progression within any of the 
teacher class classifications within the school.  Principals can accelerate teachers within 
the incremental scales, but this would be a budget issue.  The significant acceleration 
would be if a teacher were to move from a low point on the incremental scale to a 
Leading Teacher position.  This could occur if a Leading Teacher position was advertised 




Western Australia has a State Award and a collective agreement. Schools have central 
budgets and a mixture of locally/centrally appointed staff. 
 
Parent Award: Teachers (Public Sector Primary and Secondary Education) Award 1993. 
 
Name of Agreement: The School Education Act Employees’ (Teachers and 
Administrators) General Agreement 2006 (registered August 2006) defined in the 
Agreement as ‘Public Education (School Education Act Staff) Agreement 2006  
 
WA has a twelve point scale, two levels of Senior Teacher and a Level 3 Classroom 
Teacher level.  Progression through increments is subject to satisfactory service. An 
increment can be withheld or a teacher reduced on the incremental scale if service is 
deemed unsatisfactory. There is an overall performance management process in schools 
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The Senior Teacher position ‘acknowledges that there is a need to retain competent 
experienced teachers in duties directly associated with classroom teaching and learning’. 
To progress to Senior Teacher, teachers must have completed service at a specific level 
of the salary scale and completed agreed relevant professional development. Duties and 
breadth of tasks are negotiated at school level. There is no quota for these positions. Like 
other states, WA has a large number of teachers at the top of the incremental scale. 
However, according to the AEU, many of these teachers do not currently apply for Senior 
Teacher positions. 
 
The purpose of the Level 3 Classroom Teacher is to ‘support the retention of exemplary 
teachers in the classroom’.  To progress to Level 3 Classroom Teacher, teachers undergo 
a two-stage competency based selection process that requires submission of a portfolio of 
evidence and a ‘Reflective Practice’ discussion with colleagues. The portfolio allows 
applicants to demonstrate the relationship between teaching and learning and student 
learning outcomes; the Reflective Practice allows applicants to demonstrate how they 
work with other teachers and their ‘capacity for professional reflection’. Accredited Level 
3 teachers negotiate a role with their principal or line manager, with the role being 
regularly reviewed. In the main, it is a regularly timetabled allocation, perhaps once per 
fortnight, or as pooled time. Examples of time usage might be enabling other teachers to 
participate in team teaching or taking up a mentoring role.  The WA Level 3 Classroom 
Teacher position involves external review and assessment against standards. It is a 
promotion position. The Level 3 Classroom Teacher position is discussed further in 
Section D of this report. 
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APPENDIX 3: THE INCREMENTAL SCALES IN NON-GOVERNMENTAL AWARDS   
 
SECTION B – TEACHERS’ SALARY SCALE – CATHOLIC SCHOOLS – JULY 2006 
NEW SOUTH 
WALES 




















(4  per cent from 
01/03/06) 
1 36936 1 44365 1-1 46127 1 39943 1 40,966 1 39730 1 35925 1 37652 
2 40259 2 47962 1-2 47441 2 41078 2 42,586 2 42241 2 38340 2 41647 
3 42943 3 50351 1-3 48793 3 42455 3 45,575 3 45380 3 40925 3 44539 
4 45167 4 52759 1-4 20184 4 43916 4 48,563 4 47654 4 42235 4 47656 
5 47621 5 55158 1-5 53085 1 45145 5 51,552 5 49930 5 43543 5 50992 
6 50072 6 58154 1-6 54598 2 47647 6 54,541 6 52207 6 44850 6 54561 
7 52527 7 61151 1-7 56154 3 50141 7 57,529 7 54483 7 47159 7 58382 
8 54983 8 64150 1-8 57755 4 52643 8 60,518 8 56758 8 49591 8 62468 
9 57435 9 69007 1-9 59401 5 55153 9  9 59034 9 52143 9 66839 
10 59888   1-10 61539 1 57243 10  10 61231 10 54831   
11 62341   1-11 63447 2 59345 11  AST 63272 11 57652   
12 64798   1-12 65414 3 61432 12    12 60618  
13 69334   2-1 65414 4 63645 13    13 64854  
    2-2 66467 LT/AST1 2805        




TEACHERS SALARY SCALE – INDEPENDENT SCHOOLS – JULY 2006 
NSW 
2  per cent from 
1/7/06 
ACT 











2  per cent 1/7/05 
NT 
ESSINGTON 
SCHOOL (TERM 1 
2005) 
1 39445 1 46883 1 35444 1 40042 1 38500 1 37086 1 40467  
2 42006 2 49923 2 36544 2 41154 2 39593 2 38258 2 42918 1 40019 
3 44801 3 52412 3 37644 3 42513 3 40918 3 39459 3 45982 2 42798 
4 47125 4 55259 4 39144 4 43958 4 42335 4 40664 4 48204 3 45794 
5 49684 5 58148 5 40644 1 45158 1 43514 5 41867 5 50428 4 49000 
6 52247 6 62656 6 42040 2 47557 2 45922 6 44017 6 52648 5 52428 
7 54804 7 65427 7 43436 3 50029 3 48325 7 46286 7 54872 6 56100 
8 57367 8 67803 8 44936 4 52526 4 50743 8 48667 8 57093 7 60026 
9 59923 9 71189 9 46436 5 55026 5 53167 9 51178 9 59316 8 64227 
10 62486  10 47936 1 57113 1 55178 10 53812 10 61461 9 67263 
11 65046  11 49436 2 59204 2 57200 11 56581 AST 63453   
12 67609  12 50936 3 61288 3 59214 12 59254     
13 70168   4 63374 4 61348 SCT 59276     
ST1 72386  ST1 66009 LT1 2468       












1 33,743 36,708 
2 35,795 38,937 
3 38,395 41,166 
4 40,561 43,742 
    5 42,166 46,142 
6 44,694 48,200 
7 46,426 50,260 
8 48,520 52,832 
9 51,935 55,661 
10 53,526 57,976 
11 55,741 60,036 
12 57,642 62,610 
13 59,926 65,183 
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APPENDIX 4: CASE STUDIES OF PAY ARRANGEMENTS IN SIX 
INDEPENDENT SCHOOLS 
This Appendix includes specific examples from six independent schools of pay practices 
and/or variants of performance pay.  The independent schools included in this sample 
represent a range of schools in student enrolment numbers, resource base, community 
involvement and socio-economic and metropolitan/rural locations.  Names of the schools 
have been changed.  The school principal has approved each report.  
 
Rewarding excellent classroom teaching was an important issue for all these principals. Most 
felt restricted by the funding available and would like to be able to include more performance 
pay in their salary schemes. Methods of selecting or identifying teachers for extra rewards or 
bonuses varied.  
 
Five of the six schools are directly recognising perceived excellent classroom teaching 
performance in the form of differential placement on a salary scale or within a range of levels, 
or by paying a bonus of some kind. One school is recognising perceived excellent classroom 
teaching performance in the form of access to outstanding professional development 
opportunities rather than monetary reward. Performance pay at each of the schools was, to 
different extents, confidential in some respects and was ultimately at the discretion of the 
principal, usually acting in consultation with other key staff.  
 
1. Davidsonian Grammar School 
Davidsonian Grammar School is a primary to Year 12 school in a large regional town. The 
school has an enrolment of about 900 students and a teaching staff of 80. The school is in a 
federal electorate that has one of the lowest per capita incomes in Australia. The school 
opened as a new school several years ago with many staff and students from a recently closed 
school, but with a new leadership.  
 
Teachers at this school sometimes receive a level of performance pay in the form of end of 
year bonuses for exemplary performance. These teachers are selected by a panel (panel 
members not eligible) that takes into account its own knowledge of the staff and nominations 
from other staff.  The bonus is an annual 2000 award (taken as travel entitlements for personal 
pleasure) for two teachers at the school. While the Principal said that staff members 
appreciate both the recognition and reward in the bonus, he also described it as ‘only sops, 
quite frankly’, particularly in comparison to performance pay systems in other professions.  
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The principal of this school would like to be able to recognise and reward the school’s most 
exemplary teachers with a structured form of performance pay.  ‘I would like to be able to say 
to my best teachers: Don’t go into middle management, stay in the classroom.’  He sees two 
major impediments to the introduction of a performance pay system: first, teachers have been 
‘very resistant to the idea of disparities of salary based on performance; second, budgetary 
considerations are a major impediment to the introduction of a meaningful system of 
performance pay’. 
 
Student surveys of teacher performance are widely used at this school, and while staff were 
‘horrified at first’, the feedback from staff in this respect is now positive, especially as most 
staff receive positive ‘reviews’. The Principal would use both student and staff input in 
selecting outstanding teachers. He does not feel that ‘egalitarianism’ is appropriate in pay 
scales for the [teaching] profession. 
 
Budgetary considerations would probably be the major impediment to introducing 
performance pay at this school. ‘My hands are tied by salaries and awards and by the fees set 
by the [school] accountants.’ He believes that this would be the case at most independent 
schools, which ‘basically keep pace with government pay scales or pay a few hundred dollars 
above these scales’. He commented that at one stage there were two steps available above the 
incremental salary scale for those with extra responsibilities, but these have now been 
subsumed at some independent schools into the incremental scale – ‘a de facto increment’. 
The Principal thinks that schools have basically put the issue of performance pay ‘into the too 
hard basket…I don’t know of any school that has a meaningful performance pay/bonus 
system’. 
 
If this Principal were able to develop a performance pay system free of budgetary constraints, 
he would have different grades of rewards, with many teachers receiving an extra 2 per cent 
on an annual basis. There would be an extra payment (5 per cent) for competent performers in 
hard to staff areas simply because of scarcity, and a 10 per cent to 15 per cent extra payment 
for very strong performers in hard to staff [curriculum] areas. This would be an extra 
incentive to retain their services and reward their excellence. For very strong performers in 
any area there would be a 10 per cent extra payment. The Principal estimated that there would 
be about six to ten teachers from this staff of 80 in the last two categories.  
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2. Dunnellen College 
Dunnellen College is a primary to Year 12 school in a ‘leafy suburb’ of a capital city. The 
school has an enrolment of about 550 students and a teaching staff of about 60.  
 
The Principal of this school supports the concept of performance pay as recognition and 
reward for exemplary teachers, and says the school has been using a system of performance 
pay for a number of years. In order to have some flexibility in salaries, the school pays above 
the independent schools’ Award rate. This means that a teacher’s salary above the annual 
award scale can range between zero and 8 per cent. If there were to be no increment, a 
teacher’s salary would still be above the independent schools’ Award, but below the 
government Award. In practice, most teachers would be being paid between 0 per cent and 5 
per cent above the government Award. It would be unusual for a teacher not to be given an 
increment, but the increment could be withheld if performance were not deemed adequate. A 
teacher at the top of the scale could earn up to 4000 or 5000 above the top of the government 
incremental scale in recognition of outstanding performance.  
 
The school pays cash bonuses of between 1000 and 3000 at the end of the year to teachers 
who have performed ‘above and beyond’ normal duties by, for instance, running a particular 
program. Incentive awards such as ‘vouchers for a weekend away’ are also given. 
 
Salary and bonus levels based on performance are confidential to each teacher. Staff receive 
annual letters informing them of their particular increases or bonuses. ‘Otherwise you run the 
risk of people getting their noses out of joint.’ Teachers do nevertheless discuss these matters 
occasionally, although in this Principal’s experience, those with the more substantial increases 
or ‘performance pay’ are the most circumspect in this respect. ‘The ones who tend to talk 
about it are the ones with the standard increase.’ 
 
The Principal would like to differentiate more between teachers and to have a wider system of 
performance pay if the budget were bigger. He would like to increase recognition and rewards 
for ‘outstanding classroom practitioners’ and to pay them a salary commensurate with what 
they would receive if they were promoted to an administrative position. He would also offer 
additional incentive payments to retain exemplary teachers in difficult to staff subject areas 
such as Maths/Science. 
 
This Principal stated, however, that the ‘best and most brilliant Classroom Teachers’ are often 
also the most ambitious and many will eventually want to move into senior management and 
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leadership positions. He believes this would be the case in many instances even if higher 
salaries were paid for outstanding Classroom Teacher performance. He does not see this as 
necessarily detrimental to the profession overall. ‘You need to keep the bigger picture in mind 
and think beyond your own school, to raise overall standards, to have your best people in 
leadership positions in the general system and to encourage people to take on these 
challenging positions.’ 
 
3. Raasay College 
Raasay College is a school in an outer metropolitan area, with over 1400 students and a staff 
of over 120. Employment of staff is covered by the school’s own Certified Agreement, which, 
while based very much on the State’s Independent Schools’ Award, is individual to this 
school. This system has been in place for a number of years. Before a new Agreement is 
finalised, the Principal consults with the state’s independent schools’ association to discuss 
likely developments over the next few years. The Principal and Board like to give improved 
working conditions in advance of the general Award. They try to keep the salary level up to 
2000 ahead of the systemic sectoral awards. The school’s Board of Directors endorses the 
additional 1 per cent in the salary scale because ‘they are aware this premium is necessary [to 
attract quality staff]’. This Principal estimates that pay levels at the school would be in the 
middle of the independent schools’ range. 
 
Progression along the incremental scale is automatic.  The question of withholding an 
increment has never arisen and is in any case precluded by the Agreement. 
 
There is some performance pay at the school with regard to the salaries attached to senior 
positions. These salaries are set by the Principal and relate to matters such as work output. 
These salaries relate to about ten staff; they are not covered by the school Award, but are 
determined by the Principal with regard to the market. In the case, for instance, of a Deputy 
Principal, the salary could be up to $30000 above the top of the scale. These positions all have 
some element of classroom teaching, but do not relate to classroom teaching as such.  
 
There is a further category of Expert Teacher in this school. This category is for Classroom 
Teachers who have no other responsibilities. The criteria are set out clearly for these 
positions, which entail an extra 2000 to 4000 annually. With good performance, progression 
to the Expert Teacher category is ‘pretty much automatic’.  
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Some element of performance pay is also attached to positions of responsibility, with an 
allowance of, on average, about $8000 being paid. The base salary does not vary and the 
Principal has sole responsibility for the payment of these allowances, although others may 
advise. While these allowances do not generally relate directly to classroom teaching 
performance, there may be an occasion when an ‘incentive’ payment may be made in an area 
where it is difficult to retain quality staff. An example would be a highly competent 
Classroom Teacher who was offered a much more highly paid position in industry. In this 
case the Principal had the flexibility to develop a number of specific classroom related 
additional tasks related to the subject area in question, with the teacher invoicing the school 
on a monthly basis as these tasks were accomplished. In this case the additional monthly 
payment averaged at about 1000. The Principal also has the autonomy to accelerate staff on 
the incremental scale. ‘People can jump to positions [on the incremental scale] earlier 
regardless of how long they have been in the service.’ This happens occasionally, including at 
recruitment stage, when a highly competent Classroom Teacher might leave another school, 
or when a staff member is recruited from another profession. 
 
While the incremental scale and Expert Teacher allowances are part of the Agreement, the 
individual placement of staff on these levels is confidential. Other allowances and the 
individuals receiving allowances are published, as is the range of the allowances. The specific 
position and salary amount of an individual within the range of the allowance is also 
confidential. I.e. a Head of House could receive an allowance of anywhere between $7000 
and 9500.  
 
The Principal believes that the staff would generally be supportive of more extensive 
performance pay related to classroom teaching, but there is limited scope for the additional 
costs this would incur. The ‘bucket of funds’ is not unlimited and additional costs incurred 
would need to be recouped through increased fees. If logistical difficulties could be 
overcome, and if funding were available, the Principal would like to see classroom related 
performance pay system in place, with fair and transparent criteria and processes. 
 
4. Alfred Day College 
Alfred Day College is a large private school with several thousand students in a capital city. 
About 500 teachers are employed at the school. All staff are on Australian Workplace 
Agreements (AWAs). Agreed documents about practice are incorporated into the AWAs, 
which cover workload, salary scales and allowances. All contracts are confidential, but the 
range of possible, and in some cases explicit, bonuses is public. Previously, salary scales had 
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been based on historical practice, with a small group of similar independent schools following 
a separate Certified Agreement. The ability to operate as ‘Award Exempt Schools ‘was 
removed legislatively at state level several years ago, at which time the staff of this school 
voted to accept individual contracts. 
 
As in the previous Certified Agreement, under the AWAs, staff members are paid on a scale 
of about 10 per cent to 15 per cent above government school awards, with annual increments 
each year. In terms of salary, teachers “stop moving” once they reached the top of the twelve 
point scale, with the usual entry point being at the fourth level. This is about 10,000 more than 
the corresponding level in Government Schools. It is possible, but would be unusual, for an 
increment to be withheld on the basis of unsatisfactory performance.  
 
There is additional provision for performance pay. The Principal described performance pay 
at the school as ‘both direct and indirect’. Teachers who perform ‘at a very high level’ can be 
accelerated up the incremental scale, ‘reflecting a high level of performance’.  
 
There are also additional roles for outstanding teachers. They can hold various positions of 
responsibility. These can entail a very significant amount of money – a Dean, for instance, 
might earn between 20,000 and 25,000 extra annually. What is of particular interest in this 
arrangement is that the Dean would still have a 75 per cent teaching load. This is a deliberate 
practice. In the words of the Principal, ‘No-one escapes the classroom!’ (The only exemptions 
to the classroom teaching role are for those whose role necessitates constant movement 
between classes or sites.)  
 
The Principal also teaches a class. The continuation of all staff as Classroom Teachers ‘sends 
a strong message to staff – we are all of one profession’. The best Classroom Teachers have a 
leadership role, but the aim is to keep the best practitioners in the classroom – ‘to link 
leadership with practising teachers’. They are ‘involved in significant teaching practice, but 
also receive significant additional salary’. This professional bonus links the leadership aspect 
to practice.  
 
There is a small number of outstanding teachers who do not take a position of responsibility 
by choice. These teachers remain totally in the classroom. The school ‘tries to reward their 
excellence’ by paying an additional salary/bonus of between 3000 and 5000. Expert teachers 
are recommended by Heads of Departments on an annual basis, as a way of retaining their 
enthusiasm and drive. Selection is through an open process with a right of review. 
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In summary, between 3000 and 25000 can be paid to Classroom Teachers (those in the 
classroom for three quarters of their time) over and above the salary scale. About 80 people 
would be receiving a payment in conjunction with a position of responsibility, and about ten 
people would be receiving the smaller Expert Teacher payment. 
 
The Principal describes this school’s salary arrangements as ‘basically a performance pay sort 
of system. It is an extra strong and very collegial staff, all committed to the same profession. 
But you can’t have carte blanche [with regard to salaries and allowances]. Teamwork means 
you need a degree of openness and a framework for the acknowledgment of expertise and 
success. Most teachers are pretty generous about good teaching [and will accept a system of 
performance bonuses] provided they don’t think there are favourites or that special deals will 
be made. If the [performance payment] process is open, just, fair, the profession will buy it. 
This is the fourth year that this school has been using its performance payment system and the 
Principal believes that it has a high degree of acceptance and is not causing division. Welfare 
and staff morale surveys are consistently very positive. 
 
5. Ashley Cooper Grammar School 
Ashley Cooper Grammar School is a primary to Year 12 school in an outer suburb of a capital 
city with an enrolment of over 1000 students and a teaching staff of about 100. The school has 
a certified agreement, but the salary scale is discussed with teaching staff on an annual basis 
and is not incorporated within the agreement. The school is subject to the Independent 
Schools Teachers’ Award but the principal’s view is that the salary component of the award 
has become largely irrelevant because it is so far behind what he regards as market salaries. 
As in the government schools Award in this state, there is a 12 point incremental salary scale, 
with new graduate teachers entering at Level Four and progressing through the scale. The 
beginning level of salary is about 4000 above the government beginning level. There is no 
provision for withholding an increment. When staff are being recruited, an offer may be made 
at 6000 to 7000 above the corresponding level on the government scale. The Principal 
believes that it is probably inevitable at some stage to offer incentive payments for difficult-
to-staff areas, or to attract staff in areas where improvements in educational outcomes may be 
sought. While the salary scale and range of allowances are public, individual contracts within 
the school’s Agreement are confidential. 
 
This school differs from government and many other independent schools in that there is 
provision for accelerated provision through the incremental scale and that this provision is 
regularly applied. In the Principal’s words, ‘where the [government education] Department 
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has the next five years [after entry to the incremental scale at Level Four] in five small steps, 
we have two big steps, enabling teachers to progress after Level Five of the incremental scale 
to the level of ET (in government schools two levels above the top of the twelve point 
incremental scale) in two big steps’.  Teachers performing at a particularly high level can 
advance two steps at once.  There are also 9 levels of allowances available, ranging between 
$1300 and 15,000. 
 
Most of these allowances are paid to Classroom Teachers who also have a position of 
responsibility, but they can also be granted solely for outstanding classroom teaching 
performance. In this case a teacher would be recommended to the Principal by a Head of 
Department who had appraised the teacher’s performance, and the teacher would also have 
been observed by three to four other members of staff. While some documental evidence 
would also be presented, the main criteria for judgment are ‘what we’re seeing and analysis of 
[student] results’. Analysis of results at different levels would involve full consideration of 
context and value added components.  Seventy per cent of teachers at the school would be 
receiving some kind of additional allowance, with 15 per cent of teachers receiving the 
allowance for classroom teaching performance. 
 
Part of the rationale for teachers being able to accelerate through the incremental scale to the 
top of the two post scale levels is a view that teachers may often be at their best during their 
fifth and ninth year of teaching.  Rather than having small salary increases along an 
incremental scale, this arrangement ‘lets them jump’.  
 
As at other schools, performance payment is limited by available funding, with next year’s 
emphasis being on increasing accessibility for students.  An increase in any program [such as 
performance payments] means an increase in fees.  The Principal believes it would be 
beneficial if targeted extra funding were available to reward staff members who are 
performing at a very high level.  
 
6. Donnelly Grammar School 
Donnelly Grammar School is a moderate sized school in a semi-rural area. It has about 800 
students and 160 staff.  The school has its own Agreement, which pays about 4 per cent above 
the government school salary scale.  It has an incremental scale with steps and levels similar 
to those of government schools.  70 per cent to 80  per cent of staff would be at the top of the 
incremental scale. 60 per cent of staff would be receiving a special payment or allowance. 
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Two important funding priorities at this school are maintaining a low student/staff ratio and 
directing money towards the professional development of staff.  
 
Allowances and promotion positions are generally at the discretion of the principal. The 
teachers’ levels of experience, particular skills and the principal’s own observations, 
including classroom teaching observations, are factors in these decisions. The allowances and 
positions are usually attached to certain responsibilities, such as Head of Department, or to 
particular ongoing projects. Allowances and positions are not awarded on an annual or 
cyclical basis, but are ongoing. Once teachers have a particular allowance or position, they 
retain it unless they wish to relinquish the position. Staff know the amounts attached to these 
positions and allowances. There is however, a small group of leadership positions in the 
school, where people receive a special allowance that raises salary levels considerably. The 
salary levels for these positions are confidential. 
 
This school does not pay monetary rewards to teachers for performance by paying bonuses or 
by placing them at different points within a given range of salary levels. It does however 
recognise and reward outstanding performance in the classroom and in general by providing 
access to and paying for first class professional development opportunities both within 
Australia and overseas. Time and money are made available for selected staff each year to 
attend conferences and other special gatherings related to aspects of the school’s curriculum 
or programs. The decisions about which staff will be given these opportunities are made 
annually by principal, based on knowledge of classroom performance and contributions to the 
life of the school. The principal believes that this has been a very effective way of rewarding 
and recognising staff: ‘We are by and large very collegial, with a very supportive learning 
environment.  People who do well are not resented, but are rather supported and encouraged 
by other staff. We try as much as possible not to send just one person, but more than one so 
the learning can be better shared…Teachers have described these trips as ‘life-changing”. The 
exposure has shown them what’s possible.’ 
 
Summary 
A clear impression emerges from the case study schools that there is a strong desire to 
provide greater recognition to teachers who can show evidence of attaining high standards of 
professional performance.  School principals recognise the importance of promoting quality 
teaching through rewarding evidence of enhanced knowledge and skill.  
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This desire manifests itself in a wide range of schemes that vary in quality from school to 
school.  There is no consistent pattern to the definition of highly accomplished teaching or 
methods for assessing performance across schools.  These schools have no recourse to a 
system, as there is in other professions, that provides them with a credible certification that 
teachers have reached high standards of professional knowledge and skill.   
 
Each of these schools is attempting to develop career pathways for highly accomplished 
teachers and teacher leaders.  However, they find it difficult to develop on their own credible 
systems for standards-based performance.  The assessment methods they use do not lead to 
portable qualifications with profession-wide currency.  The case studies indicate that there is a 
need for a profession-wide system for providing an independent, authoritative certification 
service to schools and school systems seeking to provide incentives to teachers to attain high 
standards of professional performance and retain those that do.    
 
